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ABSTRACT
One of the main objectives of deregulating the electric power industry is to introduce
competition in the electricity business and prevent monopolies. The introduction of
deregulation has, however, led to confusions in the areas of transmission network loss
sharing and the responsibility of generation of reactive power. Because, under
deregulation, the business and economic decisions in a power system are made by each
individual vendor/utility in a decentralized manner. Each power producing entity
operates on the principle of profit maximization by optimizing its production cost of
real power, reactive power and the spinning reserve margin.
Two methods have been developed to determine a generator's share of transmission loss
in a deregulated power system. They are: the Incremental Load Flow Approach (ILFA)
and the Marginal Transmission Loss Approach (MTLA). The ILFA employs an
iterative load flow technique. The MTLA finds the transmission loss share of a
generator by utilizing the marginal rate of transmission loss. Both methods are very
straightforward and can be implemented by an electric utility or an Independent System
Operator (ISO) with little difficulty. Results obtained from both approaches agree well.
The details of the two methods along with some numerical examples have been
presented in this thesis.
The profit maximization objectives of any generating entity or an IPP not only depends
on transmission loss allocation but also on the production levels of real power, reactive
power and spinning reserve. A model for profit maximization by a generating entity or
an IPP who is interested to sell both real and reactive power is developed and presented
in this thesis. In many jurisdictions, a power producer has the option for selling spinning
reserve in addition to real and reactive power. A profit maximization model based on
the forecasted market price of real power, reactive power and spimung reserve has been
developed and presented in this thesis. The model would help a producer to decide the
production levels of these three commodities in order to realize the maximum profit.
Zero profit conditions have been considered along with the profit maximization model
ii
to determine the minimum acceptable price vectors of these three commodities. A small
test network and the IEEE 24-Bus Reliability Test System (RTS) have been utilized to
conduct studies and illustrate the concepts with numerical examples.
iii
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Electric utilities have been in business for more than a century. Starting from very small
utilization networks, utilities have become widespread and complex in nature. Power
system networks and utilities have gone through various stages of evolution since then.
But it has been going through some unprecedented business changes over the last few
years.
An electric power system is a composite entity with three main functional zones.
• Generation - generation is the process by which conventional fuels (gas, coal,
nuclear fuel, etc.) or conventional renewable sources of energy (hydraulic energy or
solar energy) are converted into the electric energy.
• Transmission - transmission is the process by which the generated electricity is
delivered in bulk to different local networks through transmission lines from the
generation plants.
• Distribution - distribution is the process of delivering the electric power from the
local networks to the retail consumers/customers.
Operation of a power system is a set of complex activities which not only depend on the
state of existing technology but also on other complex issues like economy, social
advancement, environmental impact and political decisions. These factors, however,
vary from country to country and so do the power system networks and their mode of
operation. Every power generating installation, in general, involves an enormous
amount of investment. That is why, any change in the grid network or its operation
model often raises passionate debates. But, due to the demand of social and
technological advancements the changes in power system networks and their mode of
operation are inevitable. Change and modification in a progressive way are natural
phenomena.
Electric power systems in the early days were developed on the concept of natural
monopoly. Natural Monopoly occurs if the production costs decrease as output grows
larger. If the cost of production vary greatly with the number of firms in an industry,
then fewer frrms will have lower costs than more firms. In the extreme situation, a
single firm may have the lowest cost than all other firms, this condition is known as
natural monopoly [1]. Power system networks and their operation are justified to be
natural monopoly by conventional economic consideration [2]. But researchers proved
that "It is simply not true that monopoly pricing is 'natural' result of a market merely
because firms in the market exhibit decreasing costs and demand is sufficient to support
no more than a single firm" [3]. This research shows the way that government
regulation and state ownership can be substituted by fair competition to assure good
performance and fair pricing to consumers.
Electricity has become an essential energy commodity and millions of equipment and
accessories are being in use worldwide that solely dependent on electric power. Electric
power system networks and their operations are different in different countries. But in
many different parts of the world electric utilities are facing the challenge of
transformation - from a regulated monopoly market to open competitive market.
Although electric power is considered as an energy commodity to be traded in the
market place, there exist a number of technical and economical challenges to be
addressed first for a smooth transition from a regulated to an open market energy
system.
In a monopoly system, only one utility controls all three functions of generation,
transmission and distribution in one designated service area. This service area is
primarily determined by political map and jurisdiction. In some cases, distribution is
divided among two or more electric utilities e.g. city corporation or other private
distribution companies. This conventional set-up is known as vertically integrated
system.
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Over the last two/three decades, technological advancements (e.g. metering,
transmission interconnection, efficient generation etc.) have paved the way for non-
utility generation systems (NUG). The introduction of NUGs has made the generation
function very competitive and started the elimination process of the so-called natural
monopoly in power system industry.
The possibility of a new competitive environment in this century-old regulated electric
power industry has created enthusiasm among the researchers of various fields. The
deregulation of electric power industry involves not only technical challenges but also
various non-technical and economic issues. Along with the power system researchers,
people from economics, finance, risk management and marketing are contributing to the
process of full development of a deregulated power system network that ensure
competition and fair competition.
1.2 POWER SYSTEMS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
The original idea of a monopoly electric system still exists in many countries while
other countries are progressing rapidly towards a fully deregulated system. Deregulation
is based on the principle that all customers equally share the costs and the benefits of
existing, regulated generation units. The customers will benefit from competition and
fair pricing and the producers of electricity will benefit from an efficient operation open
markets.
The nature of existing power systems in different countries, their operation and required
modifications are very complex and cannot be described with a single standard model.
Every country has its own unique characteristics ranging from social to political and
their network systems had evolved based on these factors. Despite all challenges, many
countries in the world have been restructuring their electric utilities under pressing
internal and external influences. Countries ranging from very rich like Canada, United
Kingdom to very less developed like Pakistan, Bangladesh, are restructuring their
electrical grid systems at a different accelerating rate.
The state of California of the United States first introduced a Bill for deregulation of
electric utility in 1996 [4]. The new law in California approved the California Publiq
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Utilities Commission's (CPUC) plan for a state wide Power Exchange (PX) and a
nonprofit, quasi-governmental organization called Independent System Operator (ISO)
to control electrical generation and transmission [5]. Power Exchange prohibited
utilities from contracting for power in advance. Instead, all electricity were required to
be bought and sold by Power Exchange in day-ahead and hour-ahead spot markets. All
generating companies (intended for California market) and distributing utilities were
required to bid prices daily in the PX. The deregulation Bill allowed the PX to ensure
that all utilities pay the same and the highest price offered on any given day. Power
distributors are restricted to a price cap of 6.5 cents per KWHr for charging any
residential consumer, regardless of the price paid for power in the state-managed spot
market [4,6]. The utilities in California still own the transmission network, but they no
longer operate it. Instead, the Independent System Operator (ISO) was given the
responsibility of transmission network operation. But the ISO was not allowed to enter
into contracts for power [7] and the independence of the operator is also uncertain as the
deregulated utilities still own the transmission network [5].
The primary goal of deregulation is to remove or reduce state-control over
electric/energy utilities. The Deregulation Bill did not limit the role of California Public
Utilities Commission in this context and in addition two more controlling organizations
were created (PX and ISO).
In a free market price of any commodity is free to rise and fall based on supply and
demand. Eventually the market settles down to a stable price. If the price of any
commodity is regulated and not allowed to rise with rising demand, the result will be a
severe shortage. So an artificially restricted commodity prices prevent a supply shortage
by leaving some producers out of the market [8]. The elimination of price control would
bring such producers back into the market, increase the market supply share and reduce
the market price. The retail consumers were relatively unharmed by the high price of
electricity in California because of the government-mandated retail price caps. Utilities
like Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison suffered a heavy
financial loss during the crisis period in 2000-2001 due to the restricted price capping
policy of the California Government.
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Not many generating plants, especially hydro, nuclear or fossil fuel-run units, were built
in California in last decade or so, due to various reasons including the existing price
cap. California however promoted the application of wind power as a form of green
energy. Out of the total installed capacity of 53,742 MW, wind power supplies only
1,676 MW of electric power in California [9]. The injection of wind power is not
enough to meet the rapid increase in demand for electric power due to rapid population
growth and increase in power consumption per capita caused by economic/industrial
progress. The California Energy Comnlissioll indicates demand of electric power
increased moderately and steadily by a total of 9% from 1990 to 1999 [10].
Most of the experts suggested that imposing a retail rate cap was primarily responsible
for the power crisis in Califonua [11]. They argued that allowing utilities to enter into
long-term contracts with power producers would have little effect in alleviating this
crisis. They also expressed the view that different proposed remedies such as state
takeover of the industry, the minimal increase in power rates, energy conservation
subsidies, prohibitions of "wasteful" energy use, more vigorous wholesale price
controls, or the adoption of long-term power contracts with generators would make the
situation worse.
Other states in the United States are proceeding with deep caution in deregulating of
their electric power utilities. Pennsylvania, Texas and Ohio are making good progress.
Pennsylvania allowed customers to choose their utility from January 1999. Before
deregulation, retail rate in Pennsylvania was 15 percent higher than anywhere in the
United States. But after deregulation this rate has become 4.4 percent lower than
anywhere in the United States. Unlike California, utilities in Pennsylvania are not
forced to sell their generating capacity and are allowed to enter into long-term
agreements for power supply[12].
Restructuring of electric utilities IS going ahead with different paces in different
provinces of Canada. With the inducement of Alberta's Electric Utilities Act (EUA) on
January 1, 1996, Alberta became the pioneer in deregulating the power industry in
Canada [13]. The Act has been introduced with the goal of introducing a full customer
choice and service and promoting more efficient and competitive energy pricing. This
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would allow producers of electricity to determine their own pricing and investment
policies according to the demands of the marketplace and competitive market forces,
rather than allowing regulatory authorities to determine these policies for power
production. The customers would choose their own retailer of electricity. Edmonton
Power initiated the concept of customers contracting with their utility company as the
flexibility offered by deregulation.
Under the EUA, all generators of power in the province are required to sell their energy
to the Power Pool of Alberta and distributors are required to buy energy from the Pool.
The provincial grid of transmission lines is supervised by an independent authority,
which ensures that power generators and distributors can access the market on fair
terms. Owners of transmission facilities and existing generating units nlust file separate
tariffs (the costs and terms of service) with the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board
(AEUB) for approval. The tariffs are implemented on an interim refundable basis
subject to the results of a public review prior to final approval. Because distributors
must pay a proportionate share of the cost of generating and transmitting electricity,
they will receive a proportionate share of the total refunded amount, depending on their
customer base.
Transmission and distribution systems under the EVA will remain regulated, and
existing distrIbution utilities such as Edmonton Power will continue to provide
connections to customers, and maintain their distribution lines. Starting in 1999, a
limited number of bulk customers in Alberta are allowed to have direct access to the
Power Pool, with customer choice available to the remainder of customers in 2001.
Also starting in 2001, the legislated financial arrangements ("hedges") established under
the Electric Utilities Act, which are currently regulated by the AEUB, will be replaced
by long-term arrangements which ensure fair sharing of costs and benefits. The terms of
these arrangements was set by an Independent Assessment Team and was approved by
the AEVB in 1999. In future the province expects separate generation, transmission and
distribution operations to accommodate new generation and retail operations.
Unfortunately Alberta found itself in a situation similar to California. Power price
skyrocketed as soon as the market opened in January 2001. Alberta did not achieve the
promised goals of deregulation instead went into power shortage from power surplus
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and became dependent on neighbouring provinces for power [14]. Alberta did increase
its generation capacity in last few years.
Ontario is moving with caution after watching Alberta's experience with deregulation.
Government of Ontario opened the energy market for competition in May of 2002 after:
moving back this date several times. The province's hydro electricity sector boasts a
supply reserve. Ontario's power generation with a v81iety of hydro, nuclear and fossil
fuels, would likely to protect it from over-reliance on one form of energy. In the process
of deregulation, Ontario Government breaks down Ontario Hydro into generation,
transmission and distribution utilities.
In Saskatchewan, SaskPower is the only authorized utility to serve the consumers
within the provincial boundary. SaskPower owns and controls the power generating
plants. It has evaluated cost-effective options to add new power supply because of the
growing demand for power in Saskatchewan. As a part of the plan, SaskPower started
purchasing from 210 MW non-utility (NUG) cogeneration managed by Meridian
Cogeneration Project from December 1999 [15]. Although the wholesale market is open
to competing suppliers, SaskPower, a crown corporation, still dominates the retail
market.
The United Kingdom is one of the first nations to privatize its electric utility/industry.
The overall privatization of its electricity industry was initiated shortly after a
conservative government came to power in the United Kingdom in 1979. In July of
1989, the UK Electricity Act of 1989 was signed into law [16]. Under the United
Kingdom's new approach, competition is intended to be the primary means for
disciplining costs, prices, and service. The reform of the electric industry in the United
Kingdom is considered as a success.
Two companies, National Power and PowerGen, controlled 75 to 80 percent of the
United Kingdom's capacity under the original privatization. Nuclear plants, constituting
15 to 20 percent of capacity, continue to be owned by the government. In contrast to
generation, the UK's transmission system is considered a natural monopoly and
controlled by National Grid Company. Twelve regional electricity companies (RECs)
own National Grid Company. Distribution of power is also controlled by these twelve
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RECs. There is no obligation to supply on the part of any entity producing power, or
providing distribution or transmission services.
Under the law, generating companies offer price schedules to supply power half-hourly
from each generating unit for the following day. The pool price is the highest offer price
accepted for dispatch. The offers with prices lower than the pool price receive this
common pool price and the offers with prices higher than the pool price are rejected.
Customer electricity prices declined about 15 percent during the first year of
privatization. Prices were expected to rise as excess capacity was absorbed and indeed
this began to occur after the first year. Subsequently, prices started to increase
significantly. The expectation of rising prices may have stimulated the new capacity
now under construction. Generating entities has planned to build 14 new generating
plants with a capacity to 6,700 MW since 1994.
In South America, Argentina's electricity industry is divided into three sectors:
generation, transmission and distribution [17]. The generation sector is organized on a
competitive basis with independent power producers selling their production to the
Wholesale Electricity Market ("WEM"). The generating entities can also have private
contracts with certain other market participants for selling power. Transmission sector
in Argentina is regulated and operated by different companies. Transmission companies
provide third parties access to the transmission systems they own and are authorized to
charge the generating companies for transmission access. Transmission companies are
not allowed to have their own generating plants and also prohibited from distributing
electricity. Distribution companies are allocated with individual geographical locations
and each company works on monopoly basis for its allocated region. According to the
law, distribution companies are regulated as to their rates for different types ofusers.
Like Power Exchange in California, in Argentina Compania Administradora del
Mercado Mayorista Electrico S.A. ("CAMMESA") sets the price of electricity in a spot
market. Distribution companies and large users buy power from the generating entities
through supply contracts or in the spot market. Large users pay for transmission access
if they buy power directly from generating utilities through contracts. CAMMESA can
dispatch power without any contracts among generation companies and distribution
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companies or large users in some cases. Consequently, a generation company's capacity
may be dispatched to meet power demand of the pool irrespective of its contractual
commitments. If a situation like this arises, the generation company is bound to buy or
sell excess energy from or to the pool at spot prices.
The largest country in South America, Brazil maintains world's largest operational
hydroelectric complex - Itaipu facility on the Parana River whose capacity is 12,600
MW. Brazil has total installed capacity of 65.2 GW (Jan1, 1999) and 87% of it comes
from hydro power. Brazil depends on coal and natural gas for remaining 13% capacity.
In Brazil, the electric power system consists of two major interconnected systems
(South-Southeastern-Central and North-Northeastern) [18] and many small isolated
systems in remote regions. These interconnected systems are separated and
operationally independent. A government controlled holding company, Eletrobras, is
responsible for implenlenting Brazil's electric power policy. The company plans,
finances, coordinates and supervises programs for the construction, expansion and
operation of electric power generation, transmission and distribution systems. Power
generation and transmission are dominated by Eletrobras, while distribution is
predominantly the domain of other companies owned by state and municipal authorities
and a few privately owned utilities. Main transmission lines in Brazil are the property of
Eletrobras subsidiaries and state companies such as Cesp, Cemig and Copel. Although
generation remains mostly under government control and transmission is not considered
for privatization in near future, distribution is mostly in private hands [19].
On its way to full deregulation, Brazil is currently in the process of creating a wholesale
energy market, roughly similar to the system Argentina has had for the past 6 years.
Under such a system, generation, consumption and prices would follow free market
conditions, and would allow for quicker responses to the fluctuations of supply and
demand.
All over the world, individual countries are embracing a form of deregulation for their
energy industry by moving towards a competitive, fair and liberalized market structure.
Asia is also moving gradually towards the opening up of its energy markets influenced
by the European success in deregulation of electric power system utility. World Bank
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and other international financial institute are guiding the developing countries in Asia
and Africa on their way to full open market deregulation [20].
The power industry in Bangladesh has been running on a very old concept of operation
[21,22]. The generation, transmission and most of the distribution is controlled by the
state-owned Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB). BPDB is responsible for
planning, construction and operation of power generation and transmission facilities
throughout Bangladesh and for distribution in urban areas except capital city of Dhaka
and its adjoining areas [21,23].
Due to a high level of distribution system loss in the distribution grid, two other
government agencies have been assigned some of the distribution network
responsibilities. Recently, to overcome this power shortage in Bangladesh, BPDB has
started buying power from a private generating company for the first time in its history.
As part of the reform program, private power policy was approved by the Government
in the month of October,1996. Incentive packages in terms of tax exemption on
imported capital machinery and equipment, spare parts etc. is being offered to the
Independent Power Producers (IPP). The following two distributing agenCIes are
primarily responsible for power distribution along with BPDB:
• Rural Electrification Board (REB): REB, established in 1978, is responsible for
distribution of electricity in rural areas through a system of co-operatives known
as Palli Bidyut Samities (PBS). It purchases power from both BPDB and Dhaka
Electric Supply Authority (DESA) at 33 kv.
• Dhaka Electric Supply Authority (DESA): DESA, established in 1990, is
responsible for distribution of electricity in entire greater Dhaka district (except
rural areas which is under REB) including the metropolitan city of Dhaka. It
purchases power from BPDB at 132 kv.
BPDB sells power to DESA and REB at a cost lower than the average cost of
generation of energy. A separate entity called Power Grid Company of Bangladesh
(PGCB) was created under donor pressure. This will control the transmission network
in Bangladesh which is under control of BPDB now.
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1.3 DEREGULATED ELECTRIC POWER MARKET STRUCTURE
In a conventional system, one utility or company has exclusive right of marketing
electricity in one designated service area. For Example, in Saskatchewan, SaskPower
produces power, carries it using the transmission network and delivers it to the residents
of Saskatchewan. City corporations, in Saskatoon and Regina, act as bulk power
distributors beside SaskPower. The schematic diagram of a conventional system is
shown in Figure 1.1. Since the consumers do not have any choice of their utility, the
market structure is very simple.
Power
Producers
Transmission Networkt-----------------~r_ Consumers
Figure 1.1: Schematic diagram of conventional power system network.
Deregulation is a dynamic concept and bringing radical changes in power system area.
The primary objective of a deregulated system is to provide customers their choices of
utilities. Customers would be able to choose suitable utility (or power provider) from
competing utilities based on electricity rate, service or even environmental
considerations. Consumer choice and changing role of electricity industry in the market
place have created new challenges.
Any electric power generating utility or independent power producer (IPP) would be
allowed to enter into a bilateral contract with any customer in a deregulated power
system. Allowing generators or IPP to contract directly with customers creates
competition on both sides of the transaction. Generators compete among themselves to
supply customers. This gives customers a full range of choice of generators. Generators
may charge any price the market will bear and may choose to compete not only by price
but by contract duration, payment terms, type of generation and type of electric service.
Thus, bilateral contracts will provide a wide range of choices to meet various customer
needs.
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Under bilateral contracts, which are usually long tenn in nature, the IPPs will be less
affected by market fluctuations. But they might lose also in case of high energy
demand. Using accurate load forecasting the IPPs can shield their interest in volatile
situations. The demand for energy may vary in a different ways in deregulated
environment than it varies now in a regulated network. In addition to the seasonal
effects there would be effects ofenergy price, new-coming IPPs on the energy demand.
Under deregulation, transmission lines will be controlled by an Independent System
Operator (ISO) or any neutral organization that would provide equal access right to all
interested generating utilities. Unlike in the monopoly system, generation utilities will
no longer have ownership or control of transmission and/or distribution facilities. The
role of generating utilities would be restricted to selling power only. They can sell their
power through bilateral contracts or power pool. Transmission service would still be
regulated in order to provide fair treatment to all.
In a deregulated environment, various generation utilities would compete with each
other for selling their product. They would sell their power directly to the contracted
consumers or they can bid for selling power at the day ahead, hour ahead or spot market
operated by a power pool. This power would be carried over the transmission network
which is controlled, maintained, and repaired by a designated authority.
Large customers are very attractive to suppliers, because large amounts of energy can
be sold in one place. Due to economy of scale, this makes it possible to deliver
electricity at a lower per unit cost and it means the generation utility can charge a lower
price and still make a profit. In rural areas, the scenario could be different because costs
in serving areas of low population density are already much higher. The end result
could be that large consumers in urban areas pay lower prices, while residential and
rural consumers see a significant increase in their electricity bills.
Small customers like rural or the residential customers might suffer because of the
deregulation unless their rates are somehow protected. The large customers will have
the advantage of bargaining power because of their large demand. But to avoid this kind
of situation, small customers may fonn cooperatives. These cooperatives can buy power
from the utilities or to take more advantage they can contract with the load aggregators.
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Load aggregators will be municipal or private entities that organize customers. The load
aggregators will negotiate with the generating utilities in order to obtain better contracts
on behalfof their clients.
The future energy market is still unpredictable and it has various options to grow in
order to overcome the challenges of deregulation. The future energy market, when it
takes a definite shape, might provide guidelines to the unsolved challenges. The
cOlnbination of bilateral contracts, day ahead and hour ahead market or spot market
would make the future energy market a complex entity than the present day vertically
integrated monopoly market. The big industrial consumers, municipalities, load
aggregators would compete with each other to have the best prices. The choice of green
energy would also play an important role in this sector.
1.4 INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR
In a monopoly system, a utility is responsible for delivering power to the customer and
for maintaining the system security. The Load Dispatch Centre determines the load
planning, scheduling and dispatching without violating the system constraints and
system security.
In a deregulated system, an Independent System Operator or ISO will play the role of a
supervisor for system planning and security. An ISO should perform the following
duties [24]:
• Planning services
• Power market administration services
• Operations planning (scheduling) services
• Real-time operations (dispatch) services
• Metering, settlement and billing services
• Open information communication services
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Figure 1.2: Schematic diagram deregulated power system network with an ISO.
An ISO will perform maintenance work of transmission lines on a regular basis,
perform load forecast, forecast load increase in future and study the possible expansion
of transmission network. It will conduct the energy auction and provide information
(energy price, type of generation, type of service etc.) to all involved parties. It would
schedule and dispatch load so that the system security is maintained. In case of
congestion, it would figure out customer priority based on pre-determined criterion and
cut-off power of the least priority customer to avoid major disaster and improve system
security. An ISO will also work as a spot market for instant selling and buying of
power. It would keep track of all transactions and calculate the transmission usage for
each generator or IPP.
Transmission loss occurs in a system as a result of power flows through its transmission
network. An ISO in a deregulated system is responsible for allocation and management
of transmissiollloss. It buys power from spot market to make up for transmission loss.
Two different types of transactions are playing imortant role in deregulated systems.
They are:
• Bilateral contracts
• Power pool
1.4.1 BILATERAL CONTRACTS
Generating utilities and customers may enter into bilateral contracts to avoid market
volatility. The seller arranges the transportation of the contracted power over the
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transmission network. These are individual contracts and would not affect any other
contract which are already in place. The concept of bilateral contracts allows the
custonlers and generating plants to work according to their policy and does not make
them dependent on everyday bid like in a power pool system. The price fixation and
other services and particulars of the contract would be determined by the two parties
involved in the contract. This would give them more liberty and flexibility of choice.
This concept also clearly indicates whether any new transmission line should be built.
Bilateral contracts enable customers to make their best price deals for generation supply
with whoever in the competitive market is most effective to meet their load demand.
Allowing power producers to contract directly with customers, marketers, or retailers
creates competition on both sides of the transaction. Generators compete among
themselves to supply this demand. This gives customers and their representatives a full
range of choices among generators. Generators may charge any price the market will
bear and may choose to compete not only by price but by contract duration, payment
terms, type of generation and type of electric service. Thus, bilateral contracts will
provide a wide range ofchoices to meet various customer needs.
Customers in bilateral contracts, on other hand, have broad choices of various types of
suppliers. Large customers can deal with a power producer directly or purchase power
through the marketer, power broker or energy service company. Smaller customers can
form load aggregators and purchase power in a similar way as the large customer. They
can also get help from the energy service companies who can aggregate or sum their
needs and obtain price advantage from volume, timing, load duration and other
characteristics of aggregate load.
1.4.2 POWER POOL
This is the most common form of market at present due to its simple structure~
Generating utilities or IPPs and customers both bid for selling and buying power at the
power pool. A Power pool conducts different types of auction: day ahead market, hour
ahead market, real time market etc to buy power necessary for its customers.
In a pool system, like Edmonton Power Pool and California Power Exchange (PX), both
generating utilities and customers bid for selling and buying electrical power. The
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generating utilities do not have any target for any specific customer rather they bid for
getting access to the grid. A generating utility would be out of the competitive market if
its price is too high and on the other hand a customer would have no power if its offer is
too low. Thus the pool fixes a single price for every hour which is determined by basic
supply demand relationship of economics. All parties involved in the market have equal
right to access the information regarding price and demand. A power pool system uses
the existing economic dispatch procedures.
In addition to the day ahead market and hour ahead market, a power pool also operates
its spot market. A spot market of electricity is somewhat different from other
consumable items. Electric power is generally a non-storable item and must be
consumed as it has been generated [25]. For this reason, a spot market for electric
power should operate ahead of real time. A spot market can operate the bids every 10
minutes, 30 minutes or at any convenient time interval to fulfill the demand in near
future.
In California, the ISO conducts 24 auctions one for each hour one day ahead. IPPs
submit their bid showing the price curves over that time period and customers submit
their bid in similar fashion. The ISO determines the intersection point of the aggregated
demand and supply curves and set the Market Clearing Price (MCP) for every hour.
The ISO is responsible for transmission and dispatch of the contracted energy and
provides information regarding pricing, transmission constraints, line losses, load
distribution etc. to all bidding parties [26,27]. It is accountable for voltage suport,
purchasing of spinning researve and system reliability.
One of the ISO responsibilities is to keep track of all transactions, and calculate the
transmission usage for each generator or IPP. Allocation of transmission losses among
the IPPs is an integral part of this responsibility. An ISO should also determine whether
there exists any counter-flow in the system and if any, the sources of such counter-flow.
The generating utilities (IPPs) in deregulated environment can operate under pool
system or bilateral contracts. Under a pool system, its ISO will post the hourly demand
and possible price structure and the IPP will determine its optimal operating conditions
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based on these facts. The other factors like size and location of the plant, minimum
power production requirement would also have effect on the operation ofthe IPPs.
Bjorgan et al [28] provide a guideline of financial contracts in an open electricity
market. For the policy of selling electricity in a spot market, the effect of future
contracts is evaluated. The authors show economic strategies to be followed in a spot
market for selling and bidding power. Ferrero et al. used game theory for the
determination of electricity price in a power pool [29]. The paper assumes that each
pool participant knows its own operating cost but is unaware of competitor's cost. The
Nash equilibrium point obtains the optimal price decision. Examples are given in the
paper uses two participants that represents an oligopoly situation. C.Silva et al. [30]
points out information suppression in deregulated environment and its effect on power
dispatch. The authors argue that unwillingness to full information disclosure by
competing generating entities leads to inefficient operation of a power system. Using
game theory the paper presents a new mechanism that offers efficient economic load
dispatch in a deregulated network in spite of the misinformation problem. The basic
principle used in this paper can be summarized as - when each company acts in the best
interest of its own, the outcome is efficient.
1.5 TRANSMISSION LOSS ALLOCATION
Allocation of transmission losses is a challenging and contentious issue in a deregulated
system. In recent years, some works have been reported on deregulation and open
access system. H.H.Happ introduces some methodologies for calculating cost of power
wheeling [31]. Prior to deregulation wheeling and its associated challenges were
dominating in the power sector. In addition to the existing methods for wheeling four
new methodologies are presented in the paper for allocating wheeling costs among a
number of wheels. Strbac et al. [32] have discussed the allocation of transmission loss
by tracing the generator and load contribution to line flows. In an earlier paper Strbac et
al. [33] proposed the method used for tracing the contributions. This method finds the
traceable contributions of each generator and of each load to line flows instead of
marginal contribution. The allocation has been proposed on the basis of maximum
flows in the lines and maximum flow condition in a line has been determined by
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considering different load conditions and contingency. Another proposal has been made
by Bialek [34,35] which used the same principle of proportional sharing at buses with a
different algorithm. It determines the transmission loss by tracing back power flow from
load to generator (upstream algorithm) or from generator to load (downstream
algorithm). Tsukamoto and Iyoda [36] have proposed the use of game theory for solving
the problem of transmission loss allocation. The cost associated with the transmission
network facilities in a decentralized power system has been determined according to
transmission usage pattern. The method utilizes the cooperative game theory that
originally based on the rational behaviour of decision makers and traces the negotiation
process by participating bodies. A generalized mathematical framework has been
defined by Galiana and Hic' [37]. It considers various existing methods of transactions
under open access system and proposes a generalized transaction matrix that takes care
of all these methods. It also shows a solution for the congested conditions in networks.
Transactions are showed in a virtual network and losses have been allotted to each
transaction in some proportion deternlined by the nature of the network and by the type
and level of all transactions. In another paper, Galiana and Phelan [38] show that exact
loss allocation corresponding to an infinitesimal bilateral transaction is always possible.
They developed a set of differential equations using a load contract matrix which yields
the loss allocation for any bilateral contract. The paper shows result using a small
hypothetical power system network and the solution does not include reactive
transmission loss allocations. This paper only considers a deregulated power system
network with bilateral contracts and cannot be applied to a system of hybrid
transactions.
Cheng et al. [39] address different challenges associated with bilateral contracts in a
deregulated power system network. The Authors describe modeling of bilateral
contracts using a transaction matrix. A two-dimensional matrix that includes power
generations and load demands is termed as transaction matrix. The study uses a 3-bus
system to show how to maximize an individual contract or a generator's output using
the transaction matrix. Monte Carlo methods are used for assessing operational risk of
bilateral contracts in a deregulated network in the paper.
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Anderson and Yang [40] offer structure for Use-of-Transmission-System charges in a
deregulated environment. Instead of existing proportional sharing and circuit based
methods this paper proposed a power flow comparison method to determine the use of
transmission system. A 6-bus hypothetical network and IEEE 57-bus network used to
demonstrate the results and compared with results obtained by existing methods. Power
flow comparison method uses load flow to find a generator's contribution by super
imposing the generator on the base load flow case. The difference in line flows obtained
from two load flow studies is attributed to the generator's account. This method goes in
sequence for each generator to calculate its effect on line flow but does not consider the
sequences. Fand and David [41] discussed power dispatch issue in a power network
structure dominated by bilateral and multilateral transmission contracts. A framework
for price-based operation under deregulated structure was developed and a solution to
optimal transmission dispatch is proposed. This paper particularly concentrates on
dispatch curtail challenges with bilateral and multilateral contracts in a power system
network. David also proposed a theoretical basis for coordinating pool and contracted
bilateral dispatches in an open access transmission environment [42]. He also addressed
the congestion management under pool and contracted dispatches. A 5-bus network was
used to demonstrate different strategies for bilateral transactions presented in the paper.
A transmission loss allocation method was proposed by Exposito et al. [43] based on
incremental loss factors [44]. The method presented in this paper modified incremental
loss factor method and is applicable on a nodal basis. The paper shows that incremental
loss factors method allocates some common loss factors to all transactions regardless of
their relative sizes. The authors suggest three alternative schemes in order to allocate the
mutual term to each contract - proportional allocation, quadratic allocation and
geometric allocation. This paper mainly concentrates on fair splitting of the common
loss factors used by one of the existing methods. Reta and Vargas [45] presented a
method to trace the flow of electricity in meshed electrical networks and subsequently
use this method for the calculation of transmission loss allocation. The authors argue
that existing methods for tracing the flow of electricity based on proportional sharing
principle are not physically and economically justified. The proposed method uses load
flow and equivalent linear circuit transformation of the network to trace the flow from
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any generator to any designated load in a network. The procedure described in the
paper determines the current fractions associated with each load and accordingly a
percentage of line losses could be assigned to each load. Theory of active and reactive
loss allocation and branch-power-flow decomposition was proposed by Wu and Chen
[46]. This has been used as the basis for allocating fixed costs and power losses under
electricity deregulation. This paper is also based on proportional sharing and flow
tracing in a network and uses a 4-bus network to demonstrate the obtained results.
Energy Transaction Allocation Factors were introduced by Fradi, Brignone and
Wollenberg [47]. The authors stated that MWs flows must be allocated to each line or
group of lines in proportion to the MWs being transmitted by each transaction. A
methodology was presented to calculate energy transaction allocation factors using
process of integration ofa first derivative function.
The allocation of transmission loss is dependent on market structure. A market could
operate solely on the power pool system or combination of power pool and bilateral
contracts. Different models for transmission loss allocation are possible within a certain
market structure. These models can be developed on different criteria. One of the
criteria is the supply of power due to transmission loss. The transmission loss could be
supplied by the generating unit involved in contract with a customer or by any other
generating unit which is located nearby the contracted load or it can be arranged by the
ISO itself.
1.5.1 DEMAND AND LOSS PROVIDED BY THE SAME GENERATOR
In the M.Sc. work by the author [48], two methods have been developed to deternline a
generator's share of transmission loss in a fully deregulated power system. In the first
method, a modified load flow is utilized to assess transmission losses and the method is
termed as Incremental Load Flow Approach (ILFA). In the ILFA, a load flow solution
is obtained by incrementing a customer load while the other loads are held at their
previous levels. The resulting differential transmission loss is added to the transmission
loss of the generator whose customer load has been incremented. The loads are
incremented in an alternate sequence, in discrete steps, from zero to their respective
levels.
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In the other method, a mathematical model has been developed to determine the
transmission loss that each of the sources is responsible for and the method is termed as
Marginal Transmission Loss Approach (MTLA). The mathematical approach is based
on Kron's [49] transmission loss expression and results in an iterative process. In a
conventional system, total transmission loss is calculated on the basis of real and
reactive power injections at the buses. This makes transmission loss expression a
function of generations. But in a f'ully deregulated system, transmission loss expression
is required to be a function of loads instead of generations. Transmission loss
expression should reflect the effect of bilateral contracts in a network. By utilizing the
MTLA, the transmission loss for each contract in a network can be separated. In the
MTLA, a generator's share of the transmission loss can be found by making an
incremental change in the generator's active power demand, while keeping all other
loads fixed.
1.5.2 LOSS PROVIDED BY DIFFERENT GENERATORSIISO
Every transaction of electricity involves some loss. Loss would increase with an
increase in transportation distance. A custonler may, however, want to buy power from
a remote generator and this decision may be taken because of various considerations
such as encouraging green power and subsidizing remote generating units. But the
contracted generating unit may want to supply the load demand only due to various
limitations e.g. capacity of the plant etc. In this situation the generating plant will
depend on some other generating plants for the supply of transmission loss associated
with the contract. The contracted plant might want a contract with another plant for
supplying the loss occurred due to its contract with the customer. This would be a
trilateral contract.
In another model, the generating utilities and the customers sign bilateral contracts and
the ISO will be responsible for supplying the loss occurred due to all contracts. The ISO
will determine a suitable plant based on location and price of electricity for the loss for
the system. All bilateral parties involved would pay the ISO for their respective
allocated losses.
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1.5.3 CONTRACTED GENERATOR AS A PART OF ECONOMIC LOAD
DISPATCH
Loads in a network follow some patterns and go high and low at different times of a
day. Load forecast predicts the nature of load demands from load patterns and coming
events with a high accuracy. The utilities use this prediction for determining the nunlber
of generating units required to meet the anticipated load, an essential activity of a power
system, generally known as unit commitment.
Unit commitment dictates the number of generating units to be in spinning condition to
meet load demands during the 24 hours. It also states the order of the units to be
engaged in production according to the production cost of the units and starting time of
the units. Production cost varies from unit to unit depending on their working principle.
The production costs of hydro units are far less than those of the gas turbine and thermal
units. It costs much more to produce energy in a gas turbine unit compared to that of a
similar size thermal unit. The starting time of gas turbine and hydro units are much
lower than conventional thermal plants. These two factors, production cost and starting
time, determine the allocation of load among various units. This activity is commonly
known as economic load dispatch.
A generator, in bilateral contract with a customer, is supposed to supply the required
load. The contracted generator, however, may want to include itself in the economic
load dispatch schedule of the power system network that it uses to supply the contracted
load. When a generator becomes a part of the economic load dispatch schedule of the
network, the term bilateral contract apparently does not exist anymore. But from the
customer's point of view, there is nothing to object as long as its load demand is
satisfied. From the Generator's point of view, it would want to be a part of the whole
network, if it proves to be profitable. The producer would pay the utility/ISO for the
increase in total cost due to its inclusion in the system.
1.5.4 COUNTER-FLOW
A system's transmission loss usually goes up when a generator is brought into the
system to supply a load. The introduction of a generating unit however, may actually
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decrease the overall transmission loss depending upon its location in the network. This
flow which opposes the initial flow in a particular transmission line is sometimes
termed as counter-flow. Logically, a generator can contribute to decrease transmission
loss only when there exists an initial flow in the opposite direction by another generator.
Without the initial existing generator there would be no counter-flow in the system.
According to Gerge Gross and Shu Tao [50], 'Some transactions cause flow in the same
directions as the net flow, while others cause flow in the opposite direction. The flow in
the same direction as the net flow is called a dominant flow, while the flow in the
opposite direction is a counter flow. Dominant flows increase the total transmission loss
as the amount of the corresponding transaction is increased. Absent the dominant flow,
the counter flow cannot exist. If the dominant flow disappears, the counter flow itself
becomes dominant flow' .
Counter-flow is considered to be an important cost saving feature to a power system
utility although it is a virtual term in power system analysis. It considers only the
relative magnitudes of flow contributions in a line by the generators in a system. The
concept of counter-flow stems from the relative position of suppliers (generating
utilities) and buyers (loads) and their timing of entering the nlarket with respect to each
other. This relative position and timing make a difference in the overall transmission
loss allocation.
It has been found that the determination of counter-flow depends on the sequence in
which the loads or generators are brought into a system [50]. For example, if there are
three loads, A, B and C, then for computational purposes the sequences in which the
loads can be brought into the system are ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB and CBA
[51,52]. If there is no counter-flow, then all six sequences would result in the same
transmission loss. If there is a counter-flow then the transmission losses resulting from
those sequences will differ from each other. The counter-flow in the system will also be
dependent on the generators and loads' relative position in the system.
In a monopoly system, the effect of counter-flow has been considered only for
transmission loss reduction. But, under deregulated system, counter-flow is of immense
importance in transmission loss allocation among the IPPs. The allocation of
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transmission loss can be changed abruptly depending on the sequence used to determine
it. Since counter-flow would increase the allocated loss of some generators and decrease
the allocated loss of other generators, the choice of a particular sequence could become
a subject of controversy.
1.6 ALLOCATION AND COSTING OF REACTIVE POWER
Power system networks consist of real and reactive elements. Almost in all cases, load
is made up of real and reactive components. A system should not only be capable of
meeting its real power demand but also should meet its reactive power demand.
Reactive power in a system can be controlled by adjusting the excitation of generating
units and also by the use of reactive VAR compensators.
Any flow in a transmission line, real or reactive power, produces losses. The reactive
transmission loss (iX) of the system is usually much higher that the real transmission
(12R) loss, since the system reactance is generally several times the order of resistance.
The reactive power flow in a power system is a major source of system voltage drop.
Any IPP which is in a bilateral contract with a customer, therefore, cannot intend to be
in the business of supplying real power only, but be prepared to provide enough reactive
power to maintain the system voltage to acceptable voltage levels in the system, hence
ensure security and reliability.
If generators cannot provide sufficient reactive power due to operating constraints, the
utility uses alternative methods to meet the reactive power demand of the system. There
are various methods used to supply the needed reactive power in a power system e.g.,
synchronous condensers, over excited generators, static capacitors and static VAR.
1.6.1 ALLOCATION OF REACTIVE POWER
Any generator, which is willing to enter into a bilateral contract with a consumer, would
be required to provide the real and reactive power demand of the customer. The power
flow associated with a bilateral contract like any other power flow would cause
transmission losses, both real and reactive. The allocation of reactive power loss
associated with a bilateral contract can be easily calculated using one of the methods
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[48] developed along with the allocation of the real power loss. In practice, a contracted
generator may not be able to provide the required reactive load and the allocated
reactive loss either due to its own limited capacity or system constraints. In situation
like these a contracted generator will depend on other generators or the ISO for the
supply of required reactive power at a cost premium.
1.6.2 REACTIVE POWER MARKET
In a power system network reactive power is an essential part of it. Reactive power
must be provided to maintain the system bus voltage profile throughout the grid
network. Deregulation process in power industry is creating a market for reactive
power. Previously, some utilities charge power factor penalties to their customers as an
indirect method for recovering the reactive power cost [53]. Researchers have shown
that this practice is not capable ofproviding valid basis for the pricing of reactive power
and it gives wrong price signals to customers, specially in a deregulated power system
network. Li and David [54] have used the marginal cost at different buses to figure out
the wheeling rates of reactive power in a system. Lamont and Fu [55] have reported a
different way for the calculation of reactive power price in a deregulated envirolmlent.
They used the most commonly used capital cost of generators which is normally
provided in terms real power P in $/MW. They converted this cost in terms of reactive
power as follows:
$ / MVA = $ / (MW*pf)
$ / MVAR = $ / (MVA *sinfJ) = $ / (MVA *sin(cos-1(Pj))
Where,
pi= power factor of the generator
()= power factor angle of the generator
Bhattacharya and Zhong [56] addressed the procurement challenge faced by an
Independent System Operator (ISO) in deregulated power markets. A bidding structure
is proposed considering generator's expectation of financial compensation. The paper
suggested a two-tier approach to determine the most favorable contracts for reactive
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power supply for an ISO. Monte Carlo simulation is used in order to incorporate the
uncertainty in reactive power demand. The proposed approach in the paper includes
various constraints to have an optimal reactive power procurement structure for an ISO.
The above-mentioned methods considered reactive power as equivalent to real power
for the sake of electricity spot pricing. But in practice, the concept of reactive power is
far more complicated and hence, has to be handled differently. ISO needs reactive
power in order to maintain sound operation of the grid network. In a pool system, like
California, the ISO determines the reactive power support requirement using load flow
study on a daily basis [57]. A generator in a bilateral contract is responsible for the
supply of reactive power required to meet the contracted load demand. Due to system
constraints a generator in contract may not be able to produce sufficient reactive power.
In this situation it will depend on other generators or IPPs for the fulfillment of reactive
power demand. Other generators or IPPs may take this opportunity to sell reactive
power. However, in order to settle for a price for the reactive power an IPP should know
production cost of the reactive power. Unlike real power, production cost of reactive
power does not depend on fuel cost if the generator is already spinning. Reactive power
production involves variable excitation of a generator. Hence, the related cost of
reactive power is mainly due to the variation in excitation of the machine and in many
cases could be very small. An IPP may decide whether to sell reactive power or stick to
sell of real power only once it knows the production cost of commodities and their
market prices.
1.7 SPINNING RESERVE IN A DEREGULATED SYSTEM
In a power system network, the total installed capacity is usually higher than the peak
system load. The required generating capacity in a power system depends on the
availability of generating units and the load pattern. Any healthy power system must
have additional generating capacity. This additional capacity of the generating units is
required for unplanned or forced outages as well as normal maintenance of units. The
additional capacity of the generators that is spimling that can take additional load is
known as spinning reserve.
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The spinning reserve provides the ability to increase generation output immediately and
automatically in response to any increased load demand or system contingencies. The
reserve must be capable of providing power to meet any unforeseen changes in the total
system load. Some services like medical facilities, computer-based operations,
communication area etc. require continuous power supply. When continuity of
operation is required, supply redundancy must be carried throughout the system.
In a conventional power system network, two basic concepts are used to calculate the
required amount of spinning reserve [58]
• Deterministic Approach
• Probabilistic Approach
Deterministic Approach - this approach used fixed amount of generation for spinning
reserve and does not take the probability of failures (of generators, transmission line
etc.) into aCCOlmt. The spinning reserve can found using one of the following methods
• Percentage of system load or operating capacity
• Fixed capacity margin
• Largest contingency
• Any combination of the above methods
There is a wide variation in terms of the methods used by the utilities in North America
for spinning reserve calculation. But the utilities using deterministic approach have one
thing in common, they do not consider the probability of component failure in their
calculation.
Probabilistic Approach - This approach basically uses the stochastic nature of system
components in its assessment of the required spinning reserve.
Although much of the research works on deregulated power system are focused on
transmission access and losses, little has been published on spinning reserve. Very few
works have been reported on this. Tseng et al. [59] have formulated a price-based
adaptive spinning reserve requirements. The authors have applied Lagrangian relaxation
method using game theory and oligopoly to solve the unit commitment. In deregulated
electricity market, spinning reserve is obtained and priced as an ancillary service. The
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ISO has the responsibility for meeting the reserve requirements based on predetermined
operating guidelines. The authors proposed a scheme for obtaining an optimal level of
spinning reserve at or above a minimum requirement. They have shown that the
optimum solution of the Lagrangian relaxation method for unit commitment is actually
a Nash equilibrium. In another paper, Arroyo and Conejo [60] proposed a method that
helps a power generator to optimally determine its involvement in the power pool and
spinning reserve market. They considered Ten-Minute and Thirty-Minute reserve
markets along with regular energy market. Based on the forecasted price their model
helps an IPP to decide the production level of real power and spinning reserve in order
to maximize its profit.
The responsibility for carrying spinning reserve under a deregulated environment
becomes a complex issue too. It is difficult to figure out whose responsibility is it to
carry the reserve and what should be paid for carrying it. In present, some systems like
in California, ISO is responsible for providing the spinning reserve [27]. But without
any monetary interest for the ISO the situation becomes more critical than ideally it is
thought to be.
The two possible scenarios for deregulation can be considered again - pool system and
bilateral contracts. In a pool system an ISO is responsible for spinning reserve. There
would be a number of IPPs in the market place competing each other for selling energy
to the ISO. Some IPPs would try to sell real-time power to the ISO and some would try
to bid for their spinning reserve. They would earn money for providing the spinning
reserve. The decision of the IPPs, whether to sell real-time power or just spin their
generators, would depend on the return of their investment in this sector and expected
price of these commodities. A higher price for spinning reserve would drive most of the
real-time power provider towards the bidding for spinning reserve and vice versa. But
ramp-up time of generators restricts them from bidding their full capacity at the
spinning reserve market. There must be a balance in the demand and price of energy
and number of IPPs acting as real-time power provider and spinning reserve provider.
Ultimately the market would take control and force all IPPS to an equilibrium state. All
IPPs will act in such a way so that their profits are maximized. In the long run
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equilibrium profit of each IPP will become zero. A model has been developed that
would be useful for the IPPs to decide their mode ofoperation.
In a bilateral agreement, an IPP is responsible for providing power to its contracted
customer. The contract could be made in different ways. The customer may want to buy
energy with a high degree of reliability by paying more money or the customer may opt
for a lesser degree of reliability by paying less. The IPP would have to ensure that the
energy is supplied with the pre-specified level of reliability. In order to maintain a pre-
specified level of reliability an IPP may maintain a certain magnitude of spinning
reserve or may buy emergency power from another IPP. An IPP may want its ISO to
maintain the required spinning reserve. The ISO, in this case, would charge the IPP for
spinning reserve as well as for the network access.
In market economy, the price of any product is set by its demand and supply. Under
fully deregulated environment, the energy sector would be dominated by the sanle
principle. In some extreme cases, there might be no existence of spinning reserve, if
spinning a generator proves to be less profitable than selling real-time power. The
customers, who are willing to pay for highly reliable energy, would get a higher priority
as they would be paying more. On the other hand, service to the customers, who are not
willing to pay more or who can endure power outages, might be interrupted more
frequently. The priority would be set on the basis of customers' willingness to pay
which is the principle ofmarket economy.
1.8 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
In light of the changing perspective of the power system networks and their operation,
the followings are investigated as a part of this Ph.D. research.
a) Development of a generalized transmission loss allocation model - it is
desired to develop a generalized transmission loss allocation model which can
be utilized to assess loss allocations in a bilateral contract between a generator
and a customer in a deregulated power system network.
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An energy producing agent or an IPP may explore various options to fulfill its
obligation with respect to transmission loss. The following options would be
explored.
i) Demand and Loss provided by the same generator - a generator may
want to supply its contracted customer load and allocated
transmission loss.
ii) Loss provided by different generators/ISO - a contracted generator
would supply the customer load and buy the required loss from
another generator in the system.
iii) Contracted generator as a part of economic load dispatch - a
contracted generator may want to operate within the economic load
operation to supply its customer load.
iv) Counter-flow - the existence of counter-flow can be determined by
changing the sequence of the loads or generators during the
calculation of transmission loss. However, a change in the sequence
would result a change in the transmission loss allocation. A suitable
method would be developed by the candidate to allocation of
transmission losses in the presence of counter-flows.
b) Reactive power market - In a bilateral contract, a generator is supposed to
provide customer's real and reactive power demand. Due to system constraints it
may not be able to supply the reactive demand of the contracted customer. In
this case, the contracted generator would buy reactive power from another
generator. Hence it is important to find the basis of nlinimum asking price of the
reactive power that a generator would sell to the market or another generator.
This is an optimization problem for a single IPP which is interested to sell both
real and reactive power in market place. A model is intended to develop to solve
this optimization problenl of an IPP.
c) Spinning Reserve Market - An IPP may be interested in selling spinning
reserve as well as real and reactive power. An optimization technique is required
30
to help an IPP to obtain maximum profit from selling the three commodities. A
suitable model would be developed to assist an individual power supplier to
solve this optimization problem.
1.9 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The thesis is organized in seven chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 deal with the background of
deregulation, existing power systems operation in different countries, market structure
and basic concepts of power systems. Power systems in different countries have
adopted different methods for operation and the on-going wave of deregulation is
changing the previous setup. Political situation, environmental pressures, technological
advancements, economical conditions etc. are the significant factors in making decision
for bringing any change in power system operation. Different countries have different
challenges to face and hence operations of power system vary greatly from country to
country. With the implementation of deregulation, energy market scenario is changing.
Market structure is changing too. These issues are briefly discussed in Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 describes transmission losses and its role in power system operation. The
effect of transmission losses is discussed for monopoly and pool operation and bilateral
contracts. AC load flow analysis is described briefly to show how to calculate
transmission losses in power system networks. This chapter also provides the
mathematical basis for the Marginal Transmission Loss Approach.
AC load flow analysis has been utilized to develop one of the proposed methods for
transmission loss allocation. A test system is described which has been used for analysis
in the following chapters. In addition to the test system, the IEEE Reliability Test
System is also used to test and validate the developed methods. Details of the IEEE
Reliability Test System are shown in Appendix-A. The Incremental Load Flow
Approach (ILFA) is presented in Chapter 3 along with numerical examples. Various
load conditions have been considered for the test system and the transmission loss
allocations have been shown in tables as well as plotted in graphs. The test system is
assumed to operate on bilateral contracts only. The IEEE Reliability Test System is
used to show how the developed methods can be applied to assess transmission loss
allocation in a hybrid system ofpower pool and bilateral contracts.
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The loss allocations obtained by the ILFA have been verified by the Marginal
Transmission Loss Approach (MTLA) in Chapter 4. The mathematical formulation of
the MTLA is reported in this chapter. It involves complex mathematical and matrix
manipulations resulting in a set of quadratic equations. This set of quadratic equations
can be used to obtain transmission loss allocation for any bilateral contract between a
generating entity and a customer in a power system network. Load conditions similar to
those discussed in Chapter 3 have been applied for both the test system and the IEEE
Reliability Test System to obtain loss allocations. The loss allocations resulting from
the two methods are compared. This chapter includes graphs of loss allocations for
various load conditions to provide a better view ofthe methods.
In a deregulated environment, a generating entity may have different options for
supplying power to its contracted customer load. It may supply from its own resources
or may become part of an economic load dispatch. A brief description of power system
operation including economic load dispatch is covered in Chapter 5. Cost analysis of
different available choices for a generating plant is shown in this chapter. Counter-flow
is one of the most contentious issues in power system operation especially in a
deregulated environment. Different examples are shown to indicate the existence of
counter-flow in some power system network in Chapter 5. This chapter also shows that
the developed methods for transmission loss allocation, the ILFA and the MTLA, are
capable of taking care of counter-flow in a power system network.
Reactive power supply and its optimal productions are discussed in Chapter 6. A
generator locked in a bilateral contract may not be able or even allowed to provide its
custonler with required demand of reactive power supply. Different technical reasons
may cause it but this situation makes a generating entity dependent on others. Chapter 6
includes a suitable solution to a minimum acceptable price of reactive power
considering opportunity cost for the supplying generator. A composite supply curve for
reactive power from multiple generators of different ratings is also shown in this
chapter. This chapter also includes profit nlaximization model for an IPP based on the
forecasted or expected price of three possible commodities in a power market- real
power, reactive power and spinning reserve. The model would help an IPP to decide the
production levels of these three commodities to realize maximum profit. Zero profit
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conditions are considered along with the profit maximization model to determine the
minimum acceptable price vectors of these three commodities for an IPP. Finally
Chapter 7 reports conclusions brief overview of the work reported in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: TRANSMISSION LOSS IN AN ELECTRIC POWER
SYSTEM
2.1 Transmission Loss
A Transmission network is an electrical highway through which electrical energy flows.
It cOIUlects consumers to the generators or producers of electrical power. Since the
transmission lines are made of physical conductors, loss of electrical power occurs in
the line during its flow and it is quite significant in a large network. Transmission losses
are unavoidable, and therefore, generating units are supposed to supply the losses along
with the loads in a network.
Transnlission loss can be divided into two parts: real and reactive. Real power generated
by a system should be equal to the sum of all its loads and line losses. It is needless to
say that without providing the transmission loss, the system load could not be supplied.
On the other hand, reactive power in a system is required for system voltage stability.
Reactive power loss must be provided for maintaining the required voltage profile in a
network. Unlike real power, reactive power does not have any direct monetary value but
it is an extremely important safety factor in power system security and satisfactory
operation.
Total transmission loss in a system can be calculated in different ways. One of the
popular ways is to utilize Kron's [49] transmission loss formula. This formula is based
on a nmnber of assumptions and calculates transmission loss in terms of generations. In
spite of the assumptions, Kron's formula gives a fairly close result when compared to
the results obtained through more accurate methods. The main advantage of this
formula is that it is a function of generation only, and therefore, can be applied to find
approxinlate transmission loss in a system by knowing the generation of individual
plants of the system.
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Transmission loss can also be calculated using standard AC load flow analysis. AC load
flow analysis is used widely to obtain line flows, bus angles, contingency enumeration,
bus voltages etc. for the smooth operation ofpower system network.
Deregulation in the electric power industry has brought several changes to the way
electricity producers operate and do business. Deregulation allows producers to bid for
the sale of their energy and also allows customers to bid for the purchase of this energy.
In most jurisdictions the bidding process and the resulting energy exchanges take place
in the form of a power pool operation and an independent system operator (ISO)
manages and controls this operation of the power pool. One of the important tasks of an
ISO is to ensure the balance of supply and demand on a real time basis. An ISO fulfills
this objective by buying energy 011 the spot market and it also buys extra energy fron1 a
predetermined supplier or from the spot market to make up for transmission losses.
However, one of the most important aspects of deregulation is that it allows bilateral
contracts between producers and customers.
In a bilateral contract the supplier usually produces enough power to meet its contracted
load and the resulting transmission loss. In the presence ofmultiple bilateral contracts in
a system, the ISO has to allocate the transmission loss to the appropriate parties in a
suitable manner. It is very important to determine the proper allocation of transmission
network loss and the responsible party for supplying this loss in a deregulated power
system network.
2.1.1 Transmission Loss in a Conventional Monopoly System
In a conventional system, a utility or company has the absolute right to market
electricity in a designated service area. For Example, in Saskatchewan, SaskPower
produces power, transmits it using the transmission network and delivers it to the
residents of Saskatchewan. City corporations in Saskatoon and Regina, act as sole
distributors beside SaskPower.
In a monopoly system, transmission loss is the full liability of the utility that has the
sole responsibility of producing and supplying energy in its jurisdiction. An electric
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power utility operates the system under its jurisdiction to minimize the overall operating
cost. This does not necessarily mean transmission loss minimization. A utility may use
low cost generators in order to minimize its total operating cost, but its transmission
loss may not be optimized. In a monopoly system, a utility determines which of its
generator should provide the required transmission loss in the network for an optimal
economic operation.
2.1.2 Transmission Loss in Pool System
A power pool is the most common form of market at present due to its simple nature.
The generating utilities or IPP and customers both bid for buying and selling power at
the power pool. A power pool conducts different types of auctions: day ahead market,
hour ahead market, real time spot-pricing market etc. The generating utilities (lPPs) in a
deregulated environment can operate under a pool system or bilateral contracts. Under
the pool system, the ISO in charge of the pool will post the hourly demand and possible
price structure and the IPP will determine its optimal operating conditions based on
these facts. The other factors like size and location of the generating plant, minimum
power production requirement would also have effect on the operation ofthe IPPs.
In a power pool system, the generating utilities or the IPPs only sell power to the pool
and the ISO administers the system as well as the transmission loss in the system. The
ISO calculates transmission loss and incorporates the cost of supplying this
transmission loss in the full price that it charges to the customer.
2.1.3 Transmission Loss in a System with Bilateral Contracts
In a deregulated power system, any electric power generating utility or independent
power producer (lPP) would be allowed to enter into a bilateral contract with any
customer. Generating utilities and customers contract each other for selling and buying
of power. The seller with the help of the system operator arranges the transportation of
the contratced power over the transmission network.
The transmission loss in a bilateral contract can be handled in two ways; with the direct
participation of the ISO or, without the direct participation of the ISO. In a direct
participation of the ISO, the contracting parties would let the ISO supply the
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transmission loss from a producer of its choice and the parties would share the resulting
cost according to an agreed upon formula. In an indirect participation of the ISO, the
contracting producers would produce enough power to meet its contractual obligation as
well as the resulting transmission loss. The role of the ISO would be to simply transport
the energy from the producer to the customer in exchange of an agreed upon wheeling
fee. An indirect participation of an ISO is assumed in the research work reported in this
thesis.
2.2 Transmission Loss Calculation Using AC Load F'low
It has been stated before that transmission loss can be calculated in different ways. In a
conventional monopoly system AC load flow analysis can be used to determine it.
Kron's transmission loss formula is also used to determine the transmission loss in an
electric power system network. Before explaining the AC load flow analysis a brief
description ofpower system operation is given below.
2.2.1 Power System Operation
A Power system is a composite complex entity. Its three functional areas are generation,
transmission and distribution. The combination of these three functions and their
optimized utilization is the goal of any power system operation. The generation may
consists of different kinds of power plants e.g. thermal, hydro and nuclear. An operating
authority wants to use the available generating units in an optimized and efficient way.
Loads in a network vary during the day and also during various seasons. Efficient
power system utilities take all those factors into consideration and operate for minimal
operating cost.
Loads in a network follow some patterns and go high and low at different times of a
day. Load forecast predicts the nature of load demand from load patterns and coming
events with a high accuracy. The utilities use this prediction for determining the number
of generating units required to meet the anticipated load, an essential activity of a power
system, generally known as unit commitment.
Unit commitment dictates the number of generating units to be in spinning condition to
meet load demands during the 24 hours. It also states the order of the units to be
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engaged in production according to the production cost of the units and starting time of
the units. Production cost varies from unit to unit depending on their age and working
principle. The production cost of hydro units are far less that those of the gas turbines
and thermal units. It costs much more to produce energy in a gas turbine unit compared
to that of a similar size thermal unit. The starting times of gas turbines and hydro units
are much lower than conventional thermal plants. These two factors, production cost
and starting time, determine the allocation of load among various units. This activity is
commonly known as Load Dispatch.
Once a load dispatching schedule is prepared, the feasibility of the schedule is checked
with the help of an AC load flow analysis. An AC load flow analysis usually provides
bus voltages, line flows and active reactive power mismatch.
2.2.2 AC Load Flow Technique
Load flow analyses are essential to the operation and study of a power system. In fact,
load flow forms the heart of power system analysis. Load flow analysis plays a key role
in the planning or expansions of transmission and generation facilities.
In general, a load flow analysis solves for unknown bus voltages and unspecified
generation and finally for the complex power flow in the network components for a
given power system network, with known loads and some set of specifications or
restrictions on power generations and voltages. The losses in individual components and
in the total network as a whole are usually calculated. The system is checked for
component overloads and voltage outside allowable tolerance band.
Basically, two methods are widely used for load flow analyses. They are: Gauss-Seidal
and Newton-Raphson methods. Both methods need certain input parameters for
performing an analysis. The Newton-Raphson method is widely accepted in the power
industry and is used in this work. Y-bus or Z-bus is required to be calculated before
proceeding for a solution. Buses in a network are divided into three categories: swing
bus, generator or PV bus and load or PQ bus. Each bus is associated with four
parameters: voltage magnitude, phase angle and real and reactive powers.
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Swing bus - it is a generator bus whose voltage and angle have been specified. The real
and reactive power generations are to be calculated.
Generator bus - the bus voltage and real power generated have to be specified and the
reactive power and the bus angle are to be determined.
Load bus - the bus where a load is connected and the real and reactive magnitude of the
load are known. The bus voltage and angle have to be determined.
Either of the load flow techniques actually solves a set of simultaneous algebraic
equations in an iterative way. Newton-Raphson method is widely used for load flow
analysis for its inherent simplicity of fast convergence rate. The following simultaneous
equations are required for the solution of a load flow by Newton-Raphson method. At
Bus k,
N
Pk = I Vk VnYkn cos(ekn + £5n - £5k )
n=l
N
Qk =-I Vk VnYkn sin(ekn + £5n - £5k )
n=l
Where,
Pk = real power at bus k
Qk = reactive power at bus k
Vk = rms voltage at bus k
Vn = rms voltage at bus n
Ykn = element of bus admittance matrix between buses k and n
8Jm = angle associated with Ykn
8Jc = bus angle ofbus k in radians
(2.1)
(2.2)
The method starts with some initial values for the specified parameters, P and Q for
every bus except the swing bus. Estimated values of V and £5 for each bus except the
swing bus, for which they are known, are used to calculate the same parameters. The
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mismatch in power calculation originating from specified and calculated values are
determined for each bus.
M, (0) =~ _~ (0)
k ks kc
where the subscripts s and c mean specified and calculated values respectively and the
superscript represents the iteration number. In the next step the Jacobian (J) is
determined
8~ 8~ 8~ 8~
8°1 80N_1 8~ 8VN_1
8PN-l 8PN-1 8PN-1 8PN-1
J= 8°1
80N_1 8~ 8VN_1
8Ql 8Ql 8Ql 8Ql
801 80N_1 8V1 8VN_1
8QN-l 8QN-l 8QN-l 8QN-l
801 80N_1 8~ 8VN_1
8~ 8~ 8~ 8~
8°1 80N_1 8~ 8VN_1
M,(O) ~O (0)
1 1
8PN-1 8PN-1 8PN-1 8PN-1
M N-1
(0) 801 80N_1 8~ 8VN_1 ~8N-l (0)
= (2.3)~Ql (0) 8Ql 8Ql 8Ql 8Ql ~V;(O)1
881 88N_1 8~ 8VN_1
~QN-l (0) ~VN-l(0)
8QN-l 8QN-l 8QN-l 8QN-l
881 88N_1 8~ 8VN_1
Equation (2.3) can be written as
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or
where (J) is the inverse of the Jacobian Matrix
Equation (2.3) is solved by inverting the Jacobian (.1) and errors in voltages and angles
are calculated. New values of V and 8 are estimated by subtracting these errors from
respective previous values. These new voltages and angles are then used to calculate
new bus powers using Equations (2.1) and (2.2). This process is repeated until the
mismatch at each bus comes down within a tolerable limit. The Kirchhoffs law, the
algebraic sum of all flows at a bus must be zero, should be satisfied by any load flow
solution and can be used as a convergence constraint.
2.2.3 Example of Load Flow Analysis
A small network is shown in Figure 2.1 to illustrate the load flow analysis. Bus 1, 2 and
3 are defined as swing bus, generator bus and load bus respectively. Line and generator
parameters are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The base values are 100 MVA and 138 kV.
Generator A
Bus1-T-..........r-- Line 1
Generator B
---r-"&"""'r-- Bus 2
Load
Fig.2.1 : A small power system network.
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Table 2.1: Line parameters for the system shown in Figure 2.1.
Line Number From To Bus Length Resistance Reactance
Bus (km) p.u.p.u.
1 1 2 80 0.01575 0.07876
2 1 3 50 0.0105 0.05251
3 2 3 100 0.02625 0.13127
Table 2.2: Generating unit characteristics for the system shown in Figure 2.1.
Generating Unit Cost Function Maximum Output Minimum Output
($/hr) (MW) (MW)
Generator A 0.022P12+12.45P1+70 500 90
Generator B 0.024Pl+13.65P2+80 400 40
The real and reactive power demands are 200 MW and 80 MVAR respectively and
supplied by both units.
The simultaneous equations for the system shown in Figure 2.1 are
Since Bus 2 is a generator bus and voltage V2 for this bus has been specified, Equations
(2.4), (2.5) and (2.7) are sufficient for obtaining the solutions of the load flow analysis.
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All Wlspecified voltages and angles are initially estimated as 1 p.u. and zero radian
initially.
Equation (2.3) for the current system stands as:
[ ] [ ]
-1 [ ]
J1.82 19.53 -7.33 -1.46 0.798
J1.83 = -7.33 25.63 5.12 1.998
J1.V3 1.46 -5.12 25.65 0.7902
The errors in initial estimated voltages and angles after the first iteration are
[
J1.82 ] [0.0785]
J1.83 = 0.0915
J1.V3 0.0446
The errors in voltages and angles are subtracted from their initial estimates to get a new
set of estimated values. The new estimated values are:
[
82 ] [- 0.0785]
83 = -0.0915
V3 0.9554
In the next iteration Equation (2.3) stands as:
[
J1.82 ] [19.32 - 6.86 -1.94 ]_1 [ 0.022]
J1.83 = -7.08 24.09 6.57 - 0.103
J1.V3 0.89 - 2.91 23.74 - 0.094
The error matrix becomes:
[
J1.82 ] _ [- 0.0004]
J1.83 - - 0.0032
J1.V3 - 0.0043
The new estimated values are:
[
82 ] _ [- 0.0781]83 - -0.0883
V3 0.9511
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This process continues unless the errors come down within a pre-specified tolerable
limit. The solutions of the AC load flow analysis are shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
2 1. F·hI· £ ha e . . oa ow so utlon or t e system s own In 19ure ..
Bus Type Bus Voltage Phase Real Reactive Real Reactive
Angle Generation Generation Load Loadp.u.
degrees p.u. p.u. p.u. p.u.
Swing 1 1.0 0.0 1.2391 0.7493 0.0 0.0
Generator 2 1.0 0.7222 0.8 0.2463 0.0 0.0
Load 3 0.95 -3.9598 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.8
T bl 2 3 AC I d fl
Table 2.4: Line flows in the network shown in Figure 2.1.
Line From To Real Power Reactive Power
Bus Bus p.u. p.u.
1 1 2 -0.1537 0.0317
2 1 0.1541 -0.0298
2 1 3 1.3928 0.7175
3 1 -1.367 -0.5886
3 2 3 0.6459 0.2761
3 2 -0.633 -0.2114
The system shown in Figure 2.1 is small and Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the typical format
of load flow outputs which include bus voltages, angles, generation and line flows.
Generator A connected to the swing bus is supplying (1.2391 + jO.7493 p.u.), a major
portion of the demand, while generator B is providing 0.8 + jO.2463 p.u. to meet the
load. The voltage at Bus 3 is 0.95 p.u. because of the load connected to it. This voltage
can be enhanced by connecting a tap-changing transformer to this bus. Table 2.4 shows
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the line flows. It is found from Table 2.4 that line 2 is carrying the maximum power
(1.3928 + jO.7175 p.u.) because of the system configuration. Although Buses 1 and 2
have the same voltage magnitude, a small amount of power flows from bus 2 to bus 1
due to a difference between their bus angles.
2.2.4 Transmission Loss Calculation from Load Flow
A load flow analysis can be utilized to determine total transmission loss in a system as
well as losses in individual components Le., in transformers or transmission lines. A
load flow analysis provides real and reactive powers at different buses. Total
transmission loss can be calculated easily from the algebraic sum of powers at all buses.
Loss in an individual line can be determined by power calculation at two buses that are
connected by the particular line. The difference between the line flows at the two ends
of a single line indicates the transmission loss in that line. For example, 1.3928 p.u. real
power flows from Bus 1 to 3 and 1.367 p.u. real power flows from bus 3 to 1. The
difference between these two flows, 0.0258 p.u., represents the line loss in line 1. Total
real and reactive line losses are 0.0391 p.u. and 0.1956 p.u. respectively for the system
shown in Figure 2.1.
The loss calculation by load flow is more accurate than any other method.
2.3 Transmission Loss Calculation
Kron published his very famous transmission loss formula in 1952 based on general
transnlission loss formula [49]. It is an approximate transmission loss formula as a
function of generations in a power system network. This loss formula is simple and
calculates transmission loss directly without any iteration. General transmission loss
formula has been used as the basis for the generalized Marginal Transmission Loss
Approach reported in this thesis.
2.3.1 Transmission Loss Expression
Mathematically, transmission loss is the sum of complex powers injected at all buses in
a network.
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or,
where,
S/= total complex power loss
p/= total real power loss
Q/ = total reactive power loss
S; = complex power at bus i
Vi = voltage at bus i and
1*; = complex conjugate ofbus current at bus i.
Equation (2.8a) can be written as
where,
[VB] = [ZB] [IB]
[ZB] = [R]+ [jX]
[IB ] = [Ip ]+ [jIq ]
[ZB] = bus impedance matrix of the system
[R], [.X] = real and reactive components of the bus impedance matrix
[IB] = bus current matrix
[Ip ], [Iq]= real and reactive components of the bus current matrix
Replacing VB and IB by their real and imaginary parts, Equation (2.8b) becomes:
S/ = [IBY [ZBY [IB]*
= ([Ip ] + [jIq ] Y([R] + [jX]) ([Ip ] + [jIq ] )*
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(2.8a)
(2.8b)
After separating the real and imaginary parts
and
At any bus i the following relationship holds
where,
v. = v. (cos O. + J. sin O. )
I I \: I I
V; = voltage at bus i
Ii = bus current at bus i
Equation (2.11) can be written as
Equating the real and imaginary parts of Equation (2.12)
Q; = V;Ip; sin 0; - V;Iq; cos 0;
Solving Equations (2.13) and (2.14) for Ipi and Iqi
I . = P; coso; + Q; sino;
pi V.
I
I . = P; sino; - Q; coso;
ql V.
I
or in vector form
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(2.9)
(2.1 0)
(2.11)
(2.12)
(2.13)
(2.14)
lIpJ= [C][p] + [D][Q]
lIqJ= [D][P]- [C][Q]
where,
[c]= diagonal matrix with elements(cos~)
[D] =diagonal matrix with elements( sin~ )
Now Equation (2.9), for the real part of the transmission loss, becomes
(2.15)
(2.16)
~ = [IpT [R][Ip]+ [IqT [R][Iq]
=([C][P]+ [D][Q]Y[R]( [C][p] + [D][Q])+ ([D][P]- [C][Q])T[R]( [D][P] + [C][Q])
or,
~ = [PYQCY[R][C]+ [DY[R][D])[P]- [PY([DY[R][C]+ [CY[R][D])[Q]
+ [QY ([DY [R][C]- [CY[R][D])[P]+ [QYQCY[R][C]+ [DY[R][D])[Q]
which can be written in matrix form as:
where,
[Ap]= [CY[R][C]+ [Dy[R][D]
[Bp]= [DY[R][C]-[CY[R][D]
and
(2.17)
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C1 o 0... 0 'il 'i2 r1n C1 o 0... 0
[CY[R][C] = 0 C2 O.•. 0 r21 r22 r2n 0 C2 O... 0
0 o 0... Cn rn1 rn2 ... rnn 0 o 0... Cn
=
The elements of [Ap ] are
apij =cirijc j +d;rijdj
cos 8; cos8j sin8i sin8j
= r·· + rijV; Vj lJ V; Vj
r. ( )
=-lJ-cos8.-8.V. V. I J
I J
Sinlilarly,
Equation (2.1 7) becomes
Again at any bus the following can be written
where,
PGi = power generation at bus i
PDi = power demand at bus i
Similar relation also holds for the reactive part.
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(2.18)
Using this relation, Equation (2.18) can be rewritten as
Pz = ([PGr -[PDr)ApUPG]-[PDD-[PGY -[PDr)Bp([QG]-[QDD
+([QGr - [QDr )Bp([PG]- [PDD+ ([QGr - [QDr )Ap([QG]- [QDD
After expansion Equation (2.19) becomes
(2.19)
Pz =[PGr [Ap!PG]- [PDr [Ap!PG]- [PGr [Ap!PD]+ [PDr [Ap!PD]- [PGY [Bp)QG]
+[PDr [Bp)QG]+ [PGY[Bp)QD]- [PDr [Bp)QD] + [QGr [Bp!PG]- [QDY [Bp!PG]
- [QGr[Bp!PD]+ [QDY [Bp!PD]+ [QGr[Ap)QG]- [QDY[Ap)QG]- [QGr[Ap)QD]
+[QDr [Ap)QD]
(2.20)
This is the standard general transmission loss equation for real power. A similar
expression for reactive power can also be obtained. This expression will be used in
Chapter 4 for the formulation of the Marginal Transmission Loss Approach.
2.4 Role of Transmission Loss in Present and Future Models of Network.
In a monopoly system, transmission loss plays a key role in determining economic
system operation. A utility runs its network for minimum operating cost. A load
dispatch centre (LDC) decides the generation of committed units in a network such that
the production cost is minimized. The cost associated with transmission loss is
distributed and charged to the consumers.
Deregulation of electrical power market has modified the way transmission loss is
treated. The allocation of transmission loss has become a contentious issue. Due to open
access policy in some countries, utilities share a common transmission facility.
Transmission losses occur due to the flow of power for all transactions and it is difficult
to find the component of the loss occurring due to a particular transaction. Some work
has been done to find a generator's contribution to a particular load or to a line flow
[8,11]. Those works use proportional methods for separating the flows in a line and
trace back to generators from loads to find a generator's contribution to load. Although
these methods identify links between sources and sinks, these do not help much in the
case ofa bilateral contract between a seller and a buyer.
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Several countries, that include England, Brazil, Canada and USA, are trying to
implement the concept of deregulation. The existing systems are actually different
combinations of old monopoly and predicted deregulated systems. In a deregulated
world, however, utilities would be facing new competitors that could charge lower
rates. Under deregulation, local utilities would have to allow competitive power
producers to use their transmission lines. A local utility, typically the owner of a
transmission facility, would charge other utilities who would use their transmission
network.
In some regions, power systems are still controlled by single entities (SaskPower) [5].
They can buy power from independent generators. The controlling utility can easily
determine how much power they would buy and the associated transmission loss. The
transmission loss, resulting from the purchase of external power, can be summed up
with the transmission loss occurring due to internal supply.
On their way to deregulation, some systems have introduced the idea of energy pool or
independent system operator (ISO). The energy pool structure is a spot market through
which demands for electricity are met on the basis of hourly price and volume bids by
generators and buyers. The ISO or the pool matches the sellers and the buyers based on
their bidding prices and supervises the overall system security and reliability. The
energy pool keeps record of the transactions and allocates the transnlission loss among
the participating utilities. The challenge faced the power pool and the ISO is how to
allocate the transmission loss and what should be the criterion for charging other
utilities. As no unanimous approach exists, different systems are utilizing different
methods to allocate transmission losses. Some ofthe methods are:
• Embedded cost pricing
• Cost Causation-based pricing
• Usage-based pricing
• Location-specific pricing
• Real-time pricing
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• Congestion pricing
• Opportunity cost pricing
• Market-based pricing
In a deregulated environment, consumers have the choice to buy power from any
generating companies. A consumer could take a decision by comparing the rates and
services provided by different utilities. For the last 100 years, utilities have operated as
sole monopolies, with varying degrees of price fixing and regulation from governments.
In a deregulated environment, consumers could choose an electric company the way
they now choose a long-distance telephone service.
The challenge arises immediately for the allocation of transmission loss among the
competing utilities. As an individual buyer can have a bilateral agreement with any
utility, the loss related to this supply of power should be taken into consideration in
preparing the agreement. The transmission loss originating from a bilateral contract
should be assessed in such a way that the assessment should be viewed as fair and
transparent.
Power systems typically operate under slowly changing dynamic conditions that can be
analyzed using quasi steady state analysis. Moreover, transmission systems operate
under balanced or near-balanced condition allowing per phase analysis to be used with a
high degree of confidence in the solution. These lead to the use of the conventional load
flow technique as a more accurate and valid way of finding transmission network loss.
The proper calculation of transmission loss is very inlportant for deregulated systems.
The main objective of this calculation is to distribute the loss among different utilities in
a fair and equitable manner. Transmission loss is associated with the supply of power to
any load in a system. It is important to know the associated transmission loss required to
provide power to each individual load. This fact requires that, in a deregulated
environment, transmission loss should be calculated in terms of loads, instead of
generations.
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2.5 Deregulated Market Operation
The most common form ofmarket at present is Power Pool due to its simple nature. The
generating utilities or IPP and customers both bid for buying and selling power at the
power pool. Power pool conducts different types of auction: day ahead market, hour
ahead market, real time market etc. Markets in different deregulated power systems is
operated by different organizations, such as Power Pool of Alberta is responsible for
market operation in Alberta, Independent Market Operator (IMO) runs the power
market in Ontario. Similar duties are performed by the ISO in New England and by the
Nordic Power Exchange in Norway. These markets operate on either day-ahead or
hour-ahead market policy.
In a pool system both generating utilities and customers bid for selling and buying
electrical power. The generating utilities do not have any target for any specific
customer rather they bid for getting access to the grid. A generating utility would be out
of the competitive market if its price is too high and on the other hand a customer would
have no power if its offer were too low. Thus the pool fixes a single price for every hour
which is determined by basic supply demand relationship ofeconomics.
2.5.1 Market Clearing Price
The market operators are responsible to maintain a balance between the supply and
demand of power. An electric power system must have sufficient supply of power in
order to meet the customer's requirement. The market operators determine the price of
electricity from the data obtained for supply and demand of power. This is price of
electricity is commonly known as market clearing price. The market clearing price is set
from the supply and demand relation in such a way that all power demands would be
satisfied. The companies who bid higher than the market clearing price will not be able
to sell any power. All companies who bid less than the market clearing price are
considered as successful bidders and will be considered for supplying the demand. All
successful bidders will get paid the market clearing price irrespective of their bidding
prices.
The competition among the suppliers of electric power is the soul of market economy.
If a supplier bids very high price for power and market clearing price is below than its
bid price, then this particular high-bidding supplier will not be included in the load
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dispatch schedule. This fact will force the supplier out of business. The fear of getting
out of business encourages the supplier to bid the most competitive prices in order to
compete for dispatch in the wholesale marketplace.
In Alberta, deregulation is introduced in January 1, 2001 [61]. According to their
policy, electricity is purchased on a centralized basis by the Power Pool of Alberta.
Generators bid on an hourly basis to supply the load demand. The Power Pool of
Alberta determines the market clearing price fronl the supply curve of power and from
the demand of total power. The demand side bidding has not been introduced in
Alberta. Alberta's power demand varies from 4,500 to 8,000 MW. The following figure
shows how the Power Pool of Alberta sets the market clearing price. Figure 2.2 depicts
how energy price is set by Alberta Power pool for any particular hour. Demand in
Figure 2.2 is the total demand of the system and a vertical line represents the demand.
Generators' bids are stacked. The intersection of demand line and the stepped bid curve
determines the market clearing price. Similar graphs are used to set market clearing
price for every hour of a day.
~
Market Clearing Price
_._._._._.l._._._._._._._._._._._.
Supply stacked bid curve I
I
Demand
...
..
PowerinMW
Fig. 2.2: Determination ofmarket clearing price in Alberta Power Pool.
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In Ontario, the IMO sets the limits on upper and lower boundaries of energy price [62].
The generating utilities submit their offer for every hour of a single day. The offer
includes both quantity and price of power. The IMO starting from the lowest offer
stacks up offers in an ascending order until total power supply meets the total demand.
The market clearing price is set in similar way as done in Alberta which is based on the
last accepted offer where it meets the actual load demand. All successful suppliers get
the same price which is the market clearing price.
In New England, market operation is similar to that of Ontario. New England ISO uses
day-ahead-hourly market strategy [63]. Day-ahead-hourly market means that generating
utilities and electricity suppliers separately bid the day before for every hour of the day.
The ISO gathers the bids and stack them from lowest to highest and match the
forecasted load demand for every hour of the day in consideration. The highest bid
offer from the stepped bid curve that meets the power demand sets the market clearing
price for electricity for a particular hour of the day. This is the price that will be paid to
all suppliers.
In Norway, market operation is similar to those of North American markets but in the
Nordic market sellers as well as buyers submit their bids for selling and buying power
respectively. Participants offer their bids for next-day physical delivery of power at
Nord Pool's spot market [64] and hence the market is referred to as day-ahead market.
The market operates on the principle of bidding for selling and buying power of one
hour for 24 hours of the next day. The dead line is noon of everyday for submission of
bidding for the next day. After the dead line is over Nordic Power Exchange collects all
bids and prepares two curves: an aggregate demand curve and an aggregate supply
curve. The market clearing price is determined by the intersection of these two
aggregate supply and demand curves. Figure 2.3 shows supply-demand curve and
market clearing price.
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Filled-price
d.mand
Ma.dmum bid
price
FINed-price
suppi,
Fig. 2.3: Market clearing price in Nordic Power Pool (Courtesy
http://www.nordpool.no/information/reports/nordic market report/chapter 004.html).
2.6 Bilateral Contract Options in Deregulated Power Systems
In a deregulated power system generating utilities and customers may sign contracts for
selling and buying of power in addition to the existence of a power pool. These
contracts would not affect any other contracts which are already in place. The concept
of bilateral contracts allows the customers and generating plants to work according to
their policy and does not make them dependent on the fluctuation of energy market.
Bilateral contracts enable customers to make their best deals for energy supply with
whoever in the competitive market is the most effective to meet their load demands.
Power producers may choose to compete not only by price but also by contract
duration, payment terms, type of generation and type of electric service. The price
fixation and other services and particulars of the contract would be determined by the
two parties involved in the contract. This would give them more liberty and flexibility
of choices.
Any customer can choose any supplier for buying power in a deregulated system.
According to a bilateral contract, a contracted generating unit would be responsible for
supplying power to its contracted customer. The seller arranges the transportation of the
contratced power over a transmission network. Since every eletrical transaction causes
transmission loss, the generating unit should produce enough energy to cover the load
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demand of the customer as well as the associated transmission loss. A generating unit
may however, consider different options for supplying power to its contracted load:
• The power producer may consider to contract the ISO for supplying its
contracted load and associated loss. The power supplying utilities may consider
this option when the market is low. Then it might be cheaper to buy power from
market place and sell it to the contracted customer. A bilateral contract and the
price set in a contract may be influenced by the reliability of power supply. In
the case of a firm supply, the ISO will make sure that the contracted load will be
out of any kind of load curtailment schedule. The ISO nlay curtail load of other
customers but a bilaterally contracted customer will remain connected.
• The power producer may consider to supply the contracted load and ask the ISO
for providing the associated loss. The power producer will pay the ISO for the
energy to make up for the transmission loss according to the market price. The
generator may prefer to supply power to the contracted load by itself when it
does not want to fully rely on the market for buying everyday-power. In addition
the generating plant will have the responsibilty for providing reliable power.
• The power producer may prefer to supply the load and the associated
transmission loss by itself. The power producer in this case would produce
enough power to cover for its contracted load as well as the resulting
transmission loss and utilize the transmission network under the jurisdiction of
an ISO to transport the energy to the contracted load point. The power producer
have to pay the ISO a network access fee for the usage of the transmission
network.
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CHAPTER 3: INCREMENTAL LOAD FLOW APPRAOCH
3.1 Incremental Load Flow Approach
Transmission loss is a function of system configuration and it varies with load and
generation. For a fixed system configuration loss varies with load and generation. The
system configuration of a power system network usually remains unchanged unless
lines are taken out of service due to a fault or maintenance or added. As a result,
transmission loss could be easily determined with the help ofa load flow analysis.
A conventional load flow analysis is performed to obtain quantities like line flows, line
losses, bus voltages and bus angles. It does not however, provide the share of
transmission loss of a particular generator in a system. Some methods have been
reported to find the individual contribution of a load or a generation in the aggregate
[33,34,65]. These methods, too, are based on conventional load flow analyses. These
methods, however, do not validate the concept of deregulation. Those analyses do not
take bilateral contracts between buyers and producers of electrical power into account.
In a deregulated environment, a generator who enters into a bilateral contract would be
responsible for supplying energy to its contracted consumer as well as the loss
associated with the demand. In a typical system there would be a number of bilateral
agreements. A modified load flow analysis, named as the Incremental Load Flow
Approach (ILFA), has been developed to determine the loss associated with an
individual transaction. The technique is explained in the following.
In the ILFA, a load flow program is run for load levels from zero to their given level for
each load under a bilateral contract in a system in a sequential manner. Loads are
increased by a small increment in every iteration. Each generator is assumed to have a
fixed consumer or load in the system and supposed to produce the power to meet the
load demand of its customer and the associated loss. When a certain load is increased by
a pre-specified increment, the corresponding increase in transmission loss is assigned to
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the generator that is in contract with this particular consumer. In other words, the
generator (Generator X), which has a bilateral agreement with a consumer (Consumer
A), would be responsible for the load demand (of Consumer A) and the loss originating
from the contract.
The increased transmission loss for an incren1ental change in a given load is calculated
and is assigned to a corresponding generator who is responsible for supplying the load.
During an iteration, only one load is incremented while other loads are held constant.
3.2 Assumptions in the ILFA
A load flow technique, in general, requires that the power generation for PV buses be
specified. According to the ILFA, the generation of a PV bus should be the sum of its
load and its share of the total line loss. This share would be calculated from the
incremental transmission loss. The loss is unknown prior to the first iteration. To
overcome this difficulty in the first iteration, the associated loss is neglected and the
generation of a PV bus is made equal to load. This would not affect the result as long as
the increment size is kept small.
After the first iteration, the generation at a PV bus can be assigned as the sum of its
discrete incremental load and the respective transmission loss from the previous
iteration. This means that the assigned loss is always lagging behind the actual loss by
one step. The difference would be very small if the step size is kept relatively sn1all.
It has been assumed that each load has a constant reactive to real power ratio. This
reactive ratio, the ratio of reactive to real power, is defined as,
reactivepowerJ.l = ------"'-----
real power
This assumption reduces the complexity of calculations involved in the ILFA. The
reactive ratio would depend on the nature of the load and may vary from customer to
customer.
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3.3 Example System
A small hypothetical system has been considered in this section for the purpose of
numerical examples related to the allocation of transmission loss.
The hypothetical system consists of six buses with two generators and two loads. The
generators and loads represent bulk producers and bulk consumers. The loads and the
generators are connected through five lines. Two tap-changing transformers are
connected on the load sides. The system is shown in Figure 3.1.
Generator A Generator B
Bus 5
Line 4
--r--'--r-Bus 2
Line 5
Line 1Bus 1~-+--
Bus 4
Bus 6
Line 2
CustomerB Customer A
Fig. 3.1: Test system network.
Generators A and B are connected to Buses 1 and 2 respectively. Customers A and B
are connected to Buses 5 and 6 respectively. Two tap changing transformers Tl and T2
are connected between Buses 4 - 6 and 3 - 5 respectively. Under the existing situation,
the total load could be supplied by the combined generation of Generators A and B. But
the goal is to investigate the effect of the condition where each generator is tied to its
own load by virtue of a contract. In a deregulated system, the concept of region does not
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exist and hence the customers are free to choose their own utilities. The objective is to
find the share of transmission loss due to bilateral contracts between generating utilities
and customers. For this purpose it has been assumed that bilateral contracts exist
between Generator A and Customer A and between Generator B and Customer B. As a
result of the contracts, Generator A will supply the load demand of Customer A only,
and Generator B will meet the demand of Customer B. As the generators are obliged to
supply certain amount of loads to their respective customers they are also supposed to
satisfy the associated transmission losses. The unknown at this point is the loss that an
individual generator is responsible for.
The system parameters of the hypothetical system are shown in Tables 3.1 - 3.3. Bus 1
has been considered as the swing bus except in Case 1. The base values are 100 MVA
and 138 kV. The tap changing transformers are set at nominal setting of 1 initially.
Table 3.1: Line parameters.
Line From Bus To Bus Length Resistance Reactance
Nwnber km (p.u.) (p.u.)
1 1 2 80 0.0157 0.0787
2 1 4 50 0.0105 0.0525
3 1 3 120 0.0367 0.1837
4 2 3 50 0.0105 0.0525
5 3 4 100 0.0262 0.1312
Table 3.2: Transformer data.
Transformer From To Resistance Reactance
Number Bus Bus (p.u.) (p.u.)
1 4 6 0.0053 0.0367
2 3 5 0.0039 0.0315
Table 3.3: Generating unit characteristics.
Generating Cost Function Maximum Output Minimum Output
Unit ($/hr) (MW) (MW)
A 0.022P(!+12.45P1+70 500 90
B 0.024Pl+13.65P2+80 400 40
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3.4 Allocation of Transmission Loss by Using the ILFA
In order to appreciate loss allocation in a deregulated system, different base cases have
been studied first with the help of a conventional load flow analysis. Base cases assume
that the hypothetical system contains only one load and one generator. Base case load
flow analyses help to find individual transmission loss for each generator. After the base
cases, the systenl has been analyzed for two loads and their corresponding generators
with the help of conventional load flow technique. This helps to find the effect of
combined load on transmission loss and generations. Finally, the Incremental Load
Flow Approach has been utilized to determine the share of transmission loss of the
generators.
3.4.1 Case 1
At this stage, it is assumed that the hypothetical system has a generator (Generator B)
and a load (Customer B). Generator B has been in contract with Customer B for
supplying its demand. Two different load situations have been considered and the
conventional load flow program has been used for these two load levels for finding the
transmission loss. The corresponding generations and line losses are shown in Tables
3.4 and 3.5.
Table 3.4: Real and reactive power generation and line loss for Case 1.
La Lb Ga Gb Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 0 1.5 0 1.5799 0.0799
Reactive 0 0.9 0 1.3412 0.4412
Table 3.5: Real and reactive power generation and line loss for Case 1 with
reduced load.
La Lb Ga Gb Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 0 0.9 0 0.9243 0.0243
Reactive 0 0.54 0 0.6745 0.1345
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It has been mentioned earlier that Generator B is operating only to meet the demand of
Customer B. Table 3.4 shows that for a load of 1.5 + jO.9 p.u. the required generation is
1.5799 + j1.3412 p.u. The associated line loss is 0.0799 + j0.4412 p.u. The load of
Customer A is kept at zero and hence the generation of Generator A is also forced to
zero. This is due to the fact that Generator A is contractually obligated to supply
Customer A.
The load of Customer B has been changed to 0.9 + jO.54 p.u. The corresponding
generation is 0.9243 + jO.6745 p.u. and the line loss is 0.0243 + j0.1345 p.u. (Table
3.5).
3.4.2 Case 2
This case has been investigated to see the effect of the bilateral contract between
Generator A and Customer A on the associated transmission loss. The load of Customer
B is set to zero and this allows the Generator B to produce nothing.
The generation and the line loss due to this contract is shown in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Real and reactive power generation and line loss in the system for Case 2.
Load La LoadLb Generation Ga Generation Gb Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 1.5 0 1.5527 0 0.0527
Reactive 0.9 0 1.2057 0 0.3057
For a load of 1.5 + jO.9 p.u. by Customer A, the Generator A is producing 1.5527 +
j 1.2057 p.u. and the calculated line loss is 0.0527 + jO.3057 p.u.
3.4.3 Case 3
After having the load flow solutions for individual contracts between the generators and
the customers, both generators and loads have been brought into the system, which is
our original system under consideration. Two different load situations have been
considered - Customer A has same load in both situations while Customer B has
different loads. Due to the bilateral contracts, Generator A would provide power to
Customer A and Generator B would provide power to Customer B.
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The generations of individual units and total line losses obtained from the conventional
load flow program have been presented in Tables 3.7 - 3.10. The conventional load flow
study needs the generation of PV buses to be specified and these generations are
obtained from Cases 1 and 2. Table 3.7 shows the real and reactive power generations
and line loss. Bus 1 is considered as the slack bus and the loads are assumed to be equal.
Data obtained from Case 1 is used as the generation data Gb.
Table 3.7: Power generations and line loss in the system for Case 3.a with Bus 1 as the
slack bus.
Load La LoadLb Generation Ga Generation Gb Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 1.5 1.5 1.5187 1.5799 0.0986
Reactive 0.9 0.9 1.4679 0.9036 0.5716
Table 3.8 shows the real and reactive power generations and line loss where Bus 2 is
considered as the slack bus. The loads are assumed to be equal and generation data Ga is
taken fronl Case 2.
Table 3.8: Power generations and line loss in the system for Case 3.a with Bus 2 as the
slack bus.
Load La LoadLb Generation Ga Generation Gb Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 1.5 1.5 1.5527 1.5457 0.0984
Reactive 0.9 0.9 1.4615 0.9090 0.5705
Table 3.9 shows the real and reactive power generations and line loss. Bus 1 is
considered as the slack bus and the loads are assumed to be unequal. Data obtained
from Case 1 is used as the generation data Gb.
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Table 3.9: Power generations and line loss in the system for Case 3.a with Bus 1 as the
slack bus.
Load La LoadLb Generation Ga Generation Gb Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 1.5 0.9 1.5354 0.9244 0.0597
Reactive 0.9 0.54 0.9068 0.8841 0.3509
Table 3.10 shows the real and reactive power generations and line loss where Bus 2 is
considered as the slack bus. The loads are assumed to be equal and generation data Ga is
taken from Case 2.
Table 3.10: Power generations and line loss in the system for Case 3.a with Bus 2 as
the slack bus.
Load La LoadLb Generation Ga Generation Gb Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 1.5 0.9 1.5527 0.9071 0.0598
Reactive 0.9 0.54 0.9039 0.8875 0.3514
The transmission losses shown in Table 3.7 have been calculated by considering Bus 1
as the slack bus. Both loads are equal to 1.5 + jO.9 p.u. and as evaluated in Case 1, the
magnitude of Gb has been considered as 1.5799 p.u. Bus 2 has been considered as the
slack bus and Ga has been taken as 1.5527 p.u. as evaluated in Case 1 (for the
transmission losses shown in Table 3.8. ). The real and reactive line losses are less than
the sum of the losses found in Cases 1 and 2. But, the generation of reactive power does
not drop for each generator. As for example, Table 3.8 shows that the reactive power
generation of A (1.4679 p.u.) has been increased while the opposite has happened to B.
Reactive generation of B has dropped to 0.9036 p.u. which is slightly higher than the
reactive load of Customer B. This shows clearly that Generator B is not producing as
much reactive power as it produced under Case 1. This is due to the fact that
transmission losses, both real and reactive are nonlinear functions of load and
generation.
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Tables 3.9 and 3.10 shows the generation and loss for unequal demands of Customers A
and B. Customer B's load (Lb) has been changed to 0.9 + jO.54 p.u. while Customer A's
load (La) remains unchanged at 1.5 + jO.9 p.u. The evaluations have been done with Bus
1 as the slack bus (Table 3.9) and then Bus 2 as the slack bus (Table 3.10) and
corresponding PV bus generations have been obtained from Cases 1 and 2. Comparing
the results shown in Table 3.6 with Tables 3.9 and 3.10, Generator A is producing much
less reactive power than it produces under Case 2. It is clear from Table 3.9 that an
increased burden of producing reactive power has been taken up by Generator B
(0.8841 p.u.) while Generator A (0.9068 p.u.) is producing less than that produced in
Case 2 which is just higher than the reactive demand of Customer A. This is due to the
fact that the calculated values of required generations would vary if the slack bus is
changed. In Tables 3.11 and 3.12, the generation, total transmission loss and the
contribution of the generators to transmission loss have been summarized.
The situations considered in Case 3 lead to a set of questions. What should be the
appropriate share of each generator in producing real and reactive power? What would
happen if one of the generators is unable to produce its due share and then to whom
would this generator be liable for this support? The incremental load flow approach can
be utilized to find the appropriate share of each generator in terms of real and reactive
power.
Table 3.11: Comparison of real loss contribution for the three different cases.
Load Slack System Loss Generation to
(p.u.) Bus (p.u.) mitigate loss (p.u.)
La Lb Ga-La Gb-Lb
Case 1.a 0 1.5+jO.9 2 0.0799 0 0.0799
Case 2 1.5+jO.9 0 1 0.0527 0.0527 0
1 0.0986 0.0187 0.0799
Case 3.a 1.5+jO.9 1.5+jO.9
2 0.0984 0.0527 0.0457
Case l.b 0 0.9+jO.54 2 0.0243 0 0.0243
1 0.0597 0.0354 0.0244
Case 3.b 1.5+jO.9 0.9+jO.54
2 0.0598 0.0527 0.0071
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Table 3.12: Comparison ofreactive loss contribution for the three different cases.
Load Slack System Loss Generation to
(p.u.) Bus (p.u.) mitigate loss (p.u.)
La Lb Ga-La Gb-Lb
Case 1.a 0 1.5+jO.9 2 0.4412 0 0.4412
Case 2 1.5+jO.9 0 1 0.3057 0.3057 0
1 0.5716 0.5679 0.0036
Case 3.a 1.5+jO.9 1.5+jO.9
2 0.5705 0.5615 0.0090
Case 1.b 0 0.9+jO.54 2 0.1345 0 0.1345
1 0.3509 0.0068 0.3441
Case 3.b 1.5+jO.9 0.9+jO.54
2 0.3514 0.0039 0.3475
3.4.4 Case 4
In the ILFA, the loads under bilateral contracts are increased in incremental steps in a
sequential manner. In any iteration, only one customer load is increased while the other
loads are held fixed. Let us assume that load La is increased by a step of M a while Lb
stays at its previous level. A load flow program has been developed to assess the
generations and transmission losses for this condition. Since load demand of Customer
B (Lb) is unchanged, the resulting incremental transmission loss becomes the obligation
of Generator A. Generator A has to produce adequate power to support the incremental
load demand of customer A and the resulting incremental transmission loss. In the next
iteration, Lb has been increased by a step size of Mb while La remains fixed. Again,
generations and transmission losses are calculated and the incremental loss is assigned
to Generator B.
In order to obtain a load flow solution, the buses connected with generating units have
to be declared as voltage controlled (PV) bus. The power generations at these buses are
required to be specified prior to the load flow. In a bilateral contract generation of the
PV bus should be the sum of load and its share of the total line loss. The magnitude of
this line loss, however, is unknown before the load flow analysis can be performed.
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Generator B is connected to Bus 2 and as such has been declared as a PV bus. The
generation at Bus 2 has been calculated on the basis of current load (Lb) and
transmission loss calculated from the previous load. Since the transmission loss for the
first increment of load Lb is unknown, the required output of Generation B (Gb) has been
specified as ALb. In the next increment of Customer B's load, Gb has been updated as Lb
plus the corresponding share of the line loss from the previous iteration. This
approximation works well as long as the step size remains small. A step size of 1 MW is
considered in this case.
Using the above mentioned approximation and reactive ratio of 0.6, the incremental
load flow program has been utilized to obtain generations and transmission losses.
Individual generations and transmission losses are shown in Tables 3.13 and 3.14.
Table 3.13: Individual generations and total transmission loss obtained from ILFA for
equal load condition.
La Lb Ga Gb Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 1.5 1.5 1.5414 1.557 0.0984
Reactive 0.9 0.9 1.4635 0.9072 0.5707
Table 3.14: Individual generations and total transmission loss obtained from ILFA for
different load condition.
La Lb Ga Gb Line loss
(p.u. ) (p.u. ) (p.u. ) (p.u. ) (p.u. )
Real 1.5 0.9 1.5414 0.9182 0.0597
Reactive 0.9 0.54 0.9057 0.8853 0.3511
The main goal of the ILFA is to allocate transmission losses among the generating
utilities with bilateral contracts in a deregulated power system network. Six different
situations have been considered for this purpose and the corresponding transmission
loss allocations have been assessed.
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3.4.5 Unequal Load and Different Reactive Ratio
In this section, unequal reactive ratios as well as the unequal real loads for Customers A
and B are considered. The reactive ratio for Customer B has been varied while
maintaining a constant reactive ratio for Customer A. Three different constant reactive
ratios for Customer A have been considered in this evaluation. Transmission loss
allocations are shown in Table 3.15. The real load demands of Customer A and B are
1.5 and 0.9 p.u. respectively.
Table 3.15: Calculated share of transmission loss of Generators A and B for unequal
load and unequal reactive ratio.
Real Real Reactive Reactive Calculated Loss Calculated Loss Share
La Lb ratio ratio Share ofA (p.u.) ofB (p.u.)
(p.u.) (p.u.) Jia Jib Real Reactive real Reactive
1.5 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.0397 0.239 0.0148 0.0836
1.5 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.0401 0.2407 0.0157 0.0899
1.5 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.0405 0.2427 0.0171 0.0974
1.5 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.0359 0.2156 0.0147 0.0832
1.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.0363 0.217 0.0156 0.0894
1.5 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.0328 0.1965 0.0147 0.0825
Figures 3.2 - 3.5 show loss allocations for different combinations of real loads and
reactive ratios.
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The nature of the loss allocation curves remains similar for variations in load demands
and reactive ratios. In both cases of reactive ratios, real loss allocation of Generator A
follows that ofB closely whereas reactive loss allocations differ significantly.
3.5 IEEE-Reliability Test System
The IEEE 24 bus Reliability Test System (RTS) [66] has been utilized to find to apply
the developed methods for transmission loss allocation. The system is described below:
Generating and Reliability Data: The system contains 32 generating units ranging
from 12 MW to 400 MW. The generating system includes thermal, fossil-oil, fossil-
coal, nuclear and hydro units. Reliability data (mean time to failure, mean time to
repair, forced outage rate) of the units are provided in Appendix- A. Appendix-A also
contains the operating costs of the units.
Transmission System: The transmission system consists of 24 buses. These buses are
connected by 38 lines and transformers. The transmission system has two voltage levels
- 138 kV and 230 kV, and includes cables and overhead lines. Appendix-A provides
transmission system data which includes line length, impedance, susceptance and
ratings.
The transmission network has voltage corrective devices at Bus 14 (synchronous
condenser) and at Bus 6 (reactor). These devices increase the network performance
(maintaining rated voltage) under contingency conditions.
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IEEE 24 bus Reliability Test System is shown in Appendix-A.
3.5.1 Bilateral Contracts in the IEEE-RTS
Transmission loss allocation can be found based on individual bilateral contracts in a
deregulated power system network [48]. In practice, a power system network might
,operate in a mixed-mode system - a combination ofpower pool and bilateral contracts.
The previous six-bus test system was assumed to be completely deregulated which
means only bilateral contracts exist in the system. These contracts are assumed to be
among the generators and bulk customers. Transmission loss for individual contracts
has been calculated using ILFA.
The IEEE-RTS is a moderately large system with a generating capacity of 3405 MW
and 17 load points in the network. The customers connected to these 17 buses are bulk
customers. It has been considered that a power pool is working for managing the energy
requirements of the IEEE-RTS network. This power pool arranges the auction market
and maintains the system security. In addition to the power pool, bilateral contracts are
assumed to exist in this network.
The group of Generating units at Bus 7 is in a bilateral contract with the customer at
Bus 9. It is termed as contract A. At Bus 7 there are three 100 MW units and these
plants are already selling some energy to the pool. They have a contract (Contract-A)
with the customer at Bus 9 for supplying 176 MW of real power and 36.21 MVAR of
reactive power. Another bilateral contract (Contract-B) exists between the generating
units at Bus 23 and the customer at Bus 19. At bus 23, there are two 155 MW and one
350 MW generators with a total capacity of 610 MW. These generators are also
supplying the pool and has a bilateral contract with the customer at Bus 19 for
supplying 181+j37 MVA of apparent power.
3.5.2 Loss Allocation in the IEEE-RTS Using the ILFA
Incremental Load Flow Approach (ILFA) can be utilized to determine the transmission
loss share in a mixed-mode power system network. Before implementing the ILFA it is
required to find the base condition or condition prior to the bilaterally contracted loads
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are added to the system. Base condition actually represents the power pool operations -
power demand and supply in the network.
3.5.3 Power Pool Operation in the IEEE-RTS
Generating utilities or IPPs bid for selling their power at the power pool. The generating
utilities do not have any target for any specific customer. Electricity is purchased on a
centralized basis by a hypothetical Power Pool operator called Independent System
Operator in many jurisdictions who manages the power balance of IEEE system.
Generators bid on an hourly basis to supply the their energy. The Power Pool
determines the market clearing price from the supply curve of power and from the
demand of total power. The demand side bidding has not been considered in the IEEE
system. The power demand in the system for a particular hour is considered to be 2494
MW of real power 589 MVAR of reactive power. Generators' bidding for this hour in
the IEEE power pool is shown in Table 3.16.
Table 3.16: Generators' bidding in the IEEE power pool.
Bus Size (MW) No. ofUnits Total Power (MW) Price($/MW-Hr)
22 50 6 300 25
18 400 1 400 35
21 400 1 400 40
23 155 2 310 47
15 155 1 155 50
16 155 1 155 53
1 76 2 152 65
2 76 2 152 65
7 100 1 100 67
13 197 2 394 70
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1 20 2 40 70
2 20 2 40 74
13 197 1 197 85
15 12 5 60 90
Figure 3.6 shows the bidding curve obtained from the generator side bidding in the
IEEE system. Generators' bids are stacked and the curve has a stair like shape. Demand
in Figure 3.6 is the total real power demand of the system and a vertical line represents
the demand. The intersection of demand line and the stair-like bid curve determines the
market clearing price which is 70 $/MW-Hr in this case. Similar graphs are used to set
market clearing price for every hour of a day.
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Fig. 3.6: Market clearing price in IEEE system.
Before the addition of the contracted load the demand in the network is 2494 MW of
real power 589 MVAR of reactive power. This demand is supplied by the generators in
the network including the units connected to Bus 7 and Bus 23. The load demands and
power generations at various buses are listed in Table 3.17. Table 3.17 shows data in
per unit;100 MVA and 138 kV have been chosen as base values for the system.
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Table 3.17: Loads and Generations in the IEEE-RTS for the base case.
Bus Load (p.u.) Generation (p.u.)
Real Reactive Real Reactive
1 1.0800 0.2200 1.5753 0.2075
2 0.9700 0.2000 1.7200 0.0511
3 1.8000 0.3700
4 0.7400 0.1500
5 0.7100 0.1400
6 1.3600 1.1000
7 1.2500 0.2500 1.0000 0.9520
8 1.7100 0.3500
9
10 1.9500 0.4000
11
12
13 2.6500 0.5400 3.9400 1.0036
14 1.9400 0.3900
15 3.1700 0.6400 1.5500 1.5847
16 1.0000 0.2000 1.5500 1.0991
17
18 3.3300 0.6800 4.0000 0.6108
19
20 1.2800 0.2600
21 4.0000 -0.4205
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22 3.0000 -0.3799
23 3.1000 -0.1185
24
The total complex value of the generation in the system is 25.4353 + j4.5899 p.u.
Transmission losses can be calculated from the generations and demands in the system.
Total real and reactive power losses in the network are 0.4953 p.u. and -1.3001 p.u.
There are two bilateral contracts in the IEEE-RTS system. Contract-A is between load
at Bus 9 and generators at Bus 7. Load at Bus 9 is termed as Customer A and generators
at Bus 7 are termed Generator A. Second contract known as Contract-B is between load
at Bus 19 and generators at Bus 23. Load at Bus 19 is termed as Customer B and
generators at Bus 23 are termed Generator B.
In the ILFA, the loads are increased in incremental steps in a sequential manner. In any
iteration, only one customer load is increased while the other loads are held fixed. Let
us assume that load, L9 is increased by a step of M 9 while L19 stays at its previous level.
A modified load flow program has been developed to asses the generation and
transmission loss for this condition. Since load demand of Customer B (L19) is
unchanged, the resulting incremental transmission loss beconles the obligation of
Generator A to produce it in order to support the incremental load demand of customer
A. In the next iteration, L19 has been increased by a step size of M 19 while L9 remains
fixed. Again, generations and transmission losses are calculated and the resulting
incremental loss is assigned to Generator B.
Generators A and B are connected to Buses 7 and 23 respectively have been declared as
PV buses. An incremental step size of 1 MW has been used
The incremental load flow program has been utilized to obtain generations and
transmission losses. Individual generations and transmission losses are shown in Tables
3.18 and 3.19.
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Table 3.18: Contracted loads and generations in the IEEE-RTS determined by ILFA.
L9 L19 G7 G23 Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 1.76 1.81 2.6891 4.9138 0.4286
Reactive 0.3621 0.37 0.5624 0.0828 -1.5530
Table 3.19: Transmission loss allocation for the bilateral contracts in the IEEE-RTS.
Total Loss (p.u.) Calculated Loss Share Calculated Loss
of A (p.u.) Share ofB (p.u.)
Real Reactive Real Reactive Real Reactive
0.4286 -1.5530 -0.0706 -0.2836 0.0039 0.0306
The total real and reactive transmission loss become 0.4286 p.u. and -1.5530 p.u.
respectively. According to Contract-A, generators connected to Bus 7 are delivering
power to a load of 1.76+j0.3621 p.u. at Bus 9. Generators at Bus 7 are producing
1.000+jO.9520 p.u. for the pool in addition to what is required for the contracted load at
Bus 9. Generators at Bus 7 are delivering a total of 2.6891+jO.5624 p.u. to the network.
The related transmission loss shares of Contract-A are -0.0706 p.u. and -0.2836 p.u.,
real and reactive respectively.
Generators at Bus 23, involved in bilateral Contract-B, are delivering 3.1 OOO-j0.1185
p.u. of power to the pool in addition to the contracted delivery at Bus 19. The generators
are producing a total of 4.9138+jO.0728 p.u. The calculated transmission loss shares of
Contract-B are 0.0090 p.u. and 0.0828 p.u., real and reactive respectively. It can be
noted that the contracted generators are producing different reactive powers than they
were producing before serving the contracted loads. It happened in order to maintain the
systenl voltage profile within the prescribed limits by re-allocating the reactive power
generations.
Transmission loss allocations for Contracts -A and -B are shown in Fig. 3.7 and 3.8.
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Fig. 3.7 shows the real power transmission loss allocation for the contracts. It has been
found that the final loss allocation for Contract-A is negative as shown in Fig. 3.7. The
real loss allocation for Contract-A goes downward upto the point of 1.39 p.u. after
which it begins to rise. Similar trend is found for the reactive loss allocation for
Contract-A (Fig. 3.8). Real loss allocation for Contract-B stays positive as shown in
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Fig. 3.7. Like its real counterpart, the reactive loss allocation for Contract-B also stays
positive as shown in Fig. 3.8.
3.6 Overview of Loss Allocations
A detailed study has been done to find transmission loss allocation in a deregulated
power system network. A modified load flow technique (lLFA) is employed to obtain
losses, both real and reactive, for a bilateral contact in a network. A 6-bus test system
has been utilized to find the transmission loss allocation where the system is considered
to be deregulated. Only bilateral contracts are considered in this test system. Different
load combinations have been taken into consideration and loss allocations have been
calculated using the ILFA. Later IEEE 24-bus Reliability Test System is used to find
the transmission loss allocation for bilateral contracts in a mixed-mode systenl. In the
next chapter a generalized mathematical model is developed and utilized to obtain the
transmission loss allocations.
A generator in a system may not be able to supply its due share of real and reactive
power. Results obtained from the ILFA can be utilized to assess the shortfall of the
generator. Real component of transmission loss is directly related to monetary issues
and hence should be resolved in a fair way. The reactive loss distribution is also of
importance, as it must be provided to maintain the system voltage level. The
compensation for not producing enough reactive power, either for system constraints or
own limitations, has been discussed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 4: GENERALIZED MARGINAL TRANSMISSION LOSS
APPROACH
4.1 Transmission Loss in Power Systems
Power flow in a transmission network causes some transmission losses and it is quite
significant in a large grid network. Transmission loss can be divided into two parts: real
and reactive. Real power generated by a system should be equal to the sum of its loads
and line losses. Reactive power in a system is required for system voltage stability.
Reactive power loss must be provided for maintaining the safe voltage profile in a
network. Unlike real power, reactive power does not have any direct monetary value but
it is an extremely important factor in power system operation.
Total transmission loss can be calculated in different ways. One of the popular ways is
to utilize Kron's [49] transmission loss formula. This formula is based on a number of
assumptions and calculates transmission loss in terms of generations. Despite its many
assumptions, Kron's formula gives a fairly close result when compared to the results
obtained through more accurate methods [71]. But the advantage of this formula is that
it is a function of generation only, and therefore, one can find approximate transmission
loss in a system by knowing the generation of individual plants in a system.
4.2 General Transmission Loss Formula
In a monopoly utility system, generating units are committed and dispatched in a way
that the total operating cost is minimized. Transmission loss is viewed as a part of the
overall operating cost and included in the optimization process with the help of
Lagrange multipliers. Under a bilateral contract agreements, in a deregulated
environment, a generator is responsible for supplying power to its own customer. The
Generator will use a common transmission facility managed by an Independent System
Operator (ISO) to transport power to its customer. The ISO would provide equal access
to all participating (competing) generating entities. Each generating entity that
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participates in a bilateral contract should produce enough power to meet its load and its
share of transmission loss.
Transmission loss can be calculated accurately by AC load flow analysis. Due to the
computational complexities of AC load flows, however other methods [72] have been
developed to calculate transmission loss in a simpler way. A generalized transmission
loss formula, mentioned in Chapter 2, that does not depend on network configuration
can be used for calculating transmission loss in a convenient way.
Due to its application in economic optimization, transmission loss, in general, is
expressed in terms of active power generations only. The George's formula [69] is the
simplest one that is given by
m m
~ =LL(P;Bij~)
;=1 }=1
Where,
PI = total transmission loss
Pi = active power injection at bus i.
m = number of generators
(4.1)
The coefficients By' are commonly referred to as loss coefficients. A more generalized
formula is given by Kron. The Kron's Loss formula [49] is
m m
~ =Klo + LB;oP; + L(P;Bij~)
;=1 }=1
(4.2)
In both formulae, active generations are used as the only variables to reduce the
conlputational complexities. The main advantage of the generalized loss formulae is
that they are easy to use and do not require iterations like load flows require.
It is clear from George's and Kron's formula that neither of them reflect the load
situations in the network. Although the generations used in these formulae are based on
load demand in the network, they do not provide sufficient information with respect to
the transmission loss allocation of an individual generator within a bilateral contract in a
deregulated network. In order to allocate transmission loss, the contribution of
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individual loads to power loss in a system has to be determined. Any change in a load
should be taken into consideration and its effect should be reflected fully in
transmission loss calculation. This way a generator under a bilateral contract should be
able to ascertain the amount of power it is required to produce. It should generate
enough power to satisfy its load plus meet its obligation for any additional transmission
loss unless it has other special contracts with the ISO.
In order to allocate transmission loss among the generators in a fair way, a modified
transmission loss formula is necessary which would allow one to find the responsibility
of an individual generator who enters into a bilateral contract with a customer in a
deregulated network.
4.3 Marginal Transmission Loss
The basic principle of the generalized loss formulae can be used in a modified form for
the purpose of transmission loss allocation. The modified transmission loss formula
should be a function of individual loads in a system and should be able to respond to
changes in loads. As the generation of a supplier who enters into a bilateral contract
should depend upon contracted load and its share of transmission loss, the modified loss
formula would include generation in an indirect nlanner.
Assume a power system network where a supplier (Generator A) enters into a bilateral
contract to supply energy to a specified customer (Load La). It is assumed that
Generator A should produce enough power to supply Customer A and satisfy its share
of transmission loss. Mathematically this can be written as
Ga =Loada + Lossa
Where,
(4.3)
Ga = active power generation of Generator A in MW,
Loada = active power demand of a bulk consumer in MW that Generator A is obliged
to supply and
Lossa = Generator A's share of transmission loss in MW.
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Equation (4.3) implies that generation is a function of load. A conventional loss formula
uses the amount of generations as independent variables. Transmission losses are
embedded in generations and are inseparable. But, in a deregulated system it is required
to separate the loss that is originated due to a particular load. In a monopoly system, the
losses are distributed as a consequence of economic operation. In a deregulated
network, it is important and necessary to keep track of the losses arising from individual
loads who enters into bilateral contract.
A modified loss equation has been derived which is a function of loads. The modified
loss equation can be used to calculate loss associated with an individual load that enters
into a bilateral contract with a supplier in a deregulated. It is assumed that the power
produced by the contracted generator is transferred to its destination load using a
deregulated network operated by an Independent System Operator (ISO).
4.4 Mathematical Model
Transmission loss in a network can be expressed as [68]:
~ = [PGY[ApIpG]- [PDY[ApIpG]- [PGY[ApIpD]+ [PDY[ApIpD]- [PGY[Bp)QG]
+[PDY[Bp)QG]+ [PGY[Bp)QD]- [PDY[Bp)QD]+ [QGY[BpIpG]- [QDY[BpIpG]
- [QGY[BpIpD]+ [QDY[BpIpD]+ [QGY[Ap)QG]- [QDY[Ap)QG]- [QGY[Ap)QD]
+ [QDY[Ap)QD]
(4.4)
Equation (4.4) is dependent on real and reactive power generations and demands in a
network. For the purpose of transmission loss allocation, Equation (4.4) can be
modified as a function of load demands.
In order to derive the modified form of loss equation some assumptions have been
made. These assumptions keep the transmission loss allocation problem manageable
and at the same time do not affect the results significantly. They are:
1. Constant Z-bus over the range of load variation. Although a Z-bus changes with a
change in the setting of tap-changing transformers, its overall effect can be
neglected.
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2. Constant Bus angles for a part of the load variation. In this case, three different sets
of angles have been used for the entire load range. More sets may be used for better
accuracy.
3. For the first step of the iteration, the loss has been assumed to be zero. This makes
the required generation equal to the load at the beginning.
4. Constant reactive to real power ratio. This reduces the number of variables in
transmission loss equation.
5. Bus voltages constant at 1 p.u. for the entire range of the load.
4.4.1 Simplified Loss Equation
For a system with N buses with Kth bus taken as the reference:
PG1 QGl PDl QDl
PG2 Q G2 PD2 QD2
PG = QG= PD = QD =
PGN Q GN PDN QDN
G pll ap12 G p1N
G p21 ap22 G p2N
A =p
a pN1 G pN2 G pNN
bpll bp12 bp1N
bp21 bp22 bp2N
B =P
bpN1 bpN2 bpNN
From the definition ofAp and Bp , the following relations can be realized,
G piJ = apjj
bpiJ =-bpjj
bpjj =0
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The diagonal elements ofBp are zero because of the zero angles of the sine terms in the
expression of bpij• The subscripts used in the matrices are in coordination with the bus
numbers. Every element of Equation (4.4) is a matrix and there are sixteen terms in the
equation and each term consists of three elements. It would be a huge equation
obviously. Each term has been expanded separately and finally they are gathered in one
single equation.
The first term of Equation (4.4) can be expanded as follows:
apll apI2 apIN PGl
ap2I ap22 . ap2N Po2
[poY[Ap] [po ] = [PGl Po2 ... PaN
apNI a pN2 . apNN PaN
PgIapll + Po2apI2 +... + PaNapIN
PgIap2I +Po2ap22 +.. '+PoNap2N
= [PGl Po2 ... PaN .
= PGl (PgIapll + Po2apI2 + + PaNaPIN) + Po2 (PgIapll + Po2apI2 +... + PaN apIN) +...+
PaN (PgIapll + Po2apI2 + + PaNapIN)
N N
= LPGi LPojapij
i=l j=I
i*K j*K
(4.5a)
The other terms of Equation (4.4) can be written similarly,
N N
[PDY[Ap][Po ] = LPDiLPojapij
i=I j=I
i*K j*K
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(4.5b)
N N
[PGY [Ap][PD]=L PGi L PDapij (4.5c)
i=1 j=1i:t:-K j:t:-K
N N
[PDY[Ap][PD]=LPDi LPDjapij (4.5d)
i=1 j=1i:t:-K f#K
T[] N N[PG] Bp [QG] = LPGiLQGjbp!i (4.5e)
i=1 }=1i:t:-K }:t:-K
N N
[PDY[Bp][QG] =LPDiLQG}bpij (4.5f)
i=1 }=1i:t:-K }:t:-K
N N
[PGY[Bp][QD] =LPGi LQDjbpy (4.5g)
i=1 j=1i:t:-K }:t:-K
N N
[PDY[Bp][QD] =LPDi LQDjbpij (4.5h)
i=1 j=1i:t:-K j:t:-K
N N
[QGY[Bp][PGJ =LQGiLPGjbpij (4.5i)
i=1 }=1i:t:-K j:t:-K
N N
[QD Y [Bp][PG]=L QDi L PGjbpij (4.5j)
i=1 j=1i:t:-K j:t:-K
N N
[QGY[Bp][PD]=LQGi LPDjbpij (4.5k)
i=1 j=1i:t:-K j:t:-K
N N
[QDY [BpUPDJ= LQDi LPDjbpij (4.51)
i=1 j=1i:t:-K j:t:-K
N N
[QGY[Ap][QG] =LQGiLQGjapij (4.5m)
i=1 }=1i:t:-K j:t:-K
N N
[QDY[Ap][QG] =LQDiLQGjapij (4.5n)
i=1 }=1i:t:-K j:t:-K
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N N
[QGY[Ap][QD] = LQGi LQDjapij
i=1 j=1
;'¢.K f¢.K
N N[QDY[Ap][QD]= LQDiLQDjapij
i=1 j=1
i*K j*K
Where,
PGi = real power generation at Bus i
PDi = real load demand at Bus i
QGi = reactive power generation at Bus i
QDi = reactive load demand at Bus i
(4.50)
(4.5p)
The total transmission loss in the full system can be written, by adding Equations
(4.5a)-(4.5p), as follows:
N N N N N N N N N N
~=~~~~~-~~~~~-I~I~~+I~I~~-I~I~~
i=1 }=1 i=1 }=1 ;=1 }=1 ;=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K
N N N N N N N N N N
+I~I~~+I~I~~-I~I~~+I~I~~-L~L~~
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K 1'*K
N N N N N N N N
- IQGi ~PDjbpij + IQDi ~PD1'bpij + IQGi IQGjapij - IQDi ~QG1'apij
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 1'=1 i=1 j=1
i*K j*K i*K 1'*K i*K j*K i*K j*K
N N N N
- IQGi IQD1'apij + IQDi IQDjapij
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*K j*K i*K 1'*K
(4.6)
From assumption number (4), the reactive load can be expressed in terms of real load
which eventually reduces the number ofvariables.
where, f.J = reactive ratio
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The transmission loss equation has to be separated into respective parts for the purpose
of allocating transmission loss to respective generators involved in bilateral contracts.
It is necessary to express the generation in terms of load demand and associated
transmission loss. Generation in terms of loads and associated transmission losses can
be expresses as:
N
PGi = L (PDim + Lim)
m=l
m*K
N
QGi = L (PimPDim + ~m)
m=l
m*K
N
PDi = L(PDmJ
m=l
m*K
N
QDi = L(PmiPDmi)
m=l
m*K
Where,
(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)
(4.10)
PDim = real load demand at Bus m which is supplied by generator connected at Bus i
Lim = real transmission loss allocation for the load demand at Bus m which is supplied
by generator connected at Bus i
T;m reactive transmission loss allocation for the load demand at Bus m which is
supplied by generator connected at Bus i
Pim = reactive ratio for the load at Bus m which is supplied by generator connected at
Bus i
The term, PDij defines the load at Bus j that is supplied by the generator connected at
Bus i. For example, the term PD1S is the load at Bus 5 supplied by Generator 1 and
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L Pm} expresses the total load supplied by Generator 1 to all buses. Similarly,
}
LPD}5 is the total load at Bus 5 supplied by all generators.
}
The expression for QI is basically same as the expression for PI except that the rls in Ap
and Bp are replaced by XIS for the expression for QI. The transmission loss the share of
transmission loss of any particular load can be obtained by determining the change in
transmission loss due to change in the specified load.
Equation(4.5a) can be written as
Equation (4.11) can be re-written by expanding the summation terms as
[poY[4][po]={(PDll + Lll ) + (PDl2 + Ln ) +... + (PDlN +4N)X{(PDl1 + 41) + (PDl2 + 42) + .
+ (PDlN +4N)}apll + {(PD21 +~1)+(PD22 +~2)+·· .+(PD2N +~N)}ap12 + .
{(PDM +411) +(PDN2 +LN22)+·· .+(PDNN+LNN)}apIN +
{(PD21 +~1)+(PD22 +~2)+·· .+ (PD2N +~N)K{(PDll +41) + (PDl2 +42)+···
+ (PDlN +4N)}apll + {(PD21 +~1)+(PD22 +~2)+·· .+(PD2N +~N)}ap12 + ...
{(PDM + LNl ) + (PDN2 + LN22 )+.. .+(PDNN +LNN)}apIN + ...
{(PDNl +LNl ) + (PDN2 +LN2 )+·· .+(PDNN+LNN)X{(PDll +41) + (PD12 +42)+' ..
+ (PDlN +4N)}apll + {(PD21 +~I)+(PD22 +~2)+·· .+(PD2N +~N)}apI2 + ...
{(PDM +Lm) + (PDN2 + LN22)+.. .+(PDNN+LNN)}ap1N
(4.11)
(4.l2a)
Equation (4. 12a) represents the expanded form of the first term of Equation (4.6). It can
be differentiated with respect to load PD11 in the following manner.
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Similarly, differentiating with respect to load PD 12, PD21 etc. we get
In general, Equation (4.12a) can be differentiated with respect to load, PDxy,
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(4.13a)
(4.13b)
(4.l4a)
Similar operations can be performed on the rest of the terms of Equation (4.6) and
organized in the same form as Equation (4.14a). Individual terms and their derivatives
with respect to PDxy are shown below:
(4.12b)
(4.14b)
(4.l2c)
(4.14c)
(4.12d)
(4.14d)
(4. 12e)
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(4.14e)
(4.12f)
(4.14f)
(4.12g)
(4. 14g)
(4. 12h)
(4. 14h)
(4.12i)
(4.14i)
(4.12j)
(4.14j)
(4. 12k)
(4. 14k)
(4.121)
(4.141)
(4.12m)
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(4.12n)
(4.14n)
(4.120)
(4.140)
(4. 12p)
(4.14p)
Assume,
Lxy = share of real transmission loss of Generator x for supplying load connected
at Busy.
Txy = share of reactive transmission loss of Generator x for supplying load
connected at Bus y.
aLxy
u =--
xy aP
Dxy
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The individual terms of Equation (4.14) can be written with their appropriate signs as:
(4.15a)
(4.15b)
8 [PGY[Ap ][PD ]
8PDxy
N N N
-Uxy LPDj apxj - LPDj apxj - LPGj apyj
j=1 j=1 j=1
j",K j*K j*K
(4.15c)
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(4. 15d)
(4.15e)
(4.15f)
(4.15g)
(4.15h)
a[QDrl~][PDI=flXY~PDPPYJ-~~bP>J
j¢K j¢K
(4.15i)
(4.15j)
(4.15k)
(4.151)
(4.15m)
(4.15n)
(4.150)
(4. 15p)
The sum of all terms shown in Equation (4.15a) to Equation (4.15p) represents the
differentiation of transmission loss Equation (4.6) with respect to a generalized load
PXY ' The following equation shows the change in total transmission loss with respect to
change in any load Pxy •
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8P, N N N N N
__1_ = 2Uxy LPGj a pxj +2LPGj a pXj -Uxy LPDj a pxj - LPDj a pXj - LPGj a pyj
8PDxy j=l j=l j=l j=l j=l
j¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K
N N N N N
-Uxy LPDj a pXj - LPDj a pXj - LPGj a pyj +2LPDj a pyj -Uxy LQGjbpXj
j=l j=l j=l j=l j=lj¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K
N N N N N
+Wxy LPGj b pXj - LQGjbpXj + J.1xy LPGj b pXj -Wxy LPDj b pxj + LQGj b pyj
j=l j=l j=l j=l j=lj¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K
N N N N N
- J.1 xy L P Dj b pxj + U xy L QDj b pxj + L QDj b pxj - J.1 xy L P Gj b pyj - L Q Djbpyj
j=l j=l j=l j=l j=lj¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K
N N N N N
+ J.1xy LPDj b pyj -Uxy LQGjbpXj +Wxy LPGj b pxj - IQGjbpXj + J.1xy LPGj b pXj
j=l j=l j=l j=l j=lj¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K
N N N N N
+Uxy LQDj b pxj + LQDj b pXj - J.1xy LPGj b pYi -Wxy LPDj b pXj + LQGj b pyj
j=l j=l j=l j=l j=lj¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K
N N N N N
- J.1xy LPDj b pxj + J.1xy LPDjbpyj - LQDj b pyj +2Wxy LQGjapXj +2J.1xy LQGjapXj
j=l j=l j=l j=l j=lj¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K
N N N N N
-Wxy LQDjapXj - J.1xy IQDjapXj - J.1xy LQGjapyj -Wxy LQDjapXj - J.1xy LQDjapXj
j=l j=l j=l j=l j=lj¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K j¢K
N N
- J.1xy L QGjapyj + 2J.1xy L QDjapyj
j=l j=lj¢K j¢K
(4.16)
4.4.2 Solution Approach
In a deregulated environment, a generator may enter into a bilateral contract with a load.
Since, transmission loss does not vary linearly and depends on the network
configuration and relative position of the generators and loads, it is difficult for a
Generator to know how much power to produce for supplying its bilaterally contracted
load. Therefore, it is necessary to break up the total transmission loss so that each
generator would know its share of transmission for supplying a specified load in the
system. The total transmission loss can be written as:
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N N
~=IILij
i=1 i=1
l~K htK
N N
Q/ =IITij
i=1 i=1
l;o!KhtK
Where,
(4.17)
(4.18)
Lif = share of real transmission loss of Generator i for supplying the load
connected at Busj.
Tif = share of reactive transmission loss of Generator i for supplying the load
comlected at Busj.
By utilizing MTLA, a load can be increased from zero to the respective customer's
demand in a successive process and the corresponding change in the transmission loss
for each load increment can be expressed as:
~ =Mu + ... +M21 +M22 + .. .+Mxy + .. .+MNN
8~ 8~ 8~ 8~
=--MDl1 +--MDl2 + .. .+--MDxy + ... + M DNN8PDn 8PDl2 8PDxy 8PDNN
=Uu M Dl1 + Ul2 M Dl2 + ... + UxyMDxy + ... + UNNMDNN
(4.19)
I1Q/ = I1Tu + ... + I1T21 + I1T22 + ... + I1Txy + ... + I1TNN
8Q/ 8Q/ 8Q/ 8Q/
=--MDl1 +--MDl2 + .. .+--MDxy + ... + M DNN8PDl1 8PDl2 8PDxy 8PDNN
= Wn M Dl I + ~2MDl2 + ... + WxyMDxy + ... + WNNMDNN
(4.20)
Where,
~ = total change in real transmission loss.
I1Q/ = total change in reactive transmission loss.
M xy = change in share of real transmission loss of the Generator connected at Bus x
for supplying the load connected at Bus y.
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ATxy = change in share of real transmission loss of the Generator connected at Bus x
for supplying the load connected at Bus y.
Change in individual real transmission loss can be written as
If Mxy and APDxy are small then,
Similarly for individual reactive transmission loss, change can be expressed as:
The total transmission loss in a power system network is given by Equation (4.6). In
this equation, the generation terms (PoS and Qos) are replaceable by Equations (4.7) and
(4.8). In Equation (4.6), generation terms are used in order to keep the equation size
manageable.
N N N N N N N N
~ = LPOi LPojapij - LPDi LPojapij - LPG; 'LPDapij + 'LPDi LPDjapij -
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K
N N N N N N N N
'LpG; LQojbpij + 'LPDi LQojbpij + 'LpG; LQDjbpij - LPDi LQDjbpij +
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K
N N N N N N N N
'LQOi 'LPOjbpij - 'LQDi 'LPOjbpij - LQOi 'LPDjbpij + 'LQDi 'LPDjbpij +
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K
N N N N N N N N
'LQG; 'LQojapij - LQDi LQojapij - LQOi LQDjapij +LQDi LQDjapij
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K i*K j*K
(4.21)
Differentiating the transmission loss expression PI , Equation (4.21) with respect to PDxy
we get,
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8P N N N N N
-_/_= 2Uxy LPGj a pXj +2LPGj a pXj -Uxy LPDj a pxj - LPDj a pXj - LPGj a pyj -
BPDxy j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1j*K j*K j*K j*K j*K
N N N N N
U xy LPDj a pXj - LPDj a pXj - LPGj a pyj +2LPDj a pyj -Uxy LQGjbpxj +
j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1j*K j*K j*K j*K j*K
N N N N N
Wxy LPGj b pxj - LQGjbpxj +Pxy LPG} b pXj -Wxy LPDj b px} + LQGj b pyj -
}=1 }=1 }=1 }=1 }=1j*K j*K j*K j*K j*K
N N N N N
Pxy LPD} b px} +Uxy LQDj b pXj + LQD} b pXj - Pxy LPG} b pyj - LQDjbpyj +
j=1 }=1 }=1 }=1 j=1j*K j*K j*K j*K }*K
N N N N N
PxyLPD} b pyj -uxyLQGjbpxj +wxyLPGj b px} - LQGjbpx} +PxyLPG} b px} +
}=1 }=1 }=1 }=1 }=1j*K }*K }*K }*K }*K
N N N N N
U xy I Q Dj b pxj + L Q Dj b pxj - P xy L PGj b pyj - W xy L PDj b pxj + L QGj b pyj -
j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1 }=1j*K j*K j*K j*K }*K
N N N N N
Pxy LPDj b pXj + Pxy LPDjbpy} - IQDj b pyj +2Wxy IQGjapx} +2pxy LQGjapXj-
j=1 }=1 }=1 }=1 j=1j*K j*K }*K j*K j*K
N N N N N
Wxy IQDjapXj - Pxy LQDjapXj - Pxy LQGjapyj -Wxy LQDjapXj - Pxy LQDjapXj -
j=1 j=1 }=1 }=1 j=1}*K j*K j*K j*K j*K
N N
Pxy LQGjapyj +2pxy IQDjapyj
j=1 }=1j*K j*K
(4.22)
After reorganizing, Equation (4.22) can be written as:
(4.23)
where,
100
Yxy = 2!tPGjajttj - tPGjaPJd - tPDjajttj + tPDjaPJd - tQGjbprj + /lxy tPGjbprj
i*K i*K i*K i*K i*K i*K
N N N N N
+ LQGibpYi - J.1xy LPDibpxi + LQDibpxi - J.1xy LPGibpYi +J.1XY LPDibpYi -
i=1 i=1 i=1 i=1 }=1
i*K i*K i*K i*K i*k
N N N N
LQDibpYi + J.1xy LQGiapxi - J.1xy LQGiapyi - J.1xy LQDiapxi +
i~ i~ i~ i~
i*K i*k i*k i*k
/lxyt QDjaPYj)
i*k
Now a second equation is required for the solution of Uxy and Wxy which would be
obtained from Equation (4.21). By examining Equations (2.9) and (2.10), it becomes
clear that expression for QI will be similar to that ofPI . With the exceptions of apif and
bpif elements where r's will be replaced by x's. The expression for QI can be written as:
N N N N N N N N
Ql = LPGi LPGjaplj - LPDi LPGjaplj - LPGi LPDaplj + LPDi LPDjaplj -
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*K j*-K i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K
N N N N N N N N
LPGi LQGjbplj +IPDi LQGjbplj +LPGi LQDjbplj - IpDi LQDjbplj +
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K
N N N N N N N N
LQGi LPGjbplj - LQDi LPGjbplj - LQGi LPDjbpij + LQDi IPDjbpij +
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K
N N N N N N N N
LQGi LQGjapij - LQDi LQGjapij - LQGi LQDjapij + LQDi L:QDjapij
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1
i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K i*-K j*-K
(4.24)
where,
apij = 1V,I~lOS(Oi -oJ
bpij = 1V,I~lin(oi -oJ
(4.25)
After differentiating QI with respect to PDxy and performing the mathematical operations
similar to that done for Equation (4.21), the following can be written:
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(4.26)
where,
jN N N N N N~=2~~~-~~~-~~~+~~~-~~~+~~~~
j~K j~K j~K j~K j~K j~K
N N N N N N
+ LQGjbpyj - J-Lxy LPDjbpxj + LQDjbpxj - J-Lxy LPGjbpyj +J-Lxy LPDjbpyj - LQDjbpyj
j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1
j~K j~K j~K j~K j~K j~K
Solving Equations (4.23) and (4.26) simultaneously for Uxy and Wxy,
(4.27)
It is important to note that apij and bpi;" parameters for the reactive part have to be
calculated by the relationship given in Equation (4.25).
After evaluating Uxy and Vxy, the share of transmission loss of each generator can be
evaluated using Equations (4.19) and (4.20).
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4.5 Example System
Consider the hypothetical system shown in Figure 3.1 where Generator A, connected to
Bus1, is supplying power to its contracted customer A, connected to Bus5. The real and
reactive power generation by Generator A can be written mathematically as:
(4.28)
(4.29)
Similarly, the real and reactive power generation of Generator B can be written as:
(4.30)
(4.31)
The loss allocations for both generators are obtained by determining the parameters U1S,
WlS, U26 and W26 and using Equations (4.19) and (4.20).
Previously, the loss allocations for Generator A and B were obtained using the
equations which were derived for this particular system shown in Fig. 3.1 [48]. Those
equations were not generalized and cannot be used in any other system. lt has been
suggested that for other networks new set of equations would be required. In this work,
a generalized equation has been developed that would be applicable to any power
system network. Some results are shown below in Tables 4.4-4.5 obtained by the
particular set of equations [48,70] and the equations derived in this work. Different load
parameters have been used for obtaining the loss allocations utilizing the newly derived
generalized equation.
The demand of Customers A and B have been kept fixed and their reactive power ratio
has been varied from 0.6 to 0.3. Allocations of transmission loss have been calculated
for the corresponding variations in reactive power. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the
calculated allocation of transmission loss for Generators A and B. The real load demand
of Customer A and B is 1.5 p.u.
lt can be noticed from Tables 4.1 and 4.2 that for both real and reactive powers,
difference in loss allocation for Generator A, obtained from two different methods,
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increases with a decrease of reactive ratio of Customer A while the opposite happens to
Generator B.
Table 4.1: Real Loss Allocation for equal load and equal reactive ratio.
Reactive Ratio A's Share of Loss (p.u.) B's Share of Loss (p.u.)
f.J ILFA MTLA ILFA MTLA
0.6 0.0405 0.0412 0.0579 0.0609
0.5 0.0360 0.0370 0.0518 0.0544
0.4 0.0322 0.0337 0.0469 0.0484
0.3 0.0293 0.0310 0.0432 0.0443
Table 4.2: Reactive Loss Allocation for equal load and equal reactive ratio.
Reactive Ratio A's Share of Loss (p.u.) B's Share of Loss (p.u.)
f.J ILFA MTLA ILFA MTLA
0.6 0.2430 0.2441 0.3277 0.3398
0.5 0.2158 0.2191 0.2934 0.3038
0.4 0.1940 0.2000 0.2653 0.2705
0.3 0.1769 0.1838 0.2432 0.2475
Figures 4.1 to 4.4 show the real and reactive loss allocation for both generators for a
reactive ratio of 0.6. Each figure shows two curves, one from the MTLA and the other
from the ILFA.
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Fig. 4.4: Allocation of reactive transmission loss for Generator B (u=0.6).
These figures represent a comparative view of transmission loss allocations obtained
from the two different methods. Loss allocations for Generator A by the ILFA and the
MTLA are very close for both real and reactive powers whereas those for Generator B
are little different. For Generator B, losses allocated by the MTLA are slightly higher
than losses allocated by the ILFA for both real and reactive powers.
4.6 Allocation of Transmission Loss by Using the Generalized MTLA
The MTLA equations were network dependent. New sets of equations are required to
obtain transmission losses for every new system. On the other hand, the generalized
MTLA is versatile and can be readily applied to a network of any size. A computer
program has been developed to solve Equations (4.19) and (4.20) for the determination
of the share of transmission losses. Different load conditions have been taken into
consideration to find the transmission loss shares. The results have been compared with
the shares obtained in the illcrementalload flow technique.
To start with the allocation process, the loads are varied from zero to their respective
load demands. In the MTLA, the loads are increased step by step in a sequential
manner. In any iteration, only one customer load is increased while the other loads are
held fixed. Assume that load La is increased by a step of ALa while Lb stays at its
previous level. Since the load demand of Customer B (Lb) is unchanged, the resulting
incremental transmission loss becomes the liability of Generator A to produce it in
order to support the incremental load demand of Customer A. In the next iteration, Lb is
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increased by a step size of Mb while La remains fixed. Again, generations and
transmission losses are calculated and the incremental transmission loss is assigned to
Generator B.
A variety of load combinations have been utilized to find the transmission loss
allocation by the MTLA. Both real load demand and different reactive ratio of both
customers have been varied and the transmission loss shares have been determined. The
results obtained from the MTLA have been compared with those obtained from the
ILFA.
4.6.1 Unequal Load and Different Reactive Ratio
In this section, the reactive ratios as well as the real loads of Customers A and B are
considered different. The reactive ratio for Customer B has been varied while
maintaining a constant reactive ratio for Customer A. Three different constant reactive
ratios for Customer A have been considered in this evaluation. Transmission loss
allocations are shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The real load demands of Customer A and
B are 1.5 and 0.9 p.u. respectively.
The real loss allocations for Generator A as obtained from the two methods have the
maximum difference when two loads have the maximum difference in their reactive
ratios. But the loss allocations for Generator B as obtained by the two methods are very
close. The reactive loss allocations as obtained by ILFA and MTLA are very close too.
Table 4.3: Real Loss Allocation for unequal load and unequal reactive ratio.
Reactive Ratio A's Share of Loss (p.u.) B's Share of Loss (p.u.)
Pa Pb ILFA MTLA ILFA MTLA
0.6 0.3 0.0397 0.0452 0.0148 0.0150
0.6 0.4 0.0401 0.0448 0.0157 0.0162
0.6 0.5 0.0405 0.0444 0.0171 0.0177
0.5 0.3 0.0359 0.0399 0.0147 0.0151
0.5 0.4 0.0363 0.0396 0.0156 0.0163
0.4 0.3 0.0328 0.0356 0.0147 0.0152
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Table 4.4: Reactive Loss Allocation for unequa1load and unequal reactive
ratio.
Reactive Ratio A's Share of Loss (p.u.) B's Share of Loss (p.u.)
Pa Ph ILFA MTLA ILFA MTLA
0.6 0.3 0.2390 0.2633 0.0836 0.0846
0.6 0.4 0.2407 0.2612 0.0899 0.0908
0.6 0.5 0.2427 0.2591 0.0974 0.0991
0.5 0.3 0.2156 0.2331 0.0832 0.0850
0.5 0.4 0.2170 0.2314 0.0894 0.0914
0.4 0.3 0.1965 0.2088 0.0825 0.0853
Figures 4.5 - 4.8 show loss allocations for different combinations of real loads and
reactive ratios.
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From Figures 4.5 - 4.8, it can be seen that the loss allocations for Generator A as
obtained by the two methods have higher differences than those of Generator B. Loss
allocations for Generator A and B for two different reactive ratios have been plotted
(Figures 4.17 - 4.24) and it can be noticed that Generator Bls loss allocations as
obtained by the two methods are very close to each other.
4.7 Comparison and Discussion
The loss allocations obtained by the two different methods, the ILFA and the MTLA,
differ as the real and/or reactive load changes. It is interesting to note the effect of
reactive ratio and different load demands on loss allocations. Tables 4.3 - 4.4 and
Figures 4.5 - 4.8 present the loss allocations obtained by the MTLA as well as by the
ILFA which clearly indicate that the differences between the loss allocations obtained
by the two methods vary from nominal to significant magnitudes. The assessment of
loss allocation by the MTLA is based on a number of assumptions. The assumptions
have been adopted to keep the MTLA relatively simple and manageable.
In order to have a better view of the loss allocations obtained by the two methods,
percentage of errors have been calculated for all load combinations. The loss allocations
obtained by the ILFA have been taken as base values for error calculation.
Table 4.5 indicates the errors calculated from the two different methods used for
obtaining transmission loss allocation shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. The real load
demands ofCustonlers A and Bare 1.5 and 0.9 p.u. respectively.
Table 4.5: Error table for two different methods.
Reactive Ratio Percentage of Error of Percentage of Error of
Real Loss Allocation Reactive Loss Allocation
Pa Ph A B A B
0.6 0.3 -13.92 -1.75 -10.15 -1.11
0.6 0.4 -11.52 -2.72 -8.48 -1.01
0.6 0.5 -9.43 -3.56 -6.75 -1.66
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0.5 0.3 -11.03 -2.77 -8.11 -2.11
0.5 0.4 -8.85 -4.01 -6.62 -2.21
0.4 0.3 -8.61 -3.39 -6.23 -3.39
The maximum error occurs when the two different load demands have the maximum
difference in their reactive ratios. Although the errors in loss allocations for Generator B
are nominal, the errors for Generator A in some cases are high.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show transmission loss allocations using old network dependent
equations [48] and new generalized equations. Results obtained from the generalized
equations are exactly same as the results obtained using the network dependent
equations.
Table 4.6: Allocation of real transmission loss using old and new sets of equations.
Load J.l Generator Loss Allocation
A B A B Network Dependent Generalized Eqn.
Old Eqn.
1.5 1.5 0.6 0.6 A 0.0412 0.0412
B 0.0609 0.0609
Total 0.1022 0.1022
1.5 1.5 0.6 0.3 A 0.0436 0.0436
B 0.0437 0.0437
Total 0.0874 0.0874
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Table 4.7: Allocation of reactive transmission loss using old and new sets of equations.
Load fJ. Generator Loss Allocation
A B A B Network Dependent Generalized Eqn.
Old Eqn.
1.5 1.5 0.6 0.6 A 0.2441 0.2441
B 0.3398 0.3398
Total 0.5839 0.5839
1.5 1.5 0.6 0.3 A 0.2561 0.2561
B 0.2446 0.2446
Total 0.5008 0.5008
4.8 Loss Allocation in the IEEE-RTS
The IEEE 24 bus Reliability Test System mentioned in Chapter 3 is utilized in this
section to provide numerical examples. A mixed-mode market system has been
considered where both pool and bilateral contracts exist at the same time. A
hypothetical Power Pool for IEEE RTS determines the market clearing price from the
supply curve of power and from the demand of total power. The bids and the market
clearing price is mentioned in Chapter 3. The demand side bidding has not been
considered in the IEEE system. The power demand in the system for a particular hour is
considered to be 2494 MW of real power 589 MVAR of reactive power. Two bilateral
contracts have been considered in the system. First contract, known as Contract A, is
between the load at Bus 9 and the generators at Bus 7. The load at Bus 9 is termed as
Customer A and the generators at Bus 7 are termed Generator A. At Bus 7 there are
three 1.00 p.u. (real) units and these plants are already selling some energy to the pool.
They have a contract with the customer at Bus 9 for supplying 1.76 p.u. of real power
and 0.3621 p.u. of reactive power.
Second contract known as Contract B is between load at the Bus 19 and the generators
at Bus 23. The load at Bus 19 is termed as Customer B and the generators at Bus 23 are
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termed Generator B. At Bus 23, there are two 1.55 p.u. (real) and one 3.50 p.u. (real)
generators with a total capacity of 6.10 p.u. (real) These generators are also supplying
the pool and have a bilateral contract with the customer at Bus 19 for supplying
1.81+jO.37 p.u. of apparent power.
Table 4.8 shows the loads and generations at different buses for the pool system without
considering the bilateral contracts.
Table 4.8: Loads and Generations in the IEEE-RTS for the pool system (base case).
Bus Load (p.u.) Generation (p.u.)
Real Reactive Real Reactive
1 1.0800 0.2200 1.5753 0.2075
2 0.9700 0.2000 1.7200 0.0511
3 1.8000 0.3700 0.0000 0.0000
4 0.7400 0.1500 0.0000 0.0000
5 0.7100 0.1400 0.0000 0.0000
6 1.3600 1.1000 0.0000 0.0000
7 1.2500 0.2500 1.0000 0.9520
8 1.7100 0.3500 0.0000 0.0000
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
10 1.9500 0.4000 0.0000 0.0000
11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
13 2.6500 0.5400 3.9400 1.0036
14 1.9400 0.3900 0.0000 0.0000
15 3.1700 0.6400 1.5500 1.5847
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16 1.0000 0.2000 1.5500 1.0991
17 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
18 3.3300 0.6800 4.0000 0.6108
19 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
20 1.2800 0.2600 0.0000 0.0000
21 0.0000 0.0000 4.0000 -0.4205
22 0.0000 0.0000 3.0000 -0.3799
23 0.0000 0.0000 3.1000 -0.1185
24 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Total generations in the system are 25.4353 p.u. and 4.5899 p.u. of real and reactive
power respectively. Transmission losses can be calculated from the total generations
and demands in the system. Total real and reactive power losses in the network are
0.4953 p.u. and -1.3001 p.u. without considering the bilateral contracts.
In the MTLA, the loads are increased in incremental steps in a sequential manner. In
any iteration, only one customer load is increased while the other loads are held fixed.
Let us assume that load L9 is increased by a step of AL9 while L19 stays at its previous
level. A computer program has been developed to find the generation and transmission
loss for this condition. Since load demand of Customer B (L19) is unchanged, the
resulting incremental transmission loss becomes the obligation of Generator A. In the
next iteration, L19 has been increased by a step size of AL19 while L9 remains fixed.
Again, generations and transmission losses are calculated and the incremental loss is
assigned to Generator B. This is done as only L19 has been incremented in this iteration
and Generator B is providing power to Customer B.
Generators A and B are connected to Buses 7 and 23 respectively, which have been
declared as PV bus. The generations at Buses 7 and 23 have been calculated on the
basis of current load (either L90r L19) and transmission loss calculated from the previous
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load. Since the transmission loss for the first increment of load (L9 or L19) is unknown,
the output of Generator A or B (G7 or G23) has been specified equal to M9 or M19
during the first increment of Customer A or B's load. In the next increment of Customer
A or B's load, G7 or G23 has been updated as L9 or L19 plus the corresponding share of
the line loss from the previous iteration. This approximation works well as long as the
step size remains small which is 1MW (0.01 p.u.) in this case.
Table 4.9 shows loads and required generations (loads + allocated transmission losses)
at Buses 7, 9, 19 and 23 and the transmission losses. The Generators at Bus 7 are
required to produce 2.7006+j 1.5388 p.u. in order to supply the contracted load at Bus 9.
This includes the contracted load and the transmission loss associated with supplying
this load. This required generation also includes generation for the pool which is
1.0000+j1.4336 p.u. Similarly, Generators at Bus 23 are required to produce
4.9123+j 1.1109 p.u. in order to fulfill the contract along with the supply to the pool.
Table 4.9: Contracted loads and generations in the IEEE-RTS determined by MTLA.
L9 L19 G7 G23 Line loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real 1.76 1.81 2.7006 4.9123 0.4382
Reactive 0.3621 0.37 1.5388 1.1109 -1.5161
Table 4.10 shows the transmission loss allocation, both real and reactive, determined by
the ILFA and MTLA.
Table 4.10: Loss Allocation by ILFA and MTLA.
Method Total Loss (p.u.) Calculated Loss Calculated Loss
Share ofA (p.u.) Share ofB (p.u.)
Real Reactive Real Reactive Real Reactive
ILFA 0.4286 -1.5530 -0.0706 -0.2836 0.0039 0.0306
MTLA 0.4382 -1.5161 -0.0595 -0.2404 0.0024 0.0243
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Table 4.10 provides a comparative presentation of loss allocations obtained by two
different methods. Total real transmission loss obtained by the MTLA is 0.4382 p.u.
compared to 0.4286 p.u. calculated by the ILFA. Total reactive transmission loss
obtained by the MTLA is -1.5161 p.u. compared to -1.5561 p.u. determined by the
ILFA. Transmission loss shares determined by the MTLA for Contract A, both real and
reactive, are negative which is in agreement with the loss allocations obtained by the
ILFA. This indicates that the power flows for supplying the contracted loads oppose the
initial flows in some of the lines. On the other hand, transmission loss allocations for
Contract B are positive as determined by both methods.
Figures 4.9-4.12 show the loss allocations obtained from two different methods. The
loss allocations for both real and reactive power are plotted against their real load
demand. It can be seen from Figures 4.9-4.12 that the curves of loss allocations,
obtained from two methods, exhibit similar trend. The discrepancies in the graphs are
discussed in Section 4.9.
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Fig. 4.12: Transmission loss allocations of reactive power for Contract B obtained by
the ILFA and MTLA.
Figures 4.9-4.12 show that loss allocations obtained for the Contracts A and Busing
two different methods are very close. This is true for real loss allocations as well as
reactive loss allocations. The difference in Loss allocations for Contract B, obtained by
two methods, is higher than the difference in loss allocations for Contract A. TIus is
because loss allocations obtained for the Contract B is very small compared to the total
loss as well as Contract A's loss allocation. Contract B's loss allocations have minimal
effect on the total loss allocation. In the next step loads of Contract B, both real and
reactive, are increased in order to observe the change in loss allocation. The new load at
Bus 19, which is in bilateral contract with Generator at Bus 23, is 2.81 p.u. real with a
reactive part of 0.5744 p.u. The loads belonging to Contract A remain same.
Transmission loss allocations using the ILFA and the MTLA for the increased at load at
Bus 19 are shown in the Table 4.11.
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Table 4.11: Loss Allocation by ILFA and MTLA with increased load at Bus 19.
Method Total Loss (p.u.) Calculated Loss Calculated Loss
Share of A (p.u.) Share ofB (p.u.)
Real Reactive Real Reactive Real Reactive
ILFA 0.4403 -1.4577 -0.0706 -0.2836 0.0156 0.1259
MTLA 0.4504 -1.4267 -0.0595 -0.2404 0.0145 0.1138
Table 4.11 shows that loss allocation for Contract B has become significantly higher
because Generator at Bus 23 is supplying more power to its increased contracted load at
Bus 19. It can be observed that loss allocations, both real and reactive, for Contract A
remain same as in the previous case. This is obvious due to the fact that load at Bus 9
which is in contract with Generator at Bus 7 did not change. Table 4.11 also shows that
transmission loss allocations obtained using two different methods are very close.
Figures 4.13-4.16 show the new transmission loss allocations with increased load at Bus
19.
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Fig. 4.13: Transmission loss allocations of real power for Contract A obtained by the
ILFA and MTLA with increased load at Bus 19.
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Fig. 4.14: Transmission loss allocations of real power for Contract B obtained by the
ILFA and MTLA with increased load at Bus 19.
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Fig. 4.15: Transmission loss allocations of reactive power for Contract A obtained by
the ILFA and MTLA with increased load at Bus 19.
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Fig. 4.16: Transmission loss allocations of reactive power for Contract B obtained by
the ILFA and MTLA with increased load at Bus 19.
4.8.1 Loss Allocation involving Multiple Generator and Loads in the IEEE-RTS
The developed methods can be utilized to calculate loss allocation between two buses in
a power system network. A generator may, however, be contracted to supply more than
one load or a load may have contracts with multiple generators to receive power. The
ILFA and MTLA can identify and calculate loss allocation for each individual
transaction when a generator or a load has multiple contracts at the same time. In the
IEEE system, it has been assumed that the Generator connected at Bus 7 is supplying
power to loads at Buses 8, 9 and 10 and the Generator connected at Bus 23 is supplying
power to Buses 10 and 19. These transactions are bilateral contracts. In order to make
the calculations simple it has been assumed that all contracted loads are equal to 0.96+j
0.197 p.u. In addition to the contracted loads, Buses 8 and 10 have system loads of
1.71+j0.35 p.u. and 1.95+j0.40 p.u. respectively. Table 4.12 shows transmission loss
allocation for these bilateral contracts. It should be noted that the load at Bus lOis
receiving power from two generators, one at Bus & and the other at Bus 23.
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Table 4.12: Loss Allocation for multiple bilateral contracts.
Generator Load Total Bus Load Loss (p.u.)
Bus Bus (p.u.)
Real Reactive Real Reactive
8 2.67 0.547 0.0451 0.2129
7
9 0.97 0.197 -0.0206 -0.1043
10 3.87 0.794 0.0005 0.1409
10 3.87 0.794 0.0442 0.5279
23
19 0.96 0.197 0.0254 0.3056
4.9 Overview and Discussion
Two different methods for obtaining loss allocation obtained from, ILFA and MTLA,
are utilized to obtain transmission loss allocation for two different test systems. The test
system shown in Figure 3.1 is a small network and used for better understanding of the
methods. In the test system, a deregulation of the network has been considered where
only bilateral contract can exist. Deregulation means open competition between the
generating utilities for supplying the load demands. It should work like open market for
any other commodity and market should be solely controlled by demand and supply of
power. The test system gives a glimpse of an extreme example of deregulation. The
system consists of two bilateral contracts and a number of load combinations were used
to obtain the transmission losses for these two contracts. The total load in the system is
demanded by two bulk customers and supplied by two generators. The results obtained
using the ILFA and the MTLA are shown in tables and graphs. It can be seen from the
results that the obtained loss allocations are very close.
At present, many utilities are facing difficult challenge to transform their system from a
full monopoly to a full deregulated one. Pool system is working as an in-between
system. Some utilities are operating solely on pool system and some are allowing
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bilateral contracts along with the pool system. The IEEE-RTS shown in Appendix-A
has been used in the work as a representation of the combined or mixed-mode system.
The system is assumed to operate using a pool system. The suppliers compete to sell
their electric power through bidding at the power pool. The market price is set by the
price of the last bidder where the total generation offered equals to the total load
demand. In the IEEE-RTS two bilateral contracts are considered within the existing
power pool operation. The contracted generators supply their firm customers in addition
they also sell power to the power pool through bidding. The resulting transmission
losses for supplying the contracted power have been calculated for the contracted
generators by the ILFA and the MTLA. Transmission loss allocations for the bilateral
contracts in the IEEE system, obtained utilizing two different methods, follow each
other closely.
The loss allocations obtained by the two different methods, the ILFA and the MTLA,
for both systems, the Test system and the IEEE RTS, are shown in tabular and graphical
form. Results obtained from the two proposed methods differ due to various
assumptions made in the formulation of these methods. The assessment of loss
allocation by the MTLA is based on a nurrlber of assumptions. These assumptions have
been adopted to keep the MTLA relatively simple and manageable.
In the test system the transmission lines are considered to be short line and hence the
effect of charging currents is ignored e.g. susceptance has been considered to be zero.
This means reactive power support for the network is originated from the generators
only. But in the IEEE-RTS, transmission lines considered to be medium lines and the
charging currents are taken into consideration. This means the transmission lines
provide considerable amount of reactive power support for the system network. The line
susceptances are considered to be lumped at the end of the lines. In MTLA, it is
required to find the initial conditions, real and reactive power generations, voltages and
bus angles in the network, for the calculation of loss allocations. It has been assumed
that reactive power support from the transmission lines are lumped at the generating
buses only to make the method simple. This assumption, however contributes some
differences in the loss allocation obtained the ILFA and MTLA.
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The mathematical method described in this chapter has some unique characteristics.
One of the important characteristics of the MTLA is it can be used for contracts
between any buses in a power system network. If a load at a certain bus contracts
several generators at different buses for supplying its demand, the MTLA can determine
loss allocations separately for each of the generators. The Figure 4.17 shows generation
and load matrix in a power system network. In this figure rows corresponds to
generating buses while loads are places in the columns in accordance with the MTLA..
Any matrix element (Le. 2,n) means the load at bus n is receiving partial or full support
from the generator connected at bus 2. The load at bus n may have other supplier and in
that case the column n will have non-zero value in other rows. If column has non-zero
value in the ith row then it indicates that the load at bus n also receiving power supply
from the generator connected to bus i.
LOAD
1,1 1,2 1,3 ... ... l,i Ij l,n
G 2,1 2,2 2,3 ... ... 2,i 2j 2,n
E
N 3,1 3,2 3,3 ... ... 3,i 3j 3,n
E ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
R
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
A
T
i,1 i,2 i,3 1,1 ij l,n
I j,1 j,2 j,3 j,1 j,J j,n
0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
N
n,1 N,2 n,3 n,1 n,J n,n
Fig. 4.17: Generation-load matrix.
The developed method, MTLA, can be used to find the loss allocation for each of the
transaction individually. For example, load at bus 3 has bilateral contracts with
generators at buses 1,2 and j. Now using Equation (4.27) transmission loss allocations,
both real reactive, can be obtained for bilateral contracts between buses 3 and 1, buses 3
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and 2 and buses 3 and j. Similarly a generator can supply multiple loads at the same
time according to bilateral contracts and loss allocations for each contracts can be
calculated separately. For example, generator at bus i is supplying power to loads
connected to 2, 3 and n under bilateral contracts. The MTLA allows the generator at bus
i to know how much transmission losses occur, both real and reactive, for supplying
loads at buses 2, 3 and n individually. Thus the implementation of the MTLA gives a
chance to know all individual loss allocations due to individual bilateral contracts in a
power system network right away.
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CHAPTER 5: TRANSMISSION LOSS IN THE IEEE-RTS - UNDER
DIFFERENT SCHEMES
5.1 Power System Operation
A Power system is a composite entity. Its three functional areas are generation,
transmission and distribution. The combination of these three utilities and their
optinlized utilization is the goal of power system operation. This goal is achieved
through several operating procedures such as load forecast, unit commitment and finally
load dispatch.
Loads in a network follow some dynamic patterns and go high and low at different
times of a day. Load forecast predicts the nature of load demand from load patterns and
coming events with a high accuracy. The utilities use this prediction for determining the
number of generating units required to meet the anticipated load, an essential activity of
a power system, generally known as unit commitment.
Unit commitment dictates the number of generating units to be in the spinning mode to
meet load demand during the 24 hours. It also states the order of the units to be engaged
in power production according to the production cost of these units and starting time of
the units. Production cost varies from unit to unit depending on their design, age and
working principle. The production costs of hydro units are far less than those of the gas
turbine and thermal units. It costs much more to produce energy in a gas turbine unit
compared to that of a similar size thermal unit. The starting time of gas turbine and
hydro units are much shorter than conventional thermal plants. These two factors,
production cost and starting time, determine the allocation of load among various units.
This activity is commonly known as load dispatch.
Once the load dispatching schedule has been prepared, the need for an AC load flow
analysis comes into the picture. An AC load flow analysis provides bus voltages, line
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flows, power mismatch etc. and helps to determine the feasibility of a load dispatching
schedule.
5.1.1 Economic Load Dispatch
The main objective of an economic load dispatch is to distribute the system's total load
plus transmission loss to its committed generating units in such a way that the total
production cost becomes minimum. Since the load in a system varies on a continuous
basis, the activity of economic load dispatch therefore distributes the load and
transmission loss on a continuous basis. It is a cost minimizing activity with several
constraints. These constraints originate from the requirements and limitations imposed
either by network design and or operating conditions. Some typical constraints are
reactive power flow, voltage profile and line capacity.
At present, power generating plants are mostly run by fossil fuel and water force. In
fossil fuel-run power stations, fuel cost is the major source of expenditure for the
generation of real power. But for hydro stations the fuel cost is apparently zero.
Operating characteristics of a typical thermal power station is usually described by a
quadratic cost curve in Fig. 5.1. The parameters of the quadratic cost function can be
obtained from experimental data [72,75,76,77].
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Fig.5.1: Typical cost curve ofa thermal power station.
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F=aP 2 +bP+c
where,
P = power generation
$/Hr (5.1)
a, b and c = cost parameters
The output of each generator is constrained by its minimum and maximum output
limits. The minimum limit is determined either from economical or technical
infeasibility considerations.
Marginal cost of power production can easily be obtained as:
dF
-=A=aP+b
dP
$/MwHr (5.2)
Marginal cost is also known as unit (plant) Lambda (A). Marginal cost represents cost of
one additional unit of power. The goal is to operate all units with the same value of
Lambda in order to make the system operation the most economic. The optimal point of
operation of a network will be achieved when all generators will have same marginal
cost. If Transmission loss PI is also considered then the marginal cost becomes:
(5.3)
It has been considered that power loss in transmission network is happening at the same
rate of Lambda. For economic dispatch the system wide marginal cost (As) becomes:
A=dF[ 1 ]
s dP (1- a:; (5.4)
Economic load dispatch for a power system network can be obtained using different
existing methods such as Shoult's technique, First Order Gradient Method and Dynamic
Programming Method. In this thesis Shoult's method has been used to obtain the
economic load dispatch [74]. This method is very popular and widely used.
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5.2 Transmission Loss Allocation in a Bilateral Contract
Transmission loss in an electric power system network plays an important role in the
operation of the network. In an old-fashioned monopoly system, the operation of the
network emphasizes optimal operation or minimal cost, not on minimal transmission
loss. In a monopoly system, transmission loss is the liability of the whole utility and the
operator distributes the loss among its generators according to the output dictated by the
economic load dispatch.
Under deregulation, a generating plant can sign a bilateral contract with any customer in
the system. According to a bilateral contract, the generating plant has the responsibility
of providing power to the contracted load. Any flow of electricity incurs some losses
and the contracted generating plant needs to compensate for the loss too. Transmission
loss allocations, both real and reactive, can be determined by the methods described in
Chapter 3 and 4. Once the generator knows its share of transmission loss for supplying a
particular load it can consider different options for compensating for that loss. The
possible different choices for a generator are:
• Demand and Loss Provided by the Same Generator.
• Loss Provided by Different Generator or ISO.
• Contracted Generator as a Part ofEconomic Load Dispatch.
The following sections describe different options of a generating plant for compensating
the transmission loss. IEEE 24-bus Reliability Test System has been used to study
different scenarios. The algorithm for economic load dispatch incorporating the bilateral
contracts is summarized below:
1. Obtain the basic load flow for the system without considering the bilateral
contracts.
2. Use the data obtained in basic load flow in the Economic Load Dispatch
program for the calculation of optimal power generation.
3. Use either ILFA or MTLA to calculate transmission loss allocation for the
bilateral contracts.
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4. Use loss allocation results for new load flow considering the bilateral contracts.
5. Use data obtained in step 4 to recalculate the optimal generation by Economic
Load Dispatch program for different schemes.
5.2.1 Demand and Loss Provided by the Same Generator
A generator in a bilateral contract has the responsibility to supply the contracted load as
well as associated transmission losses. The contracted generator is allowed to make as
many contracts as it wants and it is also able to know transmission losses related to each
transaction of power. After knowing the transmission losses related to each transaction,
the generator can decide whether to provide the losses from its own sources or buy it
from different sources. This decision depends on various issues such as relative distance
between the plant and the contracted loads, demand and market price ofpower etc.
The network operation in this example is considered to be done by Economic Load
Dispatch. A basic load demand of 2400 MW is considered in the IEEE-RTS network
before the bilateral contract comes in. Load demands, real and reactive, and priority
loading order of generating units [75,76] are shown in Table 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.
Table 5.1 Loads connected to different buses in the IEEE-RTS.
Bus Load
Real (MW) Reactive (MVAR)
1 108 22
2 97 20
3 180 37
4 74 15
5 71 14
6 136 28
7 125 25
8 171 35
9 000 00
10 195 40
11 000 00
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12 000 00
13 265 54
14 100 39
15 317 64
16 100 20
17 000 00
18 333 68
19 000 00
20 128 26
21 000 00
22 000 00
23 000 00
24 000 00
Table 5.2: Priority loading order of generating units.
Loading Order Unit Identification Capacity (MW) Bus
1 #1 50 22
2 #2 50 22
3 #3 50 22
4 #4 50 22
5 #5 50 22
6 #6 50 22
7 #7 400 18
8 #8 400 21
9 #9 350 23
10 #10 197 13
11 #11 197 13
12 #12 197 13
13 #13 155 16
14 #14 155 23
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15 #15 155 23
16 #16 155 15
17 #17 100 7
18 #18 100 7
19 #19 100 7
20 #20 76 1
21 #21 76 1
22 #22 76 2
23 #23 76 2
24 #24 12 15
25 #25 12 15
26 #26 12 15
27 #27 12 15
28 #28 12 15
29 #29 20 1
30 #30 20 1
31 #31 20 2
32 #32 20 2
Shoult's method has been used to obtain the Economic Load Dispatch for this system.
The total transmission loss, system Lambda (As) and running cost for supplying the load
demand of 2400 MW are 62.1753 MW, 12.55664 $/MWHr and 26960.89 $/Hr.
Marginal cost of real power for the system is 12.55664 $/MWHr.
A bilateral contract can be considered once the data for the pool operation are obtained.
Consider a bilateral contract between the generators connected at Bus 7 and the
customer connected at Bus 9. The Customer has a load demand of 175 MW of real
power and 36 MVAR of reactive power. According to the bilateral contract generators
at Bus 7 are responsible for supplying the load at Bus 9. Generators at Bus 7 are
considering supplying both load and its associated transmission losses. Transmission
losses related to the bilateral transaction, real and reactive, are determined using one of
the developed methods. Generators at Bus 7 have a negative transmission loss
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allocation if they supply the load at Bus 9 which is - 4.06866 MW. The combined
output of the generators at Bus7 is:
G7 =120+175+loss MW
The Generators at Bus 7 are supplying 120 MW to the pool and 175 MW to Bus 9 and
the associated loss. Transmission loss is negative in this case. Economic Load Dispatch
program has been run again with a constraint that generators at Bus 7 are providing
power to the contracted load at Bus 9. The total transmission loss, system Lambda (As)
and running cost for supplying the load demand of 2575 MW are 56.3163 MW,
12.32662 $/MWHr and 30823.06 $/Hr. Marginal cost of real power for the system is
12.32662 $/MWHr.
Transmission loss has been found to be negative for the bilateral contract between
generators at Bus 7 and load at Bus 9. The negative transmission loss is the result of
counter-flow and the bilateral contract should not have the full benefit of transmission
loss reduction. It should be divided equally between the pool and the bilateral contract.
The total transmission loss, system Lambda (As) and running cost for supplying the load
demand are 56.3915 MW, 12.31884 $/MWHr and 30846.22 $/Hr. Marginal cost of real
power for the system is 12.31884 $/MWHr when the bilateral contract is awarded half
of the transmission loss reduction (2.03433 MW).
5.2.2 Loss Provided by a Different Generator or ISO
A customer may want to buy power from a remote generator and this decision may be
taken because of various considerations e.g. encouraging green power, subsidizing
remote generating units etc. But the contracted generating unit may want to supply the
contracted load only. In this situation the generating plant will depend on some other
generating plants which are situated near its contracted customer. The contracted plant
might want a contract with a local plant for supplying the loss occurred due to its
contract with the customer. This would be a trilateral contract.
In another model, the generating utilities and the customers can sign bilateral contracts
and the ISO will be responsible for supplying the loss occurred due to all contracts. The
ISO will determine a suitable plant based on location and price of electricity for buying
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energy to compensate for the loss incurred by the bilateral contracts. All bilateral parties
involved would pay the ISO for their respective allocated losses.
In this situation the contracted generators at Bus 9 will produce
G7 =120+175 MW
The total transmission loss, system Lambda (As) and running cost for supplying the load
demand are 56.4878 MW, 12.30359 $/MWHr and 30866.68 $/Hr. Marginal cost of real
power for the system is 12.30359 $/MWHr.
5.2.3 Contracted Generator as a Part of Economic Load Dispatch
A generator, in bilateral contract with a customer, may want to include itself in the
economic load dispatch schedule of the power system network that it uses to supply its
contracted load. When a generator becomes a part of the economic load dispatch
schedule of a network, the term bilateral contract apparently does not exist anymore.
But from the customer's point of view, there is nothing to object as long as his load
demand is satisfied. From the Generator's point of view, it would want to be a part of
the whole network, if it proves to be profitable. The generator would pay the utility/ISO
for the increase in total operating cost due to its inclusion in the system. The total
transmission loss, system Lambda (As) and running cost for supplying the load demand
of2575 MWare 57.8316 MW, 13.59401 $/MWHr and 29509.67 $/Hr. Marginal cost of
real power for the system is 13.59401 $/MWHr when the contracted generator includes
itself in the Economic Load Dispatch schedule.
5.2.4 Comparison of Costs With Different Schemes
Different schemes of transmission loss compensation have been considered where a
generator is in a bilateral contract for supplying a contracted load. Generators connected
to Bus 7 are supplying the demand of customer connected at Bus 9. Table 5.3 shows a
comparative study of cost for supplying 175 MW of power demand by the customer at
Bus 9.
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Table 5.3: Comparative Cost Study for Different Schemes.
Scheme Total Cost ($/Hr) Cost of Contract ($/Hr)
Base Case 26960.89 -
Loss Supplied Full Loss 30823.06 3862.17
by Generator
Half Loss (Counter- 30846.22 3885.33
Flow only)
Loss Supplied by the ISO 30866.68 3905.79
Contracted Generator as a Part of 29509.67 2548.78
ELD
From Table 5.3 it is evident that the lowest cost of bilateral contract can be achieved if
the contracted generator becomes part of the Economic Load Dispatch scheme. The
lowest cost in this case is 2548.78 $/hr
Another load condition has been considered where positive transmission loss allocation
is involved. The pool has a base load of 2820 MW of real power and 567 MVAR of
reactive power. A bilateral contract is assumed between generators at Bus 7 and load at
Bus 9. The customer at Bus 9 has a load demand of 175 MW of real power and 36
MVAR of reactive power. Total cost from different schemes are shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Comparative Cost Study for positive transmission loss allocation.
Scheme Total Cost ($/Hr) Cost of Contract ($/Hr)
Base Case 33389.8 -
Loss Supplied by Generator 36998.5 3608.7
Loss Supplied by the ISO 36993 3603.2
Contracted Generator as a 36929.3 3539.5
Part ofELD
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In case of positive transmission loss allocation, the lowest cost of providing power to a
contracted load is originated from the scheme where the contracted generator is a part of
Economic Load Dispatch. In this case, the lowest cost is 3539.5 $/Hr.
It has been found that if the contracted generator includes itself in the Economic Load
Dispatch schedule then it will have the mininlunl cost. In this scheme, the contracted
generator will have no control over supplying power to its contracted load rather it will
depend on the decision of the ISO. This may impact the reliability of supply to the
contracted load.
5.3 Counter-flow
In an electrical power system network, it is possible that one or more generators may set
a flow of power that opposes the flow of the network and thereby decreases the overall
transmission loss. This flow which opposes the initial flow in a particular transmission
line is sometimes termed as counter-flow. Logically, a generator can contribute to a
decrease in transmission loss only when there exists an initial flow in the opposite
direction by another generator. Without the initial generator there would be no so called
Counter-flow in the system. In case of bringing in new generation in the system, the
new generator as well as the old ones would therefore be responsible for such overall
reduction of transmission loss.
The allocation of transmission loss can be attributed to the generators positively of
negatively based on the sequences in which the generators are brought in the system.
The same generator can be attributed different loss allocation based on various
sequences. The concept of counter-flow would be flawed if one does not consider the
relative position of generators and loads and the sequences they are brought in the
system. It is obvious that considering the numerous possible sequences in a power
system network, the loss allocation would not have any unique solution unless the
participating utilities reach an agreement.
5.3.1 Counter-flow in a Simple System
Let us consider a simple hypothetical power system network shown in Fig.5.2. The
system has two Generators Gena and Genb connected to Buses 1 and 2 respectively and
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two Customers A and B connected to Buses 2 and 1 respectively. A transmission line
connects Buses 1 and 2. Customer A has a load demand of 1+jO.5 p.u. and Customer B
has a load demand of 1.6+jO.8 p.u.
Gena
o
Bus 1
Transmission Line
Bus 2
~o
Customer B (Lb)
Fig. 5.2: A simple power system network.
Customer A (La)
Let us consider a bilateral contract between Gena and Customer A. According to the
contract Gena will supply the load demand of Customer A and the related transmission
loss. A similar bilateral contract exists between Genb and Customer B. The total
transmission loss (PI) depends on the net flow in the transmission line.
The system shown in Fig.5.2 is pretty simple and has counter-flow. If parties related to
the second contract (between Genb and Customer B) are omitted from the system then
there will be only one generator (Gena) and one customer (Customer A). The system is
shown in Fig.5.3.
Gena Bus 1 Bus 2
Or---~~I Transmission Line -----+. PIa
Customer A (La)
Fig. 5.3: A simple power system network with Customer A only.
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It is obvious from Fig.53 that transmission loss (PIa) related to the power demand of
Customer A is provided by Gena according to the bilateral contract.
Similarly Gena and Customer A (Contract A) can be omitted and the system will be left
with Genb and Customer B (Contract B) which is shown in Fig.5.4. In this case,
transmission loss (Plb) is associated with the supply of load demand of Customer B.
Bus I
~
Customer B (Lb)
Transmission Line Bus 2
1~40
Fig. 5.4: A simple system network with Customer B only.
It is obvious that PI will be less than PIa or Plb. Now if we bring in the contract B (Genb
and Customer B) into the system shown in Fig.53 then PI will be equal to the difference
between PIa and Plb. The power will flow in the direction of bigger load. This would
happen because of the counter-flow by the second contract brought into the system.
A system with only one generator and one customer cannot claim or contribute to the
transmission loss reduction, as there will be no transmission loss reduction. To have
counter-flow in a system there has to have opposing flows in one line which will
contribute to the reduction of transmission loss. In the system shown in Fig.l both
contracts are contributing to the counter-flow and hence no single generator can claim
the whole benefit of it. We have seen that the controversy about who will get the
benefit of counter-flow depends on the sequence of the contracts entering into the
system. It is quite logical to distribute the benefit of counter-flow among the parties
involved in the counter-flow.
The concept of counter-flow is embedded in the methods to allocate transmission losses
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. For this 2-bus system, the demand of Customer A was
incremented first and then that of Customer B. Results were also obtained by reversing
the loading sequence and are presented in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5: Transmission loss allocations with two different transaction sequences.
Sequence Real La Real Lb Total Loss Calculated Loss Calculated Loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) Share of A (p.u.) Share ofB (p.u.)
A-B 1.0 1.6 0.0118 0.0154 -0.0035
B-A 1.0 1.6 0.0117 0.0106 0.0012
From Table 5.5, it can be seen that loss share of both contracts changed when the
loading sequence was reversed. However, none of the generators should claim the full
benefit of the transmission loss reduction.
5.3.2 Allocation of Benefit of Transmission Loss Reduction
Existence of counter-flow depends on the relative positions of load and generators in a
network. It is important to find first whether counter-flow exists in a system or not. The
test system shown in Chapter 3 is used here for the study of counter-flow. It has been
assumed that bilateral contracts exist between Generator A and Customer A and
between Generator B and Customer B. As a result of the contracts, Generator A will
supply the load demand of Customer A, and Generator B will supply the demand of
Customer B. The generators supply their contracted loads alongwith the associated
transmission losses. Customers A and B's real load demand are 1.5 p.u. and 0.9 p.u.
respectively. Both loads have a reactive ratio of 0.6.
The methods reported in this thesis can take counter-flow into account during the
assessment of transmission loss allocations. During the assessment process, customers'
loads are incremented in a sequential way. In this study, first, Customer A's load is
incremented and then Customer B's load is incremented. This is termed as A-B
sequence and corresponding transmission losses have been calculated. This sequence
has been changed to B-A and transmission losses have been obtained with this changed
sequence. Results are shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.
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Table 5.6: Transmission loss allocations with two different transaction sequences.
Sequence Real La RealLb R.ratio Calculated Loss Calculated Loss
(p.u.) (p.u.) f1 Share of A (p.u.) Share ofB (p.u.)
Real Reactive Real Reactive
A-B 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.04055 0.24304 0.05795 0.32778
B-A 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.04044 0.24285 0.05807 0.32801
Table 5.7: Calculated generations with two different transaction sequences.
Sequence Real La Real Lb R.ratio Generation ofA Generation of B
(p.u.) (p.u.) f1 (p.u.) (p.u.)
Real Reactive Real Reactive
A-B 1.5 0.9 0.6 1.54144 1.46358 1.55707 0.90723
B-A 1.5 0.9 0.6 1.53984 1.46388 1.55867 0.90698
It is clear from the results shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 that the effect of transaction
sequence is negligible as long as the incremental step is kept small. Transmission loss
allocation obtained from two different loading sequences are virtually same due to the
fact that there is no counter-flow in this system. This happened because of the relative
position of Generator A and B and their respective loads.
In order to show the effect of counter-flow the test system has been modified. An
additional generator (C) has been connected at Bus 3. Since Bus 3 has become a voltage
controlled Bus, Bus 5 has been renloved. Bus 6 has been renamed as Bus 5 and an
additional load (Customer C) is connected at this bus. The modified system is shown in
Fig.5.5. Generator C is in bilateral contract with Customer C for supplying its demand.
Customers A, B and C's real load demands are 0.75 p.u., 0.75 p.u. and 1.5 p.u.
respectively. To keep the calculation simpler we assume that the reactive ratio for all
three loads to be 0.6. Number of loading sequences will change according to the number
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of contracts in a network. With the addition of a new bilateral contract there will be six
different combinations of loading sequences e.g. A-B-C, A-C-B etc. Table 5.8 shows
the loss allocations based on all six different sequences.
Gen. A Gen.B
Bus 1-r-+--'r--
Line 2
Line 1 --r---""'Bus 2
Line 4
Bus 4 I.-
BUSSn
Cust. B Cust. C
Line 5
GenC
Cust. A
Fig. 5.5: Test system network with additional generator (C) and load (C).
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Sequence Total Calculated Loss Calculated Loss Calculated Loss
Real Share ofA (p.u.) Share ofB (p.u.) Share of C (p.u.)
Loss Individual Avg. Individual Avg. Individual Avg.
(p.u.)
A-B-C 0.0530 0.0174 0.0206 0.0149
A-C-B 0.0530 0.0174 0.0209 0.0147
B-A-C 0.0530 0.0176 0.0207 0.0147
0.0164 0.0212 0.0153
B-C-A 0.0529 0.0142 0.0207 0.0180
C-A-B 0.0530 0.0176 0.0206 0.0148
C-B-A 0.0530 0.0142 0.0239 0.0148
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It can be seen from Table 5.8 that in most of the sequences transmission loss allocations
remain same. Only in two sequences, B-C-A and C-B-A, transmission loss allocations
have been changed and thus confirm the presence of counter-flow in this system.
Counter-flow cannot exist with a single source in a network. It requires at least two
sources in a network which might have counter-flow. Hence, it is obvious to divide the
benefit of counter-flow among the contributing generators. Table 5.8 shows the average
of the transmission loss allocation obtained from six different loading schedules.
In the next phase, another load (Customer D) has been brought into the system at Bus 5~
Customer D is assumed to have a bilateral contract with Generator C. Customer C is
connected at Bus 3. The real load demand of Customers A, B C, and Dare 0.75 p.u., 1.0
p.u., 0.75 p.u. and 0.5 p.u. respectively. The reactive ratio of all four loads is assumed to
be 0.6. The system is shown in Fig. 5.6. Since there are four customers in the system,
the total combination of sequences in which loads can be incremented is 24. Table 5.9
shows the result of loss allocations obtained from these 24 combinations.
Gen. A
Bus 1
Line 2
Bus 4
Bus 5
Cust. B Cust. C
Line 1
Line 5
Gen.B
Bus 2
Line 4
Bus 3
Cust. D Cust. A
Fig. 5.6 : Test system network with additional load (D).
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Table 5.9: Transmission loss allocations with varying incremental sequence of loads.
Sequence Total Calculated Loss Calculated Loss Calculated Loss
Real Share of A (p.u.) Share ofB (p.u.) Share of C (p.u.)
Loss Real Reactive Real Reactive Real Reactive
(p.u.)
A-B-C-D 0.0504 0.0027 0.0009 0.0390 0.2354 -0.0087 0.0516
A-B-D-C 0.0504 0.0115 -0.0012 0.0389 0.2353 -0.0001 0.0539
A-C-B-D 0.0504 0.0028 0.0016 0.0442 0.2347 0.0034 0.0520
A-C-D-B 0.0504 0.0028 0.0015 0.0411 0.2346 0.0065 0.0520
A-D-B-C 0.0504 0.0090 -0.0007 0.0415 0.2368 0.0000 0.0520
A-D-C-B 0.0505 0.0027 0.011 0.0478 0.2354 0.0000 0.0520
B-A-C-D 0.0504 0.0030 0.0006 0.0410 0.2338 0.0064 0.0537
B-A-D-C 0.0505 0.0031 0.0007 0.0480 0.2344 -0.0005 0.0534
B-C-A-D 0.0503 0.0091 -0.0010 0.0410 0.2336 0.0001 0.0556
B-C-D-A 0.0504 0.0026 0.0002 0.0391 0.2359 0.0088 0.0519
B-D-A-C 0.0505 0.0026 0.0004 0.0502 0.2347 -0.0022 0.0536
B-D-C-A 0.0504 0.0113 -0.0018 0.0391 0.2361 0.0000 0.0538
C-A-B-D 0.0504 0.0033 0.0002 0.0396 0.2270 0.0075 0.0608
C-A-D-B 0.0504 0.0093 0.0012 0.0411 0.2347 0.0000 0.0529
C-B-A-D 0.0505 0.0031 0.0009 0.0474 0.2344 0.0000 0.0532
C-B-D-A 0.0505 0.0026 0.0006 0.0500 0.2342 -0.0021 0.0539
C-D-A-B 0.0504 0.0029 0.0002 0.0396 0.2368 0.0079 0.0510
C-D-B-A 0.0504 0.0025 0.0001 0.0412 0.2351 0.0067 0.0529
D-A-B-C 0.0504 0.0030 0.0004 0.0396 0.2367 0.0078 0.0509
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D-A-C-B 0.0505 0.0030 0.0006 0.0500 0.2353 -0.0025 0.0529
D-B-A-C 0.0504 0.0026 0.0002 0.0423 0.2371 0.0055 0.0509
D-B-C-A 0.0504 0.0089 -0.0015 0.0415 0.2371 0.0000 0.0526
D-C-A-B 0.0505 0.0025 0.0002 0.0479 0.2358 0.0000 0.0525
D-C-B-A 0.0504 0.0115 -0.0018 0.0388 0.2368 0.0001 0.0530
Table 5.9 shows that transmission loss allocations changed In some occasions
confirming the presence ofcounter-flow in the system.
As mentioned earlier, counter-flows exist in a system when the power flows of
generators oppose each other. The transmission loss allocations of the generators vary
with the loading sequence if there are counter-flows in a system. Hence, it would be fair
and logical to divide the benefit of counter-flow among the responsible generators. The
transmission loss allocations for Generators A, B and C are 0.0049, 0.0429 and 0.0026
respectively. These losses are the average of losses obtained from 24 loading sequences.
144
CHAPTER 6: PARTICPATION IN REACTIVE POWER AND
SPINNING RESERVE MARKET: A PRICE TAKER'S DESCISION
6.1 Reactive Power
Transmission network of a power system consists of real and reactive elements.
Resistance elements are responsible for loss of energy and reactive elements are
responsible for storage of real energy. Although reactive elements do not consume
energy, reactive power must be provided to maintain a desirable voltage profile
throughout the network. This stored electric energy is commonly known as reactive
power. Generators, synchronous condensers, static capacitors etc. usually provide
reactive power support in a AC system. Transmission lines are also source of reactive
power in a power system network. Reactive power in a system can be controlled by
either adjusting the excitation of generating units and/or the use of reactive VAR
compensators.
Any flow in a transmission line, real or reactive power, produces active and reactive
losses. Reactive transmission loss (12X) in a system is usually much higher that real
transmission (12R) loss, since system reactance is generally several times of resistance.
Reactive power flow in a power system is a major source of system bus voltage drop.
An IPP or a generating agent should be prepared to supply all required reactive power
in addition to the real power commitment as a part of its bilateral contract obligation.
A generator under a bilateral contract to supply energy to a special customer may have
the ability to supply both real and reactive power including its share of transmission
losses. But, in some cases the contracted generator may not be allowed to produce the
required amount of reactive power stipulated by the customer contract in order to keep
the voltage profile within allowable prescribed limits. In other cases, a contracted
generator may not be able to produce the reactive power due to operational limitations.
In either case, if generators cannot provide sufficient reactive power due to their
operating constraints, system operators use alternative methods to meet the reactive
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power demand of the full system. A system operator may utilize synchronous
condensers, generators, static capacitors etc. to supply the reactive power needed in a
given power system
6.2 Allocation of Reactive Power
In a fully deregulated power system network, generators are free to enter into bilateral
contracts with their customers. A generator that enters into bilateral contract would be
responsible for providing real power as well as reactive power demand of its customer.
When a contracted generator would supply a contracted load, there would be
transmission losses, both real and reactive, associated with the transaction of power.
Transmission losses, both real and reactive, associated with a given bilateral contract
can be easily calculated. For real power, a contracted generator might provide losses
either from its own sources or from other sources in the network. For reactive power, a
generator in a bilateral contract may not be able to provide the required reactive load
and the allocated reactive loss either due to its own limited capacity or imposed system
constraints. A generator's ability to produce reactive power is limited by its MVA
capacity, stability issues and its thermal constraints. It is further limited by its location
in the network where a prespecified voltage level must be maintained. Under a bilateral
contract, a generator's share of reactive power requirement can be determined by
utilizing the ILFA or the MTLA as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
In a system, a generator may not be able to produce its share of reactive power loss due
to its voltage restriction. The requirements for reactive power in a system may originate
from various reasons. A bilaterally contracted generator may not be able to produce its
share of reactive power and therefore have to buy reactive power from a third IPP to
meet its obligation. In a deregulated electricity market reactive power can be bought and
sold along side with real power. An ISO may need reactive power to ensure a
predetermined stable voltage profile in order to maintain system security.
6.3 Reactive Power Asking Price - From Supplier's Point of View
A generator's output, both real and reactive powers, is limited by its MVA limit of the
generator. In addition, both real and reactive outputs are constrained by their operational
maximum limits. Real and reactive power outputs of a generator must also be greater
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than the minimum required operational levels to insure the stability of the generating
units. In between the maximum and the minimum limits of the real and reactive power
generation, a generation output is primarily dictated by the maxinlum MVA limit of the
generator. This can be shown in the form ofthe following equations:
i)
ii)
iii)
Where,
ifP<Pmin and Q=Qmax then dQ = 0
dP
ifP=Pmax and Q<Qmin then dP = 0dQ
if Pmax>P>Pmin and Qmax>Q>Qmin then dQ = - P
dP Q
(6.1)
(6.2)
(6.3)
P = real power, MW
Q = reactive power, MVAR
Pmax = maximum real power producing capacity of the generating unit, MW
Pmin = minimum real power producing limit of the generating unit, MW
Qmax = maximum reactive power producing capacity of the generating unit, MVAR
Qmin = minimum reactive power producing limit of the generating unit, MVAR
A model is presented in this work that provides solution to the opportunity cost in a
supplier's optimization problem and derives the reservation price vector; the lowest
possible prices of real and reactive power that will allow a generator to be operational
without losing money.
6.3.1 Reactive Power Asking Price Model
In a competitive market for real power, owners/operators of generators are assumed to
be price taker Le. price of real power, l/> is given. In addition, the total cost of real
power production is given by the cost function of a generator,
F=aP 2 +bP+c+dQ+e
The profit function can be written as,
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(6.4)
1! =(/JP + t]/Q - aP 2 - bP - c - dQ - e
Where,
s.t. Q=f(P) (6.5)
(/J = price of real power, $/MWHr
t]/ = price of reactive power, $/MVARHr
1C = profit, $/Hr
a, b, c = cost parameters for real power ofa generator
d, e = cost parameters for reactive power of a generator
The IPP-Generator's problem is to maximize profit (1!) subject to the operational
constraint 8 2 = p 2 + Q2. Where 8 is apparent power (MVA). Reactive power
production involves either variable excitation of a generator or other means such as
SVC. Hence, the related cost of reactive power can be mainly due to the variation in the
excitation of the generator which is usually small compared to the cost of real power.
In the absence of special market for reactive power ('fFO), the optimization condition is,
(/J = 2aP +b (6.6)
which can be interpreted as:
Marginal Benefit from Real Power Production = Out-of-pocket Marginal Cost
With the potential for the existence of a given market for reactive power, at least from
the producers' point ofview it is possible to derive the minimum asking price.
The minimum asking price will be positive when the owner/operator cannot make
positive profit by producing and selling real power only. With positive price of reactive
power (lfl>O), using the Lagrangian,
(6.7)
Now maximizing profit with respect to real and reactive power and the Lagrangian
multiplier (A)
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8L
-= (/J - 2aP - b -2AP = 0
8P
8L
-= 'l' - 21Q - d =0
8Q
(6.8)
(6.9)
(6.10)
For the zero profit an IPP or generator owner will operate on the following principle:
Marginal Benefit = Marginal Cost
From Equation (6.9), the following can be obtained,
21 = 'l' - d
Q
Equation (6.8) is rearranged as,
(/J = 2aP + b + 21P
Using Equation (6.11),
(/J = 2aP + b + p('l' - d)
Q
Using Equation (6.3) in Equation (6.12) the following relation can be established,
(/J =(2aP + b)+ (- dQ)('l' - d)
dP
Where,
(- dQ ) = Real opportunity cost (in terms of goods)
dP
(- dQ)('l' - d)= Monetary opportunity cost (in terms ofmoney)
dP
Equation (6.13) can be interpreted as
(6.11)
(6.12)
(6.13)
Marginal Benefit of Real Power Production = Out-of-pocket Marginal Cost +
Opportunity Cost in terms of loss of
revenue due to a decrease in reactive power
production.
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Given the price of real power in the market place, the profit maximization rule and zero
profit condition are combined to derive the minimum acceptable price of reactive power
for a generator.
6.3.2 APPLICATION
The IEEE-RTS (24 Bus) has been used for application for the proposed costing model.
It is assumed that there exists a bilateral contract between the generators at bus 7 and
load at bus 9. The IPP at bus 9 is contracted to provide the load demand of Customer at
bus 9. This implies that the IPP is responsible for supplying both real and reactive
power demand of the Customer. While supplying this load there will be associated
transmission losses and the IPP is expected to provide tins loss too in order to fulfill the
contract.
The load at Bus 9 is 240+jl06.67. It has been found that Customer's reactive load is
106.67 MVAR and its associated reactive transmission loss is 24.85 MYAR. The IPP is
supplying only 44.36 MYAR instead of required 131.52 MYAR due to system
constraints. It is obvious that it will be IPP's (connected to Bus 7) interest to find a
suitable alternative to provide required remaining reactive power demand for the
Customer, unless it has other arrangements with the pool.
The method follows shows the lowest possible prices of reactive power that will allow
the other generator to be operational without losing any money. Let us consider the
generators connected at Bus 13 as a potential supplier of the reactive power for the
bilateral contract between Bus 7 and Bus9. Bus 13 has three 197 MW generators and
generator data is given below in Table 6.1. The operating power factor is assumed to be
0.95 for 197 and 350 MW generators and 0.90 for 155 MW generators.
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Table 6.1: Generator data at Buses 13 and 23.
Real Power Reactive Maximum Cost Parameters
(MW) Power Apparent
(MVAR) Power (MVA)
Pmax P'max Qmax Q'max S a b c
197 169.12 120 65.00 207.37 0.00300 20.02271 301.22318
350 302.71 210 115.04 368.42 0.00392 8.91965 388.25027
155 140.21 100 75.06 172.22 0.00667 9.27063 206.70340
Where,
P'max= maximum real power producing capacity of the generating unit with Qmax, MW
Q'max = maximum reactive power producing capacity of the generating unit with Pmax,
MVAR
Depending on the market price of real power, five possible operating conditions exist,
which are discussed below. The reactive power variable cost coefficient d is considered
1% of the corresponding real power cost coefficient b. The reactive power fixed cost
coefficient e is considered 10% ofthe corresponding real power cost coefficient c.
Case I : The price of real power is less than its marginal cost and hence the generator
will produce zero real power. But, it will have the full capacity for reactive power
production.
c+eP=O; Q=Qmax; fJI=--+d
Qrnax
Case II : The price of real power is such the generator will produce real power (P)
within the following limits P'max> P >0.
fJI= aP 2 +bP+c+e-(/JP +d
Qrnax
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Case III : The generator produces fixed amount of real and reactive powers. The prices
of real and reactive powers are such that the generator makes up its cost of production.
P = P'max, Q = Qmax;
PcJJ+ QlJI =ap2 + bP+ c + dQ+e
tTl aP 2 + bP + c + e - epp d
or T = +
, Q
Case IV : In this case production of real/reactive power affects the production of
reactive/real power. Opportunity cost has a non-zero value for this case.
Pmax> p* > P'max, Qmax> Q> Q'max,; dQ =- PdP Q
The equation for reactive power price can be written as
lJI =(f> - 2aP - b) Q + d
P
Case V : The generator produces fixed real and reactive powers. The prices of real and
reactive powers are such that the generator makes up it cost ofproduction.
P = Pmax, Q = Q'max ;
pep + QlJI =aP2 + bP + c + dQ + e
tTI aP 2 + bP + c + e - epp d
or T = +
, Q
Case VI : The generator produces maximum real power and zero reactive powers. The
price of reactive power is less than its marginal cost and that of real power remains
fixed.
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P=Pmax , Q=O;
PlP + QP =ap2 + bP + c + dQ + e
or, aP 2 + bP + c + e - lPP =0
Fig. 6.1 shows the graph of reactive power and minimum acceptable price of reactive
power for one of the generators connected at Bus 13. This graph can also be called zero
profit curve ofa generator.
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=197 P=1Q7 /170<P<197
GCase VI F . 65<0<120
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21.5+--------------~--------------______i
~i 21 +--------------------~--------______i
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0=120
3.532.521.50.5
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Fig 6.1: Price of real power against the variation of reactive power price for zero profit.
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Region A-B in Fig. 6.1 represents the Case I situation. In this region price of real power
is less than its marginal cost and hence the generator will produce zero real power. But
it will have the full capacity for reactive power production.
The marginal cost of 1st unit or MW power for 197 MW unit
= 2*0.003*1+20.02271
= 20.02871 $/MWHr
The generator will not produce any real power if price of real power goes below
20.02871 $/MWHr.
Case II is shown by the region B-C in Fig. 6.1. The generator will produce real power
anywhere between 0 and 169.12 MW and 120 MVAR of reactive power.
Case III is depicted by the region C-D in Fig. 6.1. In this region price changes do not
affect the production level of a generator and hence a generator will produce real and
reactive power (P=169.1217, Q=120) to recover its operating costs.
It can be written as,
f1>P + 'PQ =aP2 + bP + c + dQ + e
169.1217f1> + 120'P = 0.003 *169.12172 + 20.02271 *169.1217 + 0.01 * 20.02271 *120
+ 331.3455
f1> = 1 (3831.4540 -120'P)
169.1217
'P = _1_(3831.4540 -169.1217f1»
120
Region D-E is shown in Fig. 6.1 for Case IV. In this range the production of real and
reactive power affect each other and opportunity cost of reactive power has been
considered. Reactive power production resides within the range Qmin~~Qmax for the
197 MW generator.
Finally, Case V is represented by Region E-F in Fig. 6.1. In this region price changes do
not affect the production level of a generator and hence a generator will produce real
and reactive power (P=197, Q=65) to recover its operating costs.
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It can be written as,
lPP + IJIQ =aP2 + bP + c + dQ + e
1971P + 651J1 =0.003 *1972 + 20.02271 *197 + 0.01 *20.02271 *65 + 331.3455
lP = _1_(4406.2611- 651J1)
197
IJI = _1 (4406.2611-197lP)
65
Table 6.2 Shows the reactive power production and reactive power price as well as the
real power production and its price for the 197 MW generator.
Table 6.2: Price table.
Real Power Price, lP Real Power, P Reactive Power, Q Reactive Power Price, IJI
($/MWHr) MW MVAR ($/MVARHr)
19.50000 0.00 120.00 2.961440
20.02271 0.00 120.00 2.961440
20.04000 2.88 120.00 2.961232
20.14000 19.55 120.00 2.951886
20.24000 36.22 120.00 2.928651
20.34000 52.88 120.00 2.891528
20.44000 69.55 120.00 2.840515
20.54000 86.22 120.00 2.775614
20.64000 102.88 120.00 2.696824
20.74000 119.55 120.00 2.604144
20.84000 136.22 120.00 2.497576
20.94000 152.88 120.00 2.377119
21.03744 169.12 120.00 2.246386
21.25000 169.12 120.00 1.946815
21.50000 169.12 120.00 1.594479
21.89000 169.12 120.00 1.044833
22.00990 170.00 118.75 0.875856
22.04725 175.00 111.25 0.819775
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22.08281 180.00 102.97 0.760885
22.11648 185.00 93.69 0.698426
22.14821 190.00 83.08 0.631151
22.17797 195.00 70.55 0.556690
22.18930 197.00 65.00 0.523871
22.25000 197.00 65.00 0.339146
22.30000 197.00 65.00 0.187046
22.35000 197.00 65.00 0.034946
22.36149 197.00 65.00 0.000000
6.3.3 Supply Curve for Reactive Power
Three generators at Bus 13 are identical to each other and hence will display similar
supply characteristics. In order to show the composite supply curve, Bus 23 has been
chosen. Three generators are connected at Bus 23 - two ofthem are 155 MW generators
and one is 350 MW generator. Generators cost parameters are shown in Table 6.1.
6.3.3.1 Construction of Supply Curve
The supply curve for reactive power is constructed based on the price of real power.
Any supply curve (reactive power vs. price of reactive power) is based on constant price
of real power.
Let, the price of real power, (]J = K
Following steps are to be followed in order to construct a supply curve for reactive
power:
1. Draw a line (]J = K. The line crosses zero profit curve of the generator somewhere
and get the corresponding price of reactive power from the point of intersection. Let
it call IJ'min.
2. Reactive power supply will increase with the increase of IJ' until the generator
reaches its Qmax. If IJ'min already corresponds to Qmax then supply curve will be
straight line with Q= Qmax •
156
3. If iJlmin does not corresponds to Qmax then find the reactive power price (iJI*) at which
reactive power supply will reach its maximum limit. Beyond the price iJI*, the
reactive power supply stays at its maximum level.
Now using the following equation, calculate iJI*
Where,
P = p:nax (maximum real power producing capacity of the generating unit with Qrnax)
Q=Qmax
dQ P
-=--
dP Q
4. Now for the portion between the pnces iJlmin and iJI* following of the two
approaches can be used.
a) Linear Approximation: connect the points iJlmin and iJI* and reactive power
supply within this range can be calculated using the straight-line equation.
b) Exact Method: for any value of reactive power price iJI (iJImin )iJI)iJI*) use the
following equations to solve for reactive power Q.
Fig. 6.2 shows the composite supply curve for two generators - one 155 MW and one
350 MW for lP = 13.3788 $/MWHr. The third generator (155 MW) can be easily added
to this composite supply curve. In this case the total supply curve will be lifted up by
100 MVAR. Individual price curves for both generators were plotted first in order to
obtain the supply curve. These individual price curves are omitted to save space because
they look like Fig. 6.2. The constant value of lP = 13.3788 $/MWHr is randomly
chosen from the price curve of 155 MW generator.
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The portion of the supply curve between 'JImin and 'JI* is very narrow and the maximum
error between exact and the approximate method is found to be 0.18%. Fig. 6.3 shows
the exact and the approximate method for this range of the supply curve ('JI= 0.013177
to 'JI = 0.05965). The approximate method can be employed to find this portion of the
supply curve as it differs very slightly from the exact method.
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Fig 6.2: Supply curve of reactive power for two different generators.
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6.4 Spinning Reserve in a Power System
A reliable power system should have higher generating capacity than the actual load
demand. The required generating capacity spinning at any given duration in a power
system depends on the availability of generating units and the load pattern. Generation
must be available in sufficient quantity to account for any unplanned or forced outages
as well as normal maintenance of units.
A system prepares a schedule of generation typically for 24 hours based on forecasted
load. Scheduled generation at any given time is usually higher than system load. The
additional generation beyond system load makes the system capable of handling any
sudden unforeseen load changes and possible outages of generating facilities or other
facilities.
In practice, all power system components, like any other equipment, have some
likelihood of failure. This likelihood can be reduced significantly by proper design and
good maintenance practices, but it can never be reduced to zero. Unscheduled shutdown
of one or more generating unit or units is one of the sources of power supply failure. In
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order to overcome this type of situation, additional generating capacity are kept
spinning all the time so that they can supply power to the grid at anytime. This
additional capacity is known as spinning reserve. A power system network with higher
spinning reserve offers higher reliability of supply to its customers. But maintaining this
high spinning reserve means higher costs which is eventually paid by its customers.
Utilities therefore maintain an optimunl level of spinning reserve by striking a
compromise between reliability and cost.
Basically two major techniques are used in conventional power system to establish the
spinning reserve requirements [58,78,79]. These techniques are:
• Deterministic Approach
• Probabilistic Approach
Deterministic assessment of the spinning reserve can be done using
• Percentage of system load or operating capacity
• Fixed capacity margin
• Largest contingency
• Any combination of the above methods
Different utilities have their own standards and rationale for selecting a particular
method. Deterministic approach does not consider the likelihood of any component
failure i.e. the probability of failure of generating units, transmission lines etc., in the
assessment of spinning reserve. Utilities in the past settled on their reserve requirement
with the help of deterministic approach.
A probabilistic approach can recognize the stochastic nature of all system major
components and incorporate them in a consistent evaluation of the spinning reserve
requirement. The actual magnitude and even the type of risk can be defined as the
probability that the system will fail to meet the load or just be able to meet the load for a
specified time period. In recent years many utilities started to determine their operating
reserve requirements using the probabilistic approaches.
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6.5 Spinning Reserve Market
In a deregulated market, energy suppliers compete among themselves to supply energy
and, in general, not responsible for the spinning reserve aspect of the energy. The power
providers submit their 24-hour bids for selling energy from which successful bidders are
chosen by an Independent System Operator (ISO). An Independent System Operator
(ISO) controls the operation of a power system network. An ISO, among other things,
determines the required amount of spinning reserve required to maintain a reliable
supply of electricity. The demand of spinning reserve in a deregulated market has
created a market where independent suppliers can bid for offering their generation
reserve. The Power Pool, Independent Market Operator or ISO accepts bids for real
power as well as spinning reserve. The market of spinning reserve works in the same
way as it works for real power. The market operators determine the price of electricity
from the data obtained for supply and demand of spinning reserve. The market price is
set from the supply and demand relation in such a way that the spinning reserve demand
would be satisfied. All suppliers who bid less than the market price are considered as
successful bidders and will be considered for supplying the demand. All successful
bidders will get paid the market price irrespective of their bidding prices for the amount
of committed spinning reserve.
In addition to the bidding price, the response time of a generator is also considered.
Given a demand, a generating unit can pick up load at a rate no more than its response
rate generally known as ramp rate. The ramp rate essentially dictates the amount of load
that an unit can pick up within a given time interval. The response rate of a generator
therefore, limits the spinning reserve that a generator can commit and has created two
different markets for spinning reserve. They are known as Ten-Minute and Thirty-
Minute Spinning Reserve Market.
6.5.1 Ten-Minute and Thirty-Minute Spinning Reserve Market
Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve (TMSR) is defined by the New England ISO [77] as ''the
Operable Capability of a Generator that is unloaded, is in excess of the quantity
required to serve current demand, is able to begin immediately to supply energy to serve
demand, is fully available within ten minutes and is able to be sustained for a period
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equal to the longer of thirty minutes or published NERC or NPCC requirements". Ten-
Minute Spinning Reserve Market is served by the generators which are synchronized to
the system and can meet the increased load within ten minutes. The New England
manual defines the resources for the Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Market as "the
Kilowatts of Operable Capability of an electric Generator or Generators that are
synchronized to the system, unloaded during all or part of the hour, and capable of
providing contingency protection by loading to supply Energy immediately on demand,
increasing the Energy output over no more than ten minutes to the full amount of
generating capacity so designated, and sustaining such Energy output for so long as the
ISO determines in accordance with market operation rules is necessary to satisfy the
immediate contingency". TMSR is a synchronized capacity and can supply power
within ten minutes for at least thirty minutes to overcome the initial emergency
situation. Thirty-Minute Spinning Reserve is non-synchronized and it is able to begin
supply within thirty minutes and lasts for a least sixty minutes.
Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve bids are submitted by the suppliers 24-hour ahead and is
evaluated in the same manner as it is done for real power market.
The Thirty-Minute Spinning Reserve Market works in the same way with the difference
in the supply time which is thirty minutes instead of ten minutes.
6.6 Supplier's Profit Maximization in a Deregulated Power System - A Composite
View
In a deregulated environment market force plays a vital role in determining the supply
and demand of a commodity. Electric power characteristics make it different from other
commodities but nonetheless it is subject to market force in a deregulated environment.
In a competitive market the suppliers are the price takers and they will supply their
product, if they can make profit, at a price determined by the market force. In a stable
market, price of a commodity sets to a value such that the econonlic profits of all
suppliers become zero. In a volatile market situation, suppliers may make some positive
economic profit. If high prices prevail for long time then other suppliers will enter the
market and they will increase the supply which will eventually force the price to settle
to a lower value where the economic profits of all suppliers become zero. The opposite
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scenario, where price becomes low, will force some of the suppliers to go out of the
business. The reduction in supply, due to the fact that some supplier will cease to exist
in the market, will increase the commodity price to such a level where the economic
profits of all suppliers become zero again.
In a deregulated electricity market, the suppliers bid for selling their commodity, which
is essentially electric power. An Independent Power Producer (IPP) can sell three
commodities - real power, spinning reserve and reactive power. According to the
principle of Economics, an IPP will try to maximize its profit based on the given market
prices. In the following section a profit maximization model is shown for a single
supplier in a deregulated power system network.
6.6.1 Profit Maximization Model
In a healthy competitive market an IPP will be a price taker. An IPP will determine the
production level of these commodities according to the given market prices of the
commodities in such a way that its profit becomes maximum. The profit function of an
IPP can be written as:
(6.14)
Where,
P = real power production. MW
T = spinning reserve, MW
Q = reactive power production, MVAR
cP = price of real power, $/MWHr
CPt = price of spinning reserve, $/MWHr
'I'= price of reactive power, $/MVARHr
7t: = profit, $/Hr
d, e = cost parameters of reactive power
Usually the production cost of reactive power is very small and varies between 0.5% to
2.5% depending on the machine size. In the present model, cost of reactive power has
been included. The profit function is subject to the following operating constraints:
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(P+TY +Q2 ~S2
Pmin ~(P+T)~Pmax
(6.15)
(6.16)
(6.17)
The first inequality constraint can be converted into an equality constrain using a slack
variable as follows:
(6.18)
A generator's output level cannot be increased instantaneously. The rate of change of a
generator output is constrained by its ramp-up rate. Usually ramp-up rates of thermal
generators varies between 1%-3% MW/minute of its capacity. This means a 100 MW
generator can supply only 10 MW in ten minutes for emergency supply considering the
ramp-up rate as 1%. Hence the maximum spinning reserve that this generator should
commit in a TMSR market is limited to 10 MW. The maximum magnitude of spinning
reserve that a generator should commit is constrained by:
T ~ (ramp rate)x'x Pmax (6.19)
, is either 10 or 30 minutes depending on the type of spinning reserve market: consider
the ramp rate to be 2% of the capacity (MW/minute) of a generator. The constraint can
be expressed as:
or
where, 11 = ramp rate of generator, MW/min
The Lagrangian can be expressed as:
L=Jr-l((P+TY +Q2 +,2 _S2)
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(6.20)
Taking the derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to real and reactive power,
spinning reserve, the slack variable r and the Lagrangian multiplier A:
8L
-=l/J-2aP-b-2A (P+T)=O
8P
8L
-= l/J1 - 2A(P + T)= 08T
8L
-=l[f -2AQ-d=0
8Q
8L
-=-2A1"=0
81"
From Equation (6.22), the following can be written
From Equation (6.21), real power production can be determined as:
l/J-l/J -bP= 1
2a
From Equation (6.23) the following can be written:
2A= l[f -d
Q
From Equation (6.24)
A1"=O
If A is not equal to zero, r must be equal to zero.
1"=0
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(6.21)
(6.22)
(6.23)
(6.24)
(6.25)
(6.26)
(6.27)
The interpretation of 'l' =0 is given later in the section. Equation (6.22) can be
rearranged as follows:
fJf-d( )(])1 --- P+T =0Q
(p + T)= (])lQ
fJf-d (6.28)
Using Equation (6.25), the production level of reactive power can be obtained in the
following manner.
Finally the optimum level of spinning reserve for an individual supplier can be
calculated from Equation (6.28):
P+T = (])lQ
'P-d
T= (])lQ _p
fJf-d
(6.29)
T = (])l S
~(])/ + (fJf - dy (6.30)
Equations (6.26), (6.29) and (6.30) can be used to evaluate the optimum production
level of real power, reactive power and spinning reserve, respectively, of an
Independent Power Producer based on given market prices of these commodities.
Successive relaxation technique is used to ensure that the constraints (6.16), (6.17) and
(6.19) are not violated. If the optimal solutions obtained using Equations (6.26), (6.29)
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and (6.30) does not satisfy the constraints (6.16), (6.17) and (6.19) then modified
equations are used for solutions in the boundary regions ofP, Qand T (Appendix-B).
In a competitive market every supplier will produce an optimum combination of real,
reactive power and spinning reserve so that their profit is maximized. The positive price
of real and reactive power and spinning reserve will motivate a supplier to use all of its
available room for production. The combination production levels of P, T and Qwill be
such that an IPP will utilize its maximum capacity of S. If the IPP leave any room and
combined production level is less than S then it will lose money. This fact forces the
first inequality constraint into an equality constraint as follows:
It has been already found that r=0 and this indicates that the supplier will utilize its
production capacity as long as the prices are more than marginal cost.
The 197 MW generator in Section 6.3.2 is considered for the profit maximization
model. The reactive power variable cost coefficient d is considered 1% of the
corresponding real power cost coefficient b. The reactive power fixed cost coefficient e
is considered 10% ofthe corresponding real power cost coefficient c.
Figures 6.4-6.6 show the maximum profit as a function of real power, reactive power
and spinning reserve prices. Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve bids are considered for the
calculation of profit. Figure 6.4 shows variation in profit with changes in reactive power
and spinning reserve prices while real power price remains constant at 23 $/MWHr.
Figure 6.5 shows variation in profit with changes in reactive power and real power
prices while spinning reserve price remains constant at 2 $/MWHr. Figure 6.6 shows
variation in profit with changes in real power and spinning reserve prices while reactive
power price remains constant 0.6 $/MVARHr. Equation (6.14) indicates that profit is
directly proportional to all three prices, price of real power, price of reactive power and
price of spinning reserve. Profit will increase linearly with the increase in anyone of
these three prices. It can be seen from Figures 6.4-6.6 that profit as expected increases
as the price of each of the commodities goes up and price of real power has significant
effects on profits. Profit rises more sharply as the price of real power increases.
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Fig. 6.6: Variation of maximum profit as a function of spinning reserve and real power
price (reactive power price is fixed at 0.6 $/MVARHr).
Figures 6.7-6.15 shows the optimum production level of real power, reactive power and
ten-minute spinning reserve. Figures 6.7-6.9 shows changes in real power, reactive
power and spinning reserve productions with changes in reactive power and spinning
reserve prices while real power price remains constant at 23 $/MWHr. It can be seen
from Figure 6.7 that real power production has negative relation with prices of reactive
power and spinning reserve. Optimum level of real power decreases as reactive power
and spinning reserve prices go up. Real power production equals to its maximum
capacity if prices of reactive power and spinning reserve are relatively small. Consider
the price of spinning reserve only, real power production level starts to go down as the
price of spinning reserve exceeds $ 1.6 IMWHr. Maintaining spinning reserve becomes
lucrative when the price of spinning reserve becomes higher than 1.6 $/MWHr. At 2.5
$/MWHr the spinning reserve reaches its maximum limit and afterwards real power
production level remains constant along the axis of price of spinning reserve. Maximum
spinning reserve is limited by the ramp-rate of a generator. Now consider the price of
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reactive power, real power production level remains constant as the price of reactive
power increases from zero until reaches 0.9 $/MVARHr and at this point it starts to
decline. Level of real power reaches a constant lower level when reactive power price
hits 1.61 $/MVARHr and when the price of spinning reserve is lower than 1.6 $IMWHr.
Similar effect on the real power production level can seen from Figure 6.7 when both
prices of reactive power and spinning reserve are on the higher end. Real power
production level reaches its minimum level of 129 MW when price of reactive power is
higher than 1.76 $/MVARHr and price of spinning reserve is higher than 2.5 $IMWHr.
Figure 6.8 shows that spinning reserve price has little impact on reactive power
production. Price range of spinning reserve between 1.7 $IMWHr to 2.43 $IMWHr
forces the reactive power production level to a lower value. Reactive power price has
considerable effect on its production level as it is expected. Reactive power production
level starts to rise from 0.12 $/MVARHr and continues the trend until the price reaches
0.26 $IMVARHr. Finally, the reactive power reaches its maximum level of 120 MYAR
when its price hits 1.72 $/MVARHr. Spinning reserve production level does not vary
much with the price of reactive power as it does with the price of spinning reserve.
Figure 6.9 shows that spinning reserve remains at zero until its price reaches 1.65
$IMWHr where it becomes attractive to maintain a reserve. The production level of
spinning reserve remains constant at its maximum level after its price reaches 2.1
$IMWHr. This is due to the fact that spinning reserve is limited by ramp-rate of a
generator and even if its price goes up available amount of spinning reserve is capped
by its linlit which is shown in Figure 6.9.
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Fig. 6.8: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of reactive power and
spinning reserve prices (real power price is fixed at 23 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.9: Optimum production of spinning reserve as a function of reactive power and
spinning reserve prices (real power price is fixed at 23 $/MWHr).
Figures 6.10-6.12 shows changes in real power, reactive power and spinning reserve
productions with changes in reactive power and spinning reserve prices while spinning
reserve price is fixed at 2 $/MWHr. Figure 6.10 shows that real power production level
remains at zero before its price reaches 20.03 $/MWHr. The increase in price of reactive
power tries to reduce real power production level. But the high price of real power,
beyond 26 $/MWHr, inspires the producer to maintain the real power at its maximum
level of 197 MW. Figure 6.11 shows that reactive power production kicks in as its price
reaches 0.12 $/MVARHr. The price of real power at and beyond 20.03 $/MWHr forces
the reduction in reactive power. It is evident that production of real power becomes
attractive when its price exceeds 20.03 $/MWHr. The higher price of reactive power
drags this effect along the axis of price of reactive power. Figure 6.12 shows that
spinning reserve maintains its maximum level until the price of real power reaches
22.03 $/MWHr. Spinning reserve production level becomes zero when price of real
power reaches 23.7 $/MWHr.
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Fig. 6.10: Optimum production of real power as a function of reactive power and real
power prices (spinning reserve price is fixed at 2 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.11: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of reactive power and
real power prices (spinning reserve price is fixed at 2 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.12: Optimum production of spinning reserve as a function of reactive power and
real power prices (spinning reserve price is fixed at 2 $/MWHr).
Figures 6.13-6.15 shows changes in real power, reactive power and spinning reserve
productions with changes in reactive power and spinning reserve prices while reactive
power price is fixed at 0.6 $/MVARHr. From Figure 6.13 it can be seen that real power
production level remains at zero as expected until its price reaches 20.03 $/MWHr.
Higher price of real power pushes its production to a higher level and reaches its
maximum when the price hits 22.5 $/MWHr. Real power remains at its maximum level
until the price of spinning reserve becomes 9.2 $/MWHr and real power becomes 157
MW. Reactive power production level remains at its maximum until real power price
reaches 21 $/MWHr and it becomes constant at 65 MVAR when real power price hits
22.5 $/MWHr as it is shown in Figure 6.14. Figure 6.15 shows that spinning reserve
level starts to decrease as the price of real power reaches 20.03 $/MWHr. The price of
real power at and beyond 21.1 $/MWHr forces the spinning reserve to become zero. It
is evident that production of real power becomes attractive when its price exceeds 20.03
$/MWHr. The higher price of spinning reserve drags this effect along the axis of price
of spinning reserve.
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Fig. 6.13: Optimum production of real power as a function of spinning reserve and real
power prices (reactive power price is fixed at 0.6 $/MVARHr).
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Fig. 6.14: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of spinning reserve and
real power prices (reactive power price is fixed at 0.6 $/MVARHr).
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Fig. 6.15: Optimum production of spinning reserve as a function of spinning reserve
and real power prices (reactive power price is fixed at 0.6 $/MVARHr).
Thirty-Minute Spinning Reserve bids are also considered and Figures 6.16-6.27 shows
results similar to those shown in Figures 6.4-6.15.
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Fig. 6.16: Variation of maximum profit with reactive power and spinning reserve price
when real power price is fixed at 23 $/MWHr.
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Fig. 6.17: Variation of maximum profit with reactive power and real power price while
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while reactive power price is fixed at 0.6 $/MVARHr.
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Fig. 6.19: Optimum production of real power as a function of reactive power and
spinning reserve prices (real power price is fixed at 23 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.20: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of reactive power and
spinning reserve prices (real power price is fixed at 23 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.21: Optimum production of spinning reserve as a function of reactive power and
spinning reserve prices (real power price is fixed at 23 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.22: Optimum production of real power as a function of reactive power and real
power prices (spinning reserve price is fixed at 2 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.23: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of reactive power and
real power prices (spinning reserve price is fixed at 2 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.24: Optimum production of spinning reserve power as a function of reactive
power and real power prices (spinning reserve price is fixed at 2 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.25: Optimum production of real power as a function of real power and spinning
reserve prices (reactive power price is fixed at 0.6 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.26: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of real power and
spinning reserve prices (reactive power price is fixed at 0.6 $/MWHr).
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Fig. 6.27: Optimum production of spinning reserve as a function of real power and
spinning reserve prices (reactive power price is fixed at 0.6 $/MWHr).
6.6.1.1 Zero Profit Conditions
In an open competitive market the objective of any supplier is to maximize its profit. In
a stable market the economic profits of all suppliers in the long run become zero. The
market prices determine the number of suppliers and the quantities of commodities. A
supplier that can make at least zero profit will survive in the competition and a supplier
that cannot reach the minimum zero profit condition will be out of business. A zero
profit condition of a supplier indicates the minimum price for its product that the
supplier can withstand without losing money.
In a deregulated power market, an IPP will always be interested to know its limits of
production so that it can survive in the market. An IPP is a price taker and it will
determine its production based on the market prices. It is important for an IPP to know
the level of production for a given price so that the profit will be zero. The combination
of prices of real and reactive power and spinning reserve plays an important role in a
zero profit condition. The zero profit can be obtained from combination of prices of
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these three commodities. If the pnce of anyone of them goes lower than the
corresponding price at zero profit condition an IPP might not be interested to supply
power, because doing so it will incur losses.
The minimum acceptable level of prices are obtained by solving the Equations (6.21)-
(6.25) and by making the profit function equal to zero in Equation (6.14). The zero
profit and maximum profit conditions together provide the minimum production levels
for real power, reactive power and spinning reserve for the given price ranges of these
three commodities. These production levels are shown in Appendix-C. These price
ranges for the 197 MW generator is shown in Figures 6.28 and 6.29 for the Ten-Minute
Spinning Reserve and Thirty-Minute Spinning Reserves respectively.
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Fig. 6.28: Real power, reactive power and spinning reserve price combinations for zero
profit conditions for Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve Market.
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Fig. 6.29: Real power, reactive power and spinning reserve price combinations for zero
profit conditions for Thirty-Minute Spinning Reserve Market.
6.6.1.2 Supply Curves
An IPP is likely to have more than one generator and it is also possible to have
generators with different capacities. It is possible to construct a supply curve for real
power, reactive power and spinning reserve. These supply curves will show the
optimum levels of electric power as a function of market price. A supply curve of real
power will demonstrate the optimum real power production level with a variation in real
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power market price. An IPP can utilize this information to decide when to bring
additional generation in the bidding process. Similarly supply curves for reactive power
and spinning reserve would show the optimum level of production as a function of their
respective market prices. Figures 6.30-6.32 show the supply curves for real power,
reactive power and spinning reserve respectively. Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve is
considered in this case. Figure 6.30 shows the supply curve real power for 155 MW
and 350 MW generators as functions of the price of real power. Spinning reserve and
reactive power prices are assumed to be constant at 2 $/MWHr and 0.5 $/MVARHr
respectively. It can be seen from Figure 6.30 that 155 MW generator will bid for
supplying real power when real power price is 9 $/MWHr or higher and 350 MW
generator will bid for supplying real power when real power price is 9.3 $/MWHr or
higher. Higher prices of real power would encourage the producer to sell all of its real
power as the incentive for maintaining a spinning reserve is comparatively low.
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Fig. 6.30: Supply curves for real power for 155 MWand 350 MW generators.
Figure 6.31 shows the supply curves for reactive power for 155 MW and 350 MW
generators as functions of the price of reactive power. Spinning reserve and real power
prices are assumed to be constant at 2 $/MWHr and 13 $/MWHr respectively.
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Figure 6.32 shows the supply curves for spinning reserve for 155 MW and 350 MW
generators as functions of the price of reactive power. Reactive power and real power
prices are assumed to be constant at 0.5 $/MVARHr and 13 $IMWHr respectively.
ITotal l-.
I 1350 MWGEN I
J /
/
/ 1155 MWGEN I
./( ¥I, )
120
100
~
1! 80
Q)
~
Q)
(I)
60Q)a:::
C)
c::::
'2
c:::: 40
'a
U)
20
o
o 234
Price of Spinning Reserve ($/MWHr)
5 6
Fig. 6.32: Supply curves for spinning reserve for 155 MWand 350 MW generators.
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Figures 6.30-6.32 are the supply curves for real power, reactive power and spinning
reserve as functions of their corresponding prices. Two generator are considered for the
construction of these supply curves. An IPP may own more than two generators. Any
number of generators can be included in these supply curves using the same technique.
6.7 Summary
A single supplier's optimization challenge has been addressed in this chapter. Price of
electric power in a deregulated environment is governed by market rules. Market
Clearing Price of electric power is determined from the bids obtained from suppliers.
After several market iterations an IPP would be able to forecast the market prices.
Based on forecasted market prices an IPP will determine the production levels for its
commodities - real power, reactive power and spinning reserve.
Two models have been presented in this chapter. The First model determines the
minimum acceptable price of reactive power as a function of real power price using the
zero profit condition. Results for a 197 MW generator is shown in Section 6.3.2. This
model also provides supply curve for reactive power when an IPP owns more than one
generator. This model will help an IPP in its decision making process regarding its
participation in a deregulated power market. Supply curve from a supplier that owns
one 350 MW and two 155 MW generators are shown in Section 6.3.3.1.
The second model includes spinning reserve as a product in addition to real and reactive
power. Optimum levels of production of these three commodities are indicated by this
model using profit maximization technique. The model also provides the minimum
acceptable price ranges for an IPP. This has been obtained by combining maximum
profit and zero profit conditions. Maximum profit and minimum acceptable price ranges
are shown for 197 MW generator in Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.1.1. Supply curves for real
power, reactive power and spinning reserve as a function of their respective prices are
shown for two generators in Section 6.5.1.2.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Conclusions
There are many challenges associated with the deregulation of power industry. Some of
them are technical which include transmission loss allocations, transmission access
usage, spinning reserve, reactive power pricing etc. and the others are non-technical.
The non-technical challenges originate from political, socio-economic and
environmental issues.
Of all the technical issues related to deregulation, allocation of transmission losses and
transmission access are the most contentious. This research work dealt with the issue of
transmission loss allocation for bilateral contracts, counter-flow, optimization
challenges of generating plants in a deregulated power system. An electric power
system must have sufficient supply of power in order to meet the customer's
requirement. The market operators determine the price of electricity from the data
obtained for supply and demand of real power. This price is commonly known as
market clearing price. The market clearing price is set from the supply and demand
relationship in such a way that all power demands would be satisfied. Bilateral contracts
are considered on the top of this wholesale electric power market.
Under a deregulated structure, power generating utility or an IPP may enter into a
bilateral contract with a customer. Bilateral contracts as stated earlier lead to the
challenge of sharing transmission losses among the competing generating utilities. Any
method used to allocate transmission losses should be viewed by the generating entities
as transparent and fair.
In the research work reported in this thesis, methods have been developed to allocate
transmission losses in a deregulated system where generators are tied to the loads
through bilateral contracts. For a given configuration, a discrete change in a given load
will be accompanied by a discrete change in transmission loss. The discrete change in
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the transmission loss can be attributed to the generator that is contracted to the load
provided all other factors remain the same. In a deregulated network with bilateral
contracts, a discrete change in the transmission loss can be evaluated by increasing a
load by a discrete amount while keeping all other loads at their previous levels. All
loads can be changed in a sequential manner and the corresponding discrete change in
transmission loss can be aggregated. Each generator will be responsible for supplying
its load as well as its share of transmission loss. In short, this is the working principle
that has been used in the work reported in this thesis. This working principle has been
realized by two different methods.
The Incremental Load Flow Approach (ILFA) is a relatively simple technique. It
utilizes conventional AC load flow technique in a successive manner. Some
modifications in an AC load flow are required to evaluate transmission loss allocation.
The modifications are very simple and can be implemented with little difficulty. The
second method, the Marginal Transmission Loss Approach (MTLA) is a direct
consequence of mathematical reasoning. If a transmission loss can be expressed as a
function of loads then its marginal rates can be evaluated with respect to the loads.
Traditionally, transmission losses have been expressed as functions of generation. This
is useful for the purpose of economic optimization. In order to allocate transmission
loss, we need transmission loss to be expressed as a function of loads. Starting from the
expression of bus injection in a network, a convenient and useful expression for
transmission loss has been derived which is a function of loads. The MTLA has
provided a means to check the results obtained by the ILFA. Although the MTLA uses a
different approach, it provides similar loss allocations as obtained by the ILFA.
The MTLA is a complex mathematical method based on general transmission loss
formula. This generalized method is applicable for electric power network of any size.
The derived equations in Chapter 4 can be used to find the loss allocation between any
generator and customer in a power system network. The MTLA can identify loss shares
for multiple contracts signed by a single generating utility with different customers or a
customer who is getting supply from multiple generators. This method would separate
each transaction and determine the transmission loss related to a particular contract
signed. Although the formulation of mathematical expression for the MTLA is a
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complex process, its execution time is much faster than that of the ILFA. The ILFA
requires load flow technique that needs iterations to obtain the solution for one load
level and this process has to be repeated for every incremental load level. Whereas in
the MTLA, a set of simultaneous equations are solved to calculate loss allocations and
no iteration is required during its execution.
The formulation of the MTLA is based on some assumptions. Those assumptions have
been made to keep the challenge of transmission loss allocation manageable. Although
they help to keep the formulation of the MTLA relatively simple, it has been found that
the loss allocations obtained by the MTLA differ noticeably in some load situations
than those obtained by the ILFA because of the assumptions. The assumptions of
constant Z-bus, bus voltages and angles (only three different values used) over the full
range of load demand are responsible for the deviations in results to a large extent. In an
ideal case, current bus impedance matrix, bus voltages and angles should be used
instead of assuming them to be constant. But it is cumbersome to store bus impedance
matrix, bus voltages and angles for every incremental load level used in the MTLA and
moreover, a load flow program has to be utilized to update those parameters. The use of
updated bus impedance matrix, bus voltages and angles in every load level in the
MTLA, however, gives fairly accurate and close results to those obtained by the ILFA.
The methods reported in this work consider bilateral contracts between the generators
and the customers in a deregulated network for the allocation of transmission losses.
Full deregulation would allow bilateral contracts between the generators and the buyers
and it is expected that there would be a number of such contracts in a fully deregulated
system. A generator in the bilateral contract with its customer is supposed to meet the
customer's load along with the associated transmission loss. In some cases, a generator
might not be able to produce its share of loss. In such cases, the ILFA or the MTLA
would be very useful to determine how much this particular generator would owe to
other generators in the system and the liable generator would pay accordingly. In some
cases, some generators may have to produce more reactive power than their allocations
in order to maintain the minimum voltage level in the system. In such cases, these
generators should be compensated by other generators and the ILFA or the MTLA
would be a useful tool to determine other generators' liabilities.
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The developed methods are applied to different networks in this work. A small test
network has been used to calculate transmission loss allocation where a full
deregulation has been considered. A full deregulation implies the existence of bilateral
contracts only and there will be no power pool in this kind of system. Loads are
assumed to be bulk and transmission losses, both real and reactive, are obtained for
different bilateral contracts in the test system. The results obtained from two different
methods are compared and shown in Tables and graphs. A larger system, developed by
IEEE has been used in this work in order to calculate transmission losses in a mixed:'
mode system. A mixed-mode system consists of both power pool and bilateral
contracts. In a power pool, sellers and buyers of power bid for power in hour-ahead,
day-ahead market or in a spot market. In the IEEE-RTS system, bilateral contracts are
considered over an existing power pool. Two different bilateral contracts are assumed to
exist in the IEEE-RTS and the ILFA and the MTLA are applied to calculate
transmission losses caused by each transaction.
The methods developed in this work can be used for cost-study of a bilateral contract.
Using one of these methods any generator/customer may know in advance the share of
transmission losses for its load demand. Once the generator knows its share of
transmission loss for supplying a particular load it can consider different options for
compensating the loss. The generator might consider supplying both load and loss or
buying the loss from other sources or becoming a part of an economic load dispatch. A
cost analysis has been done to have an idea about the feasibility of different options.
The cost analysis gives an idea about what a generator should do depending on the type
ofagreement with a customer.
In an electrical power system network, total transmission loss might decrease if an
additional generator is brought into the system. This happens as the power flows in
some transmission lines from the new generator oppose initial flows in those particular
lines. The latter flows are known as counter-flows. It has been mentioned earlier that
counter-flow is caused by two opposing flows in a line. Therefore, it needs at least two
generators to reduce overall transmission loss and create the existence of counter-flow.
Hence it is very important to identify the generators contributing to counter-flow along
with the calculation of transmission loss allocation. The developed methods of
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transmission loss allocation can handle this challenge very effectively. The ILFA and
MTLA are based on sequential increment of loads. The sequential load increment has
been exploited to identify the existence of counter-flow in the system.
The existence of counter-flow in a system can be revealed by exploiting the loading
sequences of bilateral contracts. In presence of a counter-flow the computed
transmission loss will change with a change in the loading sequence. Since a counter-
flow cannot exists without the presence of two sources whose flows oppose each
others'. The resulting benefit should be divided among the sources. When more than
two sources with bilateral contracts are involved, transmission losses for all loading
sequences are calculated. A generator's share of transmission loss is obtained by
averaging the shares of the losses obtained from all loading sequences. This distribution
of transmission loss is done in light of sharing the benefit of all and in essence
acceptable in absence of a specific sharing formula.
In a deregulated electricity market reactive power can be bought and sold along side
with real power. The requirements for reactive power in a system may originate from
various reasons. A bilaterally contracted generator may not be able to produce its share
of reactive power and therefore have to buy reactive power from a third generator to
meet its obligation. An ISO may need reactive power to ensure a predetermined voltage
profile in order to maintain system security.
Although the production cost of reactive power is very small when compared to the
production cost of real power, a generator may have to limit the production of real
power and lose potential business if it wants sell reactive power.
A model has been developed, based on the price of real power and real and reactive
power generating capacity of a generator, to calculate the minimum acceptable price of
reactive power for a single supplier in a competitive energy market. This model helps a
generating entity to find a way to charge other generating entities for providing reactive
power support for them. A composite supply curve can be obtained for multiple
generating units. The IEEE-RTS has been used for the model developed in Chapter 6.
A power system usually commits generating capacity above that necessary to meet its
load demand. The additional capacity, known as spinning reserve makes the system
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capable of handling unforeseen load changes and possible outages of generating
facilities or other facilities. Spinning reserve helps ensure a reliable system operation
but at an additional cost. A higher level of reliability can be achieved by increasing the
magnitude of spinning reserve. An increase in the spinning reserve will result in a
corresponding increase in the operational cost. Utilities decide an optimum level of
spinning reserve based on a compromise between reliability worth and reliability cost.
An Independent System Operator in a deregulated system determines the required
amount of spinning reserve that is needed for maintaining a reliable supply of
electricity. The demand for spinning reserve has created a market and generators and
independent suppliers can bid for offering their reserve as they bid for selling their real
power. The rate at which a generating unit can pick up its load is limited by its ramp-up
time or ramp rate. This fact limits the spinning reserve that can be held by a generator
and has created two different markets for spinning reserve. They are known as Ten-
Minute and Thirty-Minute spinning reserve market.
In a deregulated electricity market, a generator or an Independent Power Producer (IPP)
can sell three commodities - real power, spinning reserve and reactive power. Any IPP
will try to maximize its profit based on the given market prices. Chapter 6 deals with
the profit maximization model for a single supplier in a deregulated power system
network. The objective function of the model is to indicate the optimum level of
production of three commodities - real power, reactive power and spinning reserve
based on the forecasted market price. An IPP will decide its production levels to gain
maximum profit. The IEEE-RTS has been utilized as an example system and maximum
profit and productions are shown in graphs for given market price variations
considering both Ten-Minute and Thirty-Minute Spinning Reserves.
A set of minimum acceptable price vectors have been evaluated and shown in Chapter
6. This set governs the decision of an IPP not to produce anything if market prices go
below the minimum acceptable prices. An IPP will incur losses if it continues to
produce when any of the prices falls below the minimum acceptable price ranges. Both
Ten-Minute and Thirty-Minute Spinning Reserves are considered to obtain the
minimum acceptable price vectors.
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An IPP usually owns more than one generating units. These generating units may vary
in size. Techniques have been developed to construct composite supply curves for an
IPP when it owns multiple numbers of units. The supply curves for real power, reactive
power and spinning reserve based on the variation in market prices are shown in
Chapter 6.
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APPENDIX-A
The figure and data are obtained from [55, 64, 65, 70, 71].
BUS 22
Synch.
Condo
BUS 17
BUS 24
.................BUS1
BUS 1
BUS 9.........
BUS 12
..........BUS7
Figure A.l: IEEE 24-Bus Reliability Test System.
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a e Ine Impe ance aa.
1 1 2 0.0026 0.0139
2 1 3 0.0546 0.2112
3 1 5 0.0218 0.0845
4 2 4 0.0328 0.1267
5 2 6 0.0497 0.1920
6 3 9 0.0308 0.1190
7 3 24 0.0023 0.0839
8 4 9 0.0268 0.1037
9 5 10 0.0228 0.0883
10 6 10 0.0139 0.0605
11 7 8 0.0159 0.0614
12 8 9 0.0427 0.1651
13 8 10 0.0427 0.1651
14 9 11 0.0023 0.0839
15 9 12 0.0023 0.0839
16 10 11 0.0023 0.0839
17 10 12 0.0023 0.0839
18 11 13 0.0061 0.0476
19 11 14 0.0054 0.0418
20 12 13 0.0061 0.0476
21 12 23 0.0124 0.0966
22 13 23 0.0111 0.0865
23 14 16 0.0050 0.0389
24 15 16 0.0022 0.0173
25 15 21 0.0063 0.0490
26 15 21 0.0063 0.0490
27 15 24 0.0067 0.0519
28 16 17 0.0033 0.0259
29 16 19 0.0030 0.0231
T hI Al L· . dDt
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30 17 18 0.0018 0.0144
31 17 22 0.0135 0.1053
32 18 21 0.0033 0.0259
33 18 21 0.0033 0.0259
34 19 20 0.0051 0.0396
35 19 20 0.0051 0.0396
36 20 23 0.0028 0.0216
37 20 23 0.0028 0.0216
38 21 22 0.0087 0.0678
Table A2: Bus data.
Bus # Bus Type Bus Voltage Bus Angle Po Qo PL QL
1 0 0.00 1.08 0.22
2 2 0.00 0.97 0.20
3 1 0.00 0.00 1.80 0.37
4 1 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.15
5 1 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.14
6 1 0.00 0.00 1.36 0.28
7 2 0.00 1.25 0.25
8 1 0.00 0.00 1.71 0.35
9 1 0.00 0.00 1.75 0.36
10 1 0.00 0.00 1.95 0.40
11 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 2 0.00 2.65 0.54
14 1 0.00 0.00 1.94 0.39
15 2 0.00 3.17 0.64
16 2 0.00 1.00 0.20
17 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18 2 0.00 3.33 0.68
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19 1 0.00 0.00 1.81 0.37
20 1 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.26
21 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bus Type 0 = swing bus
Bus Type 1 = load bus
Bus Type 2 = generator bus
Table A3: Generation Data.
Bus PGmax QGmax QGmin V max Vmin
(p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.) (p.u.)
1 1.92 1.20 -0.75 1.05 0.95
2 1.92 1.20 -0.75 1.05 0.95
7 3.00 2.70 0.00 1.05 0.95
13 5.91 3.60 0.00 1.05 0.95
15 2.15 1.65 -0.75 1.05 0.95
16 1.55 1.20 -0.75 1.05 0.95
18 4.00 3.00 -0.75 1.05 0.95
21 4.00 3.00 -0.75 1.05 0.95
22 3.00 1.45 -0.90 1.05 0.95
23 6.60 4.50 -1.75 1.05 0.95
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Table A4: Generating Unit Reliability Data.
Unit Size Number of Forced MTTF MTTR Scheduled
(MW) Units Outage Rate (hrs.) (hrs.) Maintenance(wks/year)
12 5 0.02 2940 60 2
20 4 0.10 450 50 2
50 6 0.01 1980 20 2
76 4 0.02 1960 40 3
100 3 0.04 1200 50 3
155 4 0.04 960 40 4
197 3 0.05 950 50 4
350 1 0.08 1150 100 5
400 2 0.12 1100 150 6
MTTF = mean time to failure
MTTR = mean time to repair
MTTRFo~edOumgeRate=----------
MTTR+MTTF
DU·LT hI A5 Ga e eneratIng nIt ocations am.
Bus Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6
(MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW)
1 20 20 76 76
2 20 20 76 76
7 100 100 100
13 197 197 197
15 12 12 12 12 12 155
16 155
18 400
21 400
22 50 50 50 50 50 50
23 155 155 350
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f U't C D taT bi A6 Ga e enera mg nl ost a .
Unit Size Number of Running Cost Parameters
(MW) Units
a b C
12 5 0.13733 23.27773 30.39611
20 4 0.18256 37.55452 40.0000
50 6 0.00000 0.50000 0.00000
76 4 0.01131 12.14489 100.43962
100 3 0.02203 17.92387 286.24109
155 4 0.00667 9.27063 206.70340
197 3 0.00300 20.02271 301.22318
350 1 0.00392 8.91965 388.25027
400 2 0.00028 5.34515 216.57585
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APPENDIX-B
Case 1:
Profit ofan IPP is written as
(B.t)
The Lagrangian can be expressed as:
(B.2)
Taking the derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to real and reactive power,
spinning reserve, the slack variable 'r and the Lagrangian multiplier A:
8L
-=(/)-2aP-b-2A (P+T)=O
8P
8L
-=(/)1 -2A(P+T)=0
8T
8L
-=tp -2AQ-d=0
8Q
8L
-=-2..1,1:=0
81:
From Equation (B.6)
If'r is not equal to zero, A must be equal to zero.
..1,=0
From Equation (B.3), the following can be written
(/)-b
P=--
2a
208
(B.3)
(B.4)
(B.5)
(B.6)
(B.7)
(B.8)
(B.9)
From Equation (B.5) the following can be written:
lJf=d (B.10)
Equation (B.10) shows that the price of reactive power is equal to its marginal cost if
A. is equal to zero. This situation indicates that the magnitude of reactive power Q
has no effect on profit and therefore, the producer may set the production ofQat any
level within its limits. The system operator may also ask the producer to provide a
certain magnitude of Q in order to maintain a desired voltage profile without having
to impose an additional cost burden to the producer.
From Equation (BA),
(/>1 = 0 (B.11)
This indicates A. will be zero if the price of spinning reserve becomes zero and
spinning reserve T has no effect on profit and the producer may set the production
level ofT at any magnitude within its limits.
Case 2:
In this case Q is considered equal to Qmax. Equations (B.3, BA, B.6, B.7) will be
used in this case.
If A. is not equal to zero, r must be equal to zero.
From Equations (B.3) and (BA), real power production can be determined as:
(/>-(/> -bp= 1
2a
Spinning reserve can be obtained from Equation (B.7)
If r is not equal to zero, A. must be equal to zero.
From Equation (B.3),
(/> -bp=--
2a
From Equation (BA),
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(B.12)
(B.13)
(B.15)
(B.16)
This indicates A will be zero if the price of spinning reserve becomes zero and
spinning reserve T has no effect on profit and therefore, the producer may set the
production level ofT at any magnitude within its limits.
Case 3:
In this case T is considered equal to Tmax• Equations (B.3, B.5, B.6, B.7) will be used
in this case.
If A is not equal to zero, 'r must be equal to zero.
From Equation (B.5),
2A= tp -d
Q
Using Equations (B.3) and (B.I7), the following can be written:
(B.I7)
(B.IS)
Equations (B.7) and (B.IS) is used to obtain a quartic equation ofP as follows:
4a2p4 + Sa2(Tmax - k)p3 + ((tp - dy - 4a2(S2 + 2kTmax - (Tmax - kY))P2 +
(2Tmax (tp -d)+Sa2k(S2 -T2max +kTmax)P + ((tp -dy _4a2k 2(S2 -T2max))=O
(B.I9)
Where,
C/J-bk=--
2a
P can be obtained from Equation (B.I9) and subsequently Q can be obtained from
Equation (B.IS).
If'r is not equal to zero, Amust be equal to zero.
From Equation (B.3),
C/J-bp=--
2a
From Equation (B.5),
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(B.20)
(B.2I)
Equation (B.2!) shows that the price of reactive power is equal to its marginal cost if
A. is equal to zero. This situation indicates that the magnitude of reactive power Q
has no effect on profit and therefore, the producer may set the production level of Q
at any magnitude within its limits.
In all other cases optimal magnitudes ofP, Q and T can be obtained using equations
shown in Chapter 6.
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APPENDIX-C
Zero Profit Production ,Curves for Ten-Minute Spinning Reserve:
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Pri:e of AeactM! Po'tIIlr l"MVARIi') 3 0
Pri:e of Spinning IleseI'w ~Ii')
Fig. C.I: Optimum production of real power as a function of reactive power and
spinning reserve prices for zero profit condition.
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Pri:e of AeactMl Po'tIIlr lfIhIVARIi')
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Fig. C.2: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of reactive power and
spinning reserve prices for zero profit condition.
212
40
3D
20
10
2
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Fig. C.3: Optimum production of spinning reserve as a function of reactive power
and spinning reserve prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.4: Optimum production of real power as a function of reactive power and real
power prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.5: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of reactive power and
real power prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.6: Optimum production of spinning reserve as a function of reactive power
and real power prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.?: Optimum production of real power as a function of spinning reserve and
real power prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.8: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of spinning reserve
and real power prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.9: Optimum production of spinning reserve power as a function of spinning
reserve and real power prices for zero profit condition.
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Zero Profit Production Curves for Thirty-Minute Spinning Reserve:
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Fig. C.IO: Optimum production of real power as a function of reactive power and
spinning reserve prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.II: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of reactive power
and spinning reserve prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.12: Optimum production of spinning reserve as a function of reactive power
and spinning reserve prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.13: Optimum production of real power as a function of reactive power and
real power reserve prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.14: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of reactive power
and real power prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.15: Optimum production of spinning reserve power as a function of reactive
power and real power prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.l6: Optimum production of real power as a function of real power and
spinning reserve prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.l7: Optimum production of reactive power as a function of real power and
spinning reserve prices for zero profit condition.
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Fig. C.18: Optimum production of spinning reserve as a function of real power and
spinning reserve prices for zero profit condition.
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